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ABSTRACT 
As Pretoria grapples simultaneously with its apartheid past and its promising but 
precarious future, an accurate map of US policy towards post-apartheid South Africa is 
critical. Without such a map, policymakers are liable to miscalculate US commitment to 
engagement, perhaps to detrimental effect. Seeking to draw the contours of US policy 
between 1994 and 1999, this study operates at the junctures between realism and 
liberalism, and between international relations and comparative foreign policy theory, 
allowing insights from each to illuminate analysis across a broad range of issue-areas. 
US calls for "partnership" with South Africa must be considered against the 
backdrop of global developments, historical patterns, and current political exigencies in 
the US, especially pressures for disengagement. Discussion thus begins at the system 
level before presenting a brief overview of the history of US South Africa policy and of 
policy under Clinton as demonstrated via official statements, administrative initiatives, 
and US responses to events involving South Africa. Analysis then delves into the sub-
unit level, considering the role of public opinion and bureaucratic process and politics in 
US policymaking. The study disaggregates Clinton's South Africa policy across four 
issue-areas, as suggested by Zimmerman's "issue-based foreign policy paradigm," in this 
case namely development assistance, trade, global and regional security, and issues of 
political symbolism. Issue-area analysis reveals interest group and bureaucratic activity 
in each of these areas, and indicates the net direction of policy towards Pretoria with 
regard to engagement. 
The research found that the end of the Cold War, a reduced US economic 
advantage internationally, and globalisation have created the conditions for a return to the 
fundamental US policy of democracy promotion. Under this policy, South Africa has 
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featured as both a pivotal state and a big emerging market, and as one of a few nations to 
share a Binational Commission with America. Democracy promotion is not free from 
detractors, however, who denounce it as a "recolonisation" of the developing world. Such 
criticism warrants attention. Further, the analysis confirmed the suggestion that US 
foreign policy is more accurately described as a set of policies, and therefore that issue-
area analysis has value in clarifying the net direction of the various threads of US policy 
towards a particular nation, based on the domestic factors underlying policy in each issue-
area. At the sub-national level, issue-area analysis showed that, since 1994, both interest 
group and bureaucratic activity has, on balance, encouraged deeper engagement in South 
Africa. In fact, there is unprecedented interest from sources within the public and the 
government. The Binational Commission stands as an example of this, as well as of the 
Clinton/Gore drive to "reinvent government." On this note, while the BNC has not 
revolutionised Africa policymaking, it has accomplished projects in record time and 
established valuable links which should last beyond the current period. 
The US emphasis on its "partnership" with South Africa may need reviewing, 
however, in view of the potential cost of such a liaison for South Africa. Delivery on 
promises, rather than rhetoric, would be of greater assistance to South Africa in it's quest 
to grow as a democratic, economically thriving and independent leader among developing 
nations. 
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·OPSOMMING 
Terwyl Pretoria tegelykertyd worstel met sy apartheidsverlede en sy belowende, 
dog onsekere toekoms, is betroubare insig in VSA beleid teenoor die nuwe Suid-Afrika 
noodsaaklik. Sonder die insig sal beleidmakers gevaar loop om die VSA se intensies 
verkeerd te vertolk, dalk met nadelige gevolge. Hierdie studie teken die kontoere van 
VSA beleid tussen 1994 en 1999, op die basis van 'n ontginning van die raakpunte tussen 
realisme en liberalisme, en tussen internasionale betrekkinge en vergelykende teoriee van 
buitelandse beleid. 
Die VSA se beroep op vennootskap met Suid-Afrika moet gesien word teen die 
agtergrond van wereldwye ontwikkelinge, historiese patrone en die venneende herlewing 
van Amerikaanse afsydigheid teenoor die res van die wereld. Die analise begin dus by die 
stelselvlak voordat 'n kort oorsig gegee word van die geskiedenis van die VSA se beleid 
teenoor Suid-Afrika, en van beleid onder Clinton soos blyk uit amptelike verklarings, 
administratiewe inisiatiewe, en die VSA se reaksie op gebeure wat Suid-Afrika raak. 
Vervolgens peil die studie die sub-eenheid vlak van analise en gee aandag aan die rol van 
openbare mening, burokratiese prosesse en die politiek van VSA beleidvonning. 
Die proefskrif ontleed Clinton se Suid-Afrika-beleid in besonderhede, deur te 
fokus op vier kwessie-gebiede ("issue areas") soos deur Zimmennan se "kwessie-
verwante buitelandse beleidsparadigma" voorgestel, naamlik ontwikkelingshulp, handel, 
politieke simbolisme, en globale en regionale sekuriteit. K wessiegebied-analise Ie 
eiesoortige belangegroep en burokratiese aktiwiteite ten opsigte van elk van die vier 
kwessies bloot, en wys op die gevaar van 'n te gemaklike veralgemening oor "die" VSA-
beleid. Nogtans identifiseer die proefskrif die netto-rigting van VSA-beleid teenoor 
Pretoria gedurende die Clinton-era. 
Die proefskrif bevind dat die einde van die Koue Oorlog, groter ekonomiese 
pariteit tussen die groot moondhede, en globalisering die VSA aanspoor om na een van 
sy basiese beleidsrigtings, naamlik die bevordering van liberale demokrasie, terug te keer. 
In tenne hiervan word Suid-Afrika as 'n sleutelstaat beskou, en vanuit 'n 
investeringsoogpunt as 'n groot ontluikende mark. Gevolglik is dit een van die min state 
III 
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wat 'n Binasionale Kommissie met die VSA deel. Die VSA se bevordering van 'n baie 
bepaalde konsepsie van demokrasie word deur sommige kritici, moontlik tereg, as 'n 
vorm van herkolonialisering beskou. 
Die analise bevestig dat die VSA se buite1andse beleid meer akkuraat beskryf kan 
word as 'n ste1 beleide, en derhalwe dat kwessiegebiedanalise waarde het om die netto 
rigting van die verskeie drade van VSA beleid teenoor 'n spesifieke staat, gebaseer op qie 
binnelandse faktore wat die beleid in elke kwessiegebied onderskraag, op te helder. Op 
die sub-nasionale vlak wys kwessiegebiedanalise uit dat die aktiwiteite van sekere 
belangegroepe, sowel as burokratiese inisiatiewe, sedert 1994 meer VSA-betrokkenheid 
by Suid-Afrika aangemoedig het. Die Binasionale Kommissie is 'n voorbeeld hiervan. So 
ook is die Clinton/Gore veldtog om burokratiese rompslomp uit te skakel, ter wille van 
meer effektiewe internasionale betrekkinge. In hierdie verband het die Binasionale 
Kommissie miskien nie 'n omwentelling in Washington-be1eidmaking ten opsigte van 
Afrika teweeggebing nie, maar dit het weI reaksietyd drasties gesny, en waardevolle 
kontakte gevestig wat langdurig kan wees. 
Die VSA se klem op sy vennootskap met Suid-Afrika sal miskien heroorweeg 
moet word, in die lig van die potensiele nadeel van so 'n verbintenis vir Suid-Afrika se 
aansien in die ontwikkelende wereld. Nakoming van Amerikaanse beloftes, eerder as 
woorde, sal Suid-Afrika meer help in sy strewe om 'n demokratiese, ekonomiese 
vooruitstrewende en onafhanklike were1dburger te wees. 
IV 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The Challenge: 
Mapping US policy toward South Africa in the 1990's 
1.1 The Research Problem: To Draw an Accurate Map 
US interest in South Africa, indeed in the African continent south of the Sahara, 
has been marginal, at best, throughout US history. Since slavery's abolition, and in view 
of the vigorous competition between European nations to colonise Africa in the 1800's, 
the US has generally had little to do with the continent outside of mining precious stones 
and minerals and, after decolonisation, attempting to bring it under the US wing during 
the Cold War. Consequently, the study of US policy toward African nations, including 
South Africa, has been sporadic and comprises very little of the great body of literature 
analysing US foreign policy as a whole. Within the small subset which does deal with 
Africa, moreover, few studies are devoted to understanding US Africa policy as a 
function of both global and domestic sources, I even though theorists increasingly 
acknowledge that seldom is foreign policy adequately accounted for by study of just one 
or the other of these sources (Miller, 1992: 2-3; Putnam, 1993; Caporaso, 1997: 566-567). 
As the increasing reach and magnitude of transnational relations brings greater 
complexity to foreign policy with each passing decade, any study of US South Africa 
policy which aspires to contribute to the policy debate in the 1990's, and beyond, requires 
a look inside that policy to accurately discern, and bring a depth of understanding about, 
current trends. 
I Clough (1992) does look at both the geopolitical aspects of US Africa policy and (briefly) domestic 
constituencies for Africa. Schraeder (1994) focuses on bureaucratic processes and politics behind US 
security policy toward Africa, with a briefIook at post-Cold War dynamics. Grundy (1997) breifly 
considers external and internal factors US policy before turning to analyse South Africa's America policy. 
Otherwise, the focus of various journal articles on US policy towards Africa/South Africa has been either 
systemic factors (eg, Connell and Smyth, 1998; Broderick, 1997), or one of the domestic factors under 
study here (eg, Smyth, 1997; Payne, 1994). 
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Introduction 
Discernment and understanding are especially critical for two reasons. The first is 
the oft-overlooked gap between rhetoric and reality in the world of politics, between the 
statements of an administration and the policy actions of a democracy such as the United 
States. The second reason is that nations relate across a variety of issues, some of which 
attract more public interest and activism than do others, some of which involve greater 
conflict at the policymaking level than do others, and all of which can create unexpected 
contours in the overall policy picture, or "map" of one nation's foreign policy towards 
another. With regard to the rhetoric/reality gap, most international relations textbooks 
and numerous political journals can fill in the missing details,2 although in the age of 
CNN and 24-hour news coverage via 3D-second soundbites, there is much to discourage 
such study. But even academic publications often offer foreign policy analysis 
conducted on the basis of a few issues, perhaps those which are most salient at the time, 
or hold the interest of the writer. Analysis which takes into consideration the gap 
between words and action in a nation's foreign policy may bring the necessary depth for 
one set of issues, but without considering the differing issue-areas in that policy such 
analysis will result in a map which is too narrowly focused, lacking in the breadth 
required by policymakers to assess foreign policy accurately. 
So, in sum, to see US policy purely as a function of systemic power relations is to 
negate the "power" of domestic politics in the United States. However, to move from the 
global perspective to view US policy through the policymaking dynamics of only one or 
two issue-areas is similarly misleading. 
It is the conviction underlying this study that, given the importance to South 
Africa's future of a sound estimation of US policy, and given the importance of South 
Africa's new non-racial democracy to Africa and to the wider international community, 
2See, for instance, Kegley and Wittkopf (1997), or any of the numerous journals in the field such as World 
Policy Journal, Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, and International Affairs. 
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including the United States, the neglect of well-rounded analysis of US South Africa 
policy must be rectified. The cost of continuing without an accurate map, or with a flat, 
narrowly focused map, is too high. Those costs involve South Africa's future, which 
holds great importance to the international community, including the United States, but 
also the future of foreign policy analysis and its usefulness to policymakers in general. 
1.1.1 South Africa's Future, and Its Importance to the International Community 
The fact that the process of change in South Africa did not deteriorate into war as 
in Zimbabwe in the 1970's and in innumerable other places around the globe before and 
since, and that instead peaceful negotiations brought about a new, non-racial constitution, 
gives great hope to the international community that new inroads into democratic 
governance have been achieved. For these inroads to be choked off by economic and 
political tumult after a few years, or decades, would not only undermine that hope but 
also shake already fragile, indeed volatile, race relations in many places, including 
America. * 
Post-apartheid South Africa still appears committed to achieving political 
consolidation and addressing the inequities. of the past, as well as to maintaining 
economic policies which will engender strong economic growth based on international 
reintegration -- all of which are critical to the next phase beyond peaceful transformation. 
But few would argue that the success of these efforts is by any means assured, or that 
public pressure in South Africa might not cause the government to abandon its policies in 
favour of more rapid change. In view of the increased financial pressure on emerging 
markets the world over since late 1997, calls to reject participation in any "Neo-Liberal 
Economic Order" will no doubt grow as well. These calls come from without, as well as 
*Though the author acknowledges that the term "America" is also used to refer to North and South 
America, it is used herein, as a concession to brevity, to connote the United States of America. 
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from within, due largely to the fact that, despite some "Afro-Optimism" in the late 1990's, 
Africa remains in debt, at war, and marginalised by the developed world to a large degree. 
The Southern Africa Development Conference, the Organisation for African Unity, and 
the Non-Aligned Movement, all of whom have looked to the new South Africa for 
leadership, express growing disillusionment over international efforts to address such 
issues as the crushing debt burden of the developing world -- at the same time that the US 
economy enjoys its longest-running economic boom ever. 
Thus, while South Africa stands to gain some benefit by a close "partnership" with 
the US, there are implications. Continued cooperation may, for instance, jeopardise 
Pretoria's new legitimacy as a leader in the developing world and especially in Africa. 
However, can- South Africa afford to choose to bypass that close relationship? And if 
South Africa continues to take the risk of appearing close to the US, can Pretoria count on 
the US to remain engaged in South Africa, in view of the perceived disengagement 
sentiment in Washington in the late 1990's? While the first of these questions must form 
the basis of another study, the second highlights the importance of understanding the 
direction of US policy under Clinton. 
For, even as US policymakers acknowledge the dangers, to the US and the 
international system, inherent in allowing budding democracies such as South Africa to 
falter, they have wavered in their commitment to act accordingly. Indeed, in some ways, 
since the end of the Cold War, the US has appeared as a giant unsure of its next move in 
the international arena -- here taking a step toward disengagement, there a leap into 
engagement. In the middle of the 1990's, support for international disengagement (or 
"isolationism," as it is often termed -in the discourse4), appeared to take its historical place 
4Disengagement is here defined as a policy of shaking off or loosening cooperative international bonds --
which can consist of military commitments, commercial ties, political allegiances, or other relations and 
which is the opposite of engagement, or a policy seeking to enter more fully into any of these bonds_ The 
tenn "disengagement sentiment" will be used throughout this study as the tenn preferred over that of 
"isolationism" due to the several and obtuse meanings, and derogative connotations, attached to the latter. 
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among the pressures confronting US policymakers, much to the dismay of 
internationalists in Washington and abroad. In addition, other factors in the policymaking 
process seemed ready to relegate South Africa to its traditional place at the bottom of US 
foreign policy agendas, just above the rest of Africa Only the fact of South Africa's 
successful democratic elections, and then the announcement by President Clinton and 
President Mandela of the formation of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission, 
prevented South Africa from slipping off that agenda altogether. Indeed, the changed US 
requisites within a transformed world political economy, the signs of rising 
disengagement sentiment, and the predisposition of US policymakers to de-emphasise 
Africa policy in general, remain powerful forces militating against any stated intentions of 
the Clinton administration to engage with South Africa in a "partnership" for the new, 
post-Cold War, post-apartheid world. 
1.1.2 Foreign Policy Analysis in the 1990's and Beyond· 
Finally, with regard to foreign policy analysis, as noted earlier, much has been 
written about the need to incorporate a look at global and domestic sources into the study 
" 
of a nation's foreign policy. Little, however, has been noted about the need for issue-area 
analysis to become a vital element of such study.5 How, for instance, are South African 
policymakers to assess the cooperation of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission in the 
area of job creation (a distributive issue) as opposed to the acrimony caused by the US 
Trade Representative's suspension of trade preferences due to alleged intellectual property 
rights (a regulatory issue)? Political scientists must begin to recognise the fact that 
foreign policy differs, or the foreign poliCies of a nation toward another differ, in content 
across issue-areas, often because of differences in processes of formulation between those 
issue-areas. It is the net effect of these poliCies which foreign policy analysis often seeks 
5For an excellent attempt at such a proposition, see Milner (1997). 
5 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Introduction 
to illuminate. To fail to recognise issue-areas as critical to an understanding of foreign 
policy, and to fail to integrate tools for analysis accordingly, is to deny the field of foreign 
policy analysis, and policymakers, valuable insights which might change the course of 
foreign relations, and indeed history. 
1.2 Study Aims and Questions for Exploration 
This study does not presume to be a definitive work on US policy toward post-
apartheid South Africa, nor on establishing issue-area analysis in the field of foreign 
policy analysis. Rather, this study. aims to open up an analytically-integrated discussion 
of that policy, utilising issue-area analysis, and in doing so to discern the current degree 
of US engagement in South Africa as a whole. 
Insofar as the following study considers US policy both as a response to its current 
systemic context, and as a result of its internal politics and policy processes, it seeks to 
"cross the divide" between two levels of analysis -- international and domestic -- which so 
often has remained intact with regard to US Africa policy studies (eg, Payne, 1994; 
Schraeder, 1994; Massie, 1997; Connell and Smyth, 1998). International questions 
regarding US hegemony and global economic relations and integration receive attention, 
along with emerging US foreign policy guidelines in response to changed global 
requisites, all of which must inform any analysis of US policymaking toward South 
Africa. An outline of Clinton's policy statements on South Africa follows, as well as 
discussion of US policy actions in the form of initiatives on South Africa and responses 
to events involving South Africa. Against that backdrop, sub-state level analysis 
examines two major sources of US policy: 1) society, especially interest groups, and 2) 
the institutions of the state, or, the bureaucracy, with a special emphasis on the role of the 
Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission. The author employs issue-area analysis to 
disaggregate US South Africa policy into the variety of policies evident across the 
spectrum of bilateral interactions which result, in part, from the activity of these two 
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factors. As called for above, the methodology employed will enable the analyst to view 
the different dynamics in play across issue-areas, and then to reaggregate these to gain a 
more accurate picture of US policy overall. 
The questions which this exploratory study of US policy toward post-apartheid 
South Africa seeks to address are the following: 
1. What is guiding US foreign policy generally, and towards specific regions such as 
Sub-Saharan Africa, in the post-Cold War period? Is there a "global logic" behind 
US policy in the 1990s? 
2. With regard to US policy towards South Africa, is there one, unified policy, or, as 
earlier suggested, are there several policies which differ in tone and even in 
direction, depending on the sorts of issues at stake? 
3. Does issue-area analysis assist in discerning and understanding more deeply US 
South Africa policy in the post-apartheid period? 
4. What are the issues in US South Africa policy? What are the implications of 
public interest group and bureaucratic activity for policymaking in different issue-
areas? 
5. What is the significance of the GorelMbeki Binational Commission? Has this 
policy innovation under Clinton changed the way in which policy is made and 
implemented with regard to South Africa? 
6. What is the likelihood of disengagement becoming a salient feature of US foreign 
policy in the near future? Is the US disengaging from South Africa (and from 
Africa in general), as is sometimes suggested? Where does South Africa fit, if at 
all, into US foreign policy priorities in the 1990's? 
7. What continuities or discontinuities from earlier periods have carried over into US 
South Africa policy in the 1990's? What can be said about future directions of US 
South Africa policy? 
With these questions In mind, the following framework is established for 
exploring the content and context of US South Africa policy in the post-apartheid period. 
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1.3 A Framework for Analysis 
1.3.1 T enns of Reference and Periodisation 
The questions above all relate to the question inferred in the title of this 
dissertation: Where does US policy toward post-apartheid South Africa feature on the 
spectrum of possibilities between "partnership" and disengagement at the end of the 
1990's? As these two words, partnership and disengagement, are the operative tenns of 
reference for this study, it is important to clarify their definitions at the outset. As noted 
earlier, the tenn disengagement, for the purposes of this study, is defined as a policy of 
shaking off or loosening cooperative international bonds -- which can consist of military 
commitments, commercial ties, political allegiances, or other relations, and is the 
opposite of engagement, or a policy seeking to enter more fully into any of these bonds. 
"Partnership," a tenn intentionally borrowed from the Clinton administration 
pronouncements on its policy toward post-apartheid South Africa, connotes a high level 
of cooperative engagement, even a consensus on common goals and how to achieve them, 
perhaps by working together. 
The period beginning in 1994 was chosen as the focus of the following study for 
the simple reason that, before the election of Nelson Mandela as President in the 
reconstituted South Africa, the only articulated US policy toward post-apartheid South 
Africa -- besides that inherited from the Bush administration -- was "wait and see." 
Clinton and Gore may have been ready before mid-1994 to enter the fray to congratulate 
Mandela and the fledgling nation hatching at the tip of Africa, even to offer development 
funding and trade incentives, but these policy actions could not be taken until the anti-
apartheid lobby in the US was satisfied that apartheid was truly dead. Only Mandela's 
inauguration in May of 1994 gave such assurance. The study was conducted over the 
period 1995 to 1998, inclusive, thereby providing the closing date of December 1998. 
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1.3.2 Levels of Analysis 
This study, in submitting that it is necessary not only to take account of the 
changed global context of US foreign policy but also to look inside the US and to analyse 
the dynamics posed for that policy by both domestic politics and by the process of US 
foreign policymaking, operates from the assumptions of "second-image" approaches in its 
analysis of international relations. That is, state and society are here considered important 
in the formulation of US foreign policy. Analysis will move from the "third-image," or 
system level, to the state and sub-state level, in the belief that context is important to the 
task of issue-area analysis. Analysis at the individual, or "first-image" level, is provided 
in brief for further context only.6 An in-depth study of the roles of Bill Clinton and 
Nelson Mandela, or of Thabo Mbeki and Al Gore, in US South Africa policy over the 
period under study would no doubt bear great dividends from a contemporary historical 
point of view, but has been left to another to conduct. 
Recent studies have found, of course, that internal sources of foreign policy are 
themselves affected by changes in the international system, evidence of which was indeed 
observed in this study as well. "Second-image reversed" theory did not, however, form a 
major focus here.7 The present work might be considered, for those interested in this 
theoretical approach, as groundwork for such a study. Instead, US South Africa policy is 
here scrutinised from within. Specifically, that policy as demonstrated over the 1994~ 
1998 period is disaggregated along issue-area lines in order to learn the content and 
directional thrust of its domestic sources. The disaggregation process is accomplished 
6This decision was based on agreement with the opinion that while a leader's "individual or idiosyncratic 
qualities influence policy style, ... many restraints reduce the impact of personality on policy itself. All 
recent presidents have found it necessary to bend strong convictions to the force of competing political 
pressures, because successful presidential performance requires a willingess to satisfy political constituents 
at home and abroad" (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1996: 547-8). 
7The term "second-image reversed" was introduced by Peter Gourevitch (1978). See also the volume 
edited by Robert O. Keohane and Helen v. Milner (1996), as well as Caporaso (1997). 
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using a typology based on William Zimmerman's "issue-based foreign policy paradigm" 
(Zimmerman, 1973: 1208). 
Such a dual emphasis -- on global and domestic sources of US foreign policy --
places this study at two critical junctures: firstly, at the juncture between the realist and 
the liberal schools of thought, and secondly, at that between foreign policy analysis and 
the study of comparative politics. 
1.3.2.1 The Realist/Liberal Juncture 
With regard to the realist/liberal juncture, as current developments in the 
international political economy increasingly challenge several -- but not all -- of the 
propositions of realism, there is a growing need to explore the overlap between the two 
approaches. For many contemporary theorists, it seems that "realism and liberalism have 
always been in conversation; it is hard to imagine one without the other" (Rosenthal, 
1995: 324). Even earlier, there was growing acknow,ledgement that "the sharp opposition 
between realist and liberal theories is overstated," and that "in fact, the 1\:"0 approaches 
can be complementary" (Keohane and Nye, 1989: xi). 
Much of the following analysis would place this study squarely in the liberal' 
school of thought except for the fact of certain premises borrowed from the realist school. 
These premises are that states (which are, however, not considered unitary) are most 
likely to act in their own (albeit aggregated) interests, and that building international 
relations on more idealistic views about human motivations is bound to lead, at best, to 
disappointment, and at worst, to conflict. This study is not about to suggest that the US 
and South Africa are likely to go to war, only that the bilateral relationship must be seen 
to be constructed on national self-interest, in both cases, for any effective analysis to 
occur. That should not be seen to preclude discussion of what might be, or "ought" to be, 
however. In the words of another analyst, "the normative nature of the problem is not 
dissolved by suggesting that the actors always do (and will) act according to their 
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respective self-interests," because· "what is to count as self-interest is partially determined 
by normative considerations. [When one nation asserts a policy,] ... part of what is being 
asserted is that [a] particular interest ought to be ... defended. (Frost, 1983: 8-9). 
Perhaps most important for the purposes of this study, however, IS that 
contemporary developments such as "transnational"s relations could be expected to lead 
to "new definitions of interest" (Keohane and Nye, 1989: xi). If policymakers, and their 
publics, could begin to see that global and national interests are often overlapping, as they 
did after the Great Depression of the 1930's when protectionism was largely (though not 
entirely) discredited, and as they increasingly perceive in issues of environmental 
degradation in the 1990's, than the proclivity of states to act in their own interests will 
hopefully begin to bring their policies increasingly in line with the interests of other 
nations, a state of affairs that would surely support the notion of "international 
cooperation as the continuation of domestic politics by other means" (Milner, 1997: 246). 
While evidence to support optimism that such cooperation is imminent is indeed sparse 
(Milner, 1997: 251), there does appear to be signs that the longer-term, broader 
perspective on national interest is gaining credence in some quarters.9 
The following analysis, then, might best be considered to be based on a 
modification of realist theory. Realist theory is firstly modified in that, unlike classical 
realism, military issues are not considered most important but rather feature among the 
most important of international issues, along with economic and "new security" concerns 
such as environmental degradation, international crime and terrorism, and the threat of 
pandemics of infectious disease. Secondly, unlike realism, this study differentiates 
SSy "transnational" this study refers to the "multiple channels of contact among societies," that Keohane 
and Nye refer to as the third aspect (after the minor role of military force, and an absence of hierarchy 
among issues) of their theory of complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 33). 
9The passage ofNAFTA, of the European Union's Charter, of the Convention to Eliminate Discrimination 
against Women, and of several international environmental treaties, are a few examples. While not all of 
these have been ratified by the US, the fact of their existence and of continued (and increasingly respected 
and institutionalised) transnational campaigns on their behalf does support greater optimism. 
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between issue-areas in expected policy outcomes. The power of a state like the US will 
not necessarily translate into an ability to assert its will in the international arena every 
time it wishes to do so, for instance, as coalitions of less powerful states can make 
enforcement of the US' will too politically costly (as when Pretoria disregards US 
displeasure over South Africa's friendly relations with Libya). And thirdly, the 
transnational relations that have mushroomed even further with the development of the 
Internet and the "world wide web" can undermine stated US policy to an increasing 
degree, in that independent US actors, whether from the legislature or the business 
community, can blur the picture of US intentions and lines of authority by either 
expressing different US goals, or acting according to different goals. The example of 
national legislators, churches, civic groups and several municipal pension fund managers 
across America denying support for the US policy of "constructive engagement" with 
apartheid South Africa in the 1980's is a case in point. Ultimately, government policy as 
enunciated and acted upon by the administration remains the framework of government-
to-government relations. But unless administrations take into account the impact of the 
many transnational links in bilateral relations, often effected through domestic factors 
such as interest groups and bureaucracies, that policy will become increasingly ineffective 
-- or, very occasionally, overturned by congressional action, as in the case, again, of 
"constructive engagement" and US sanctions against South Africa. 
Such modifications allow the following discussion to steer away from the realist 
preoccupation with theories such as Hegemonic Stability Theory (Kindleberger, 1973, 
Gilpin, 1975; Isaak, 1991), or those dealing with regime analysis (Krasner, 1983; 
Keohane, 1984), which deal solely with system level analysis. The concepts of hegemony 
and regimes remain Important, but in view of the increasing globalisation, or widening 
and deepening of relations between and across the boundaries of the world's nation-states, 
and of the changed nature of security threats at the end of the twentieth century, both 
foreign policy analysis and formulation require fresh thinking. 
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On the other hand, neither does the above modifications of realism steer 
discussion into the preoccupations of "complex interdependence" as developed in the 
1970's by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (Keohane and Nye, 1977). That theory 
posited an "ideal" (though not necessarily universally desirable) world in which mutual 
(although asymmetrical) vulnerability in international relations reigned. While this ideal, 
as they noted, "sometimes comes closer to reality than does realism," this study maintains 
the importance of the nation-state in the late 1990's, based on the continued force of 
nationalism and protectionism, for instance, and therefore does not share the emphases of 
complex interdependence theory on multiple channels of transgovernmental and 
transnational (non-governmental) relations and their direct affect on world politics. The 
following is concerned, rather, with the impact those -- of state and societal actors and of 
world politics -- on the policies of a particular nation-state. 
1.3.2.2 The Domestic/International Juncture 
With regard to the second juncture, that between foreign policy analysis and 
comparative politics, there is much debate in the literature over the wisdom of bridging 
the gap between the two (eg, Waltz, 1979; Putnam, 1988 and 1993; Caporaso, 1997) 
While there is no argument with Waltz when he points out that "without prior systemic 
theory, unit-level analysis of world politics floats in an empirical and conceptual 
vacuum," there is argument here when he posits the autonomous -- therefore nonreducible 
-- character of systemic international relations theory. This study agrees, rather, with 
Caporaso, who comments that "if [Waltz'] position is believed, it rules out explanatory 
reductionism, that is, the explanation of international phenomena by reference to second 
or first image factors." Caporaso also notes that, "given the incompleteness of 
international relations theory, it rarely provides knowledge that is sufficient to explain the 
actions of the component units," and proceeds to argue that this theoretical insufficiency 
"provides the motivation to bring the theories of domestic and international politics closer 
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together" (Caporaso, 1997: 563). The dual approach of this study follows just such a 
motivation. 
An emphasis on domestic as well as international factors elicit., criticism from 
other than neo-realists, of course. Those decrying the ramifications for North/South 
inequalities of "globalisation" and the US drive to establish a neo-liberal or new world 
order (Falk, 1997; Murphy, 1993; Arrighi, 1997; Chomsky, 1997; Robinson, 1996) would 
see such detailed focus as perhaps "missing the forest for the trees." Certainly, a step 
back for a broader vista is valuable, as the numerous writings at the international level on 
current world affairs demonstrates. However, given these numerous writings, and the 
dearth of analysis of the domestic sources of the US role in current world dynamics and 
their relation to specific countries such as South Africa, the study undertaken in these 
pages provides analysis which is missing in the wider literature. 
Feminist critique might likewise find this study of international and domestic 
sources of US South Africa policy lacking, in that questions of gender roles and women's 
rights certainly rarely enter US policy considerations, except insofar as do human rights 
generally (which, they may rightly argue, is all too rarely). Indeed, the need for further 
analysis of international affairs from the feminist point of view is compelling considering 
the continued oppression of women the world over. The cultural barriers to US 
intervention in this realm are, however, prohibitive and better addressed by indigenous 
. women's movements within Southern Africa (Venter and Funk-Bridgman, 1994) than by 
the predominantly white, male US policymaking establishment (Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright and Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Susan Rice 
notwithstanding). South Africa has undertaken refonns which place it ahead of the 
United States in tenns of women's numbers in the legislature and in other governmental 
roles, in any case. In view of these factors, except through any implicit feminist world 
view underlying the analysis, this study does not seek to address the issue of sexual 
equality in international relations, nor in US South Africa policy. 
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1.3.3 Normative Questions 
The notion that for political science to be useful, it must be void (as far as 
possible) of normative questions is well-countered, in this author's view, by the argument 
that for political science to be truly useful it must take into account exactly those 
questions which will impinge on the "ought" in policymaking. There is little doubt that 
"actors in the realm of international relations are regularly ... called upon to decide what, 
given the specific situation, would be the right thing to do, ... [to face] the moral problem 
of choosing the ends to be pursued in a given situation and deciding upon what means 
might legitimately be used in pursuit of those ends" (Frost, 1983: 8). Recent 
developments in Kosovo illustrate this point far too graphically. 
With regard to the normative questions facing US policymakers on South Africa 
in the 1990's, these are very different from those facing US policymakers throughout the 
post-World War II period. While apartheid was posing a human rights challenge to the 
international community on the one hand, the Cold War was dictating from the other (for 
most US policymakers) the criteria by which allies and enemies were to be chosen and by 
which issues were to be prioritised. The fight against communism in Africa outweighed 
the fight for racial equality in US South Africa policy up until 1986 when the US popular 
will overturned policymakers' choices, as shall be discussed in the following chapters. In 
the 1990's, the issues in the post-Cold War and post-apartheid world have, more than 
anything else, to do with the spread of American-style liberal democracy and the 
sovereignty of the least powerful nations of the world in the face of this overwhelming 
trend. What should the US do in view of the consequences for developing nations -- and 
for the globe -- of the unequitable distribution of wealth which has been further 
reinforced by recent trends in financial flows and investment? Will anyone, whether 
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nation or "transnational hegemonic elite," I 0 benefit from this phenomenon called 
globalisation, I I in the long run? According to one analyst, "a previous era of 
globalisation shows that heightened interdependence and cooperation does not safeguard 
stability if inequality between and inside nations is left unaddressed" (Nel, 1998: 2). 
Meanwhile, as previously mentioned, in the late 1990's Africa remains in debt, at war, 
and marginalised by the developed world to a large degree, as the US economy enjoys its 
longest-running economic boom ever, boasting an effective inflation rate of nil and an 
unemployment rate 'below 5 percent. 
South Africa is different from the rest of the continent in many respects, it is true. 
It has weathered the financial crisis of 1997-98 remarkably well, and resisted the 
prognosis of race war beyond the euphoria of 1994. But how can the US engage with 
, ' 
Pretoria in a "partnership" when their respective economies differ in scale by a factor of 
30? If South Africa cannot afford to bypass the opportunity of close relations with the 
US, is it right for the US to highlight this budding "partnership" when the political cost of 
a close relationship between the two nations is so much greater for South Africa than it is 
for the US? These are the normative questions that must be addressed by policymakers 
in Washington at the end of the Clinton era. 
1.3.4 Sub-Unit Level Theories 
At this point, discussion turns to theory about the making of US foreign policy, 
specifically pluralist and interest aggregation theory, and three models of bureaucratic 
process and politics. These constructions will guide the discussion in the chapters dealing 
with the domestic factors in US South Africa policy (Chapters Five and Six). 
lOSee Robinson, 1996, for discussion of an application of the Gramsian theory of hegemony, in which 
preponderance by one society over others transcends national borders and involves cross-national linkages 
along class lines, to the process of globalisation in the 1990's. 
IIGlobalisation is defined here as the widening and deepening of relations between and across the 
boundaries of the world's nation-states. 
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1.3.4.1 Pluralism and the study o/US Foreign Policy 
A major assumption underlying this study is that the United States is essentially a 
pluralist nation. As such, it is a nation in which "power is shared amongst a plurality of 
competing parties and interest groups" (Evans and Newnham, 1992: 257) who, in any 
given area, will jostle for position until one, or a coalition of several, can "impose its 
political orientation" on national policy in that area (AugeUi and Murphy, 1988: 8). This 
definition intentionally allows for the impression that pluralism is not always "of the 
people and for the people" as a whole, and that there may be inordinate power (ie, 
inordinate access to decisionmaking processes, due, for instance, either to campaign 
donation practices, unscrupulous legislators,. or a sheer vacuum of policy in certain areas) 
residing in one or another interest group or party. Concessions to the theory of elitism do 
occur in the analysis which follows, in that the use of issue-area analysis provides for 
instances in foreign policymaking where, due either to a lack of interest, or to compelling 
threats to the survival of a state, or to narrowly-defined redistributive issues, a few at the 
top of the relevant hierarchy -- whether that be a governmental or social hierarchy -- are 
left to decide on (and in the latter case, pressure for) policy. It is the proposition that not 
all of foreign policymaking is carried out along elitist lines which is posited here, not that 
no foreign policy is made along elitist lines. 
The theory of interest aggregation states that "sentiments at the grassroots level of 
a pluralist society will eventually be reflected on a higher level of aggregation, to the 
point that national policy will be affected" (Beitz, 1984: 55). In addition to the 
qualification regarding issue-areas to be discussed below, this study would add, however, 
that sentiments must be vocalised -- whether through polls or protests -- and like-minded 
citizens organised, before national policy is likely to be specifically affected by that 
sentiment. The US Constitution itself protects the right to "petition the Government for 
redress of grievances," and the practice in the US of seeking to change policy (or, lobby) 
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in line with the aggregated interests of an interest group apparently predates even the 
constitution (Eastman, 1977: 4). Interest groups and political parties play an important 
role in aggregating policy preferences of the US public, and would appear more effective 
than public opinion polls in communicating those preferences regarding specific policies 
to policymakers (Kull et aI, 1997: 178), even as polling has become increasingly frequent 
and more sophisticated since the end of the second World War. 
Effective communication of aggregated preferences becomes especially important 
in light of the historical disdain with which many foreign policymakers have viewed the 
public at large when it comes to matters external. Public opinion, specifically, was long 
deemed by the "Almond-Lippman Consensus" to provide "inadequate foundations for 
stable and effective foreign policies" due to its "volatile" nature and lack of "coherence or 
structure," and in any case was seen to have very little impact on foreign policy (Holsti, 
1992: 439).12 Subsequent studies (Holsti, 1992: Nincic, 1992; Shapiro and Page, 1994), 
however, mount a credible challenge to that consensus, in essence refuting all three 
claims by Lippmann about the inadequacies of public sentiment on foreign policy 
matters. At the same time, other political analysts have seen a greater willingness among 
US policymakers to take seriously the public, whether via polling data or interest group 
activity, in the formation of foreign policy (Foyle, 1997; Powlick: 1991). This may have 
followed the changed content of US foreign policy, with the end of the Cold War and the 
rise of ethnic and commercial concerns world-wide (Huntington, 1997; Deese, 1994; 
Halperin, 1997; Clough, 1994), but surely it is also due to greater information flows to the 
public through such media as CNN and the Internet, as well as the increased sense of 
12Lippman, in two early studies of public opinion (1922 and 1923), dismissed the common man as "too 
fully engaged in the requirements of earning a living and otherwise attending to his most immediate needs 
to have the time or inclination to satisfy the ... assumptions about the informed and engaged citizen 
celebrated in classical democratic theory." Lippman was especially pessimistic regarding the qualifications 
of the greater American polity to comment on foreign policy. Almond, writing in the 1950's, introduced the 
idea of differences between an "informed public" and the masses, the second of which would fit Lippman's 
description of the public. 
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vulnerability among Americans to international political trends. These h:vo aspects of the 
current state of affairs would seem to provide the fodder and the incentive for the US 
public to organise and communicate its various policy preferences. The extent to which 
ethnic interests have increased their leverage in the formulation of US foreign policy (eg, 
Shain, 1994/95: 812) could have particular implications for this study, in light of the 
intensity of African-American sentiment op. US South Africa policy in the 1980's, and 
will be explored in some depth in Chapter Five. 
1.3.4.2 Models of Bureaucratic Process and Politics 
In addition to the public, bureaucracies form an important source of US foreign 
policy, and as such form the second domestic factor under examination, in the issue-area 
analysis of Chapter Six. The role of the US bureaucracy was highlighted by Graham 
Allison with his models of bureaucratic (or organisational and governmental) process and 
politics in his 1971 book, Essence of Decision. While some subsequent critiques have 
disagreed with the premises or the method behind Allison's theorising (eg, Krasner, 1972; 
Bendor and Hammond, 1992), his models have formed the springboard for a number of 
other studies (eg Ripley, 1995; Smith 1994; Hunter, 1982; Brewer, 1980; Halperin and 
Kanter, 1973), and remain an important contribution to the study of domestic sources of 
US foreign policy, especially for pointing out that implicit conceptual models shape our 
analysis of foreign policy (Allison, 1971: 4). Offered as alternatives to the "classical" 
rational actor model which dominated (and, it could be argued, continues to dominate) 
the field of foreign policy analysis, Allison's second and third models, termed the 
organisational process model and the governmental politics model, were each an 
alternative "conceptual lens" for the study of foreign policymaking. 
In introducing Model IT, Allison posited that "government consists of 'a 
conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of 
its own." Thus "governments define alternatives and estimate consequences as their 
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component organizations process infonnation" and "act as these organizations enact 
routines." As such, Allison concluded, governments' behaviour might be understood 
"less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of large organizations functioning 
according to standard patterns of behaviour" or "standard operating procedures" which 
change slowly, if at.all, over time (Allison, 1971: 67-68). His Model III focused not on 
the bipartisan tug-o-war of national politics (as the name governmental politics might 
infer), but on foreign policy as a "resultant of various bargaining games among players in 
the national government," each of whom sits atop a large organisation and is also a player 
in his or her own right, with often predictable "conceptions of national, organizational, 
and personal goals" (aptly captured in the expression, "where you stand is where you sit"). 
These players must compete with others in similar positions of power within the 
government in order to advance the policy preference of their organisations, or to gain 
concessions in some sort of compromise policy outcome. The cumulative effect of such 
dynamics is decisions not by a "single rational choice, but by the pulling and hauling that 
is politics" (p. 144, 166, 176). 
Even given the "tentative" nature of Allison's models, and his insistence that 
further testing was necessary, they do provide a useful "conceptual lens" 13 through which 
to view US South Africa policy as disaggregated along the lines of issue-area. How, for 
example, is the 1997 fiasco surrounding the rumour of South African arms sales to Syria 
explained, except that a bureaucrat in one position of power (the Department of State) 
sought to protect his conception of US policy (warm US-South African relations), at the 
expense of another aspect of US policy (isolating state sponsors of terrorism), while the 
latter was later vociferously defended by a spokesperson for the White House. This 
example is only one of several instances in which confusing signals emanate from 
13Models II and III will together form the basis of the analysis of bureaucratic activity on US South Africa 
policy. 
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bureaucratic Washington to cast shadows over a supposedly cooperative bilateral 
relationship. 
An additional aspect of bureaucratic processes which comes under scrutiny for the 
first time in such a study is that of the Clinton/Gore project in "reinventing government" 
(REGO). The US-South African Binational Commission is viewed, in part, as an 
example of these efforts to streamline governmental processes and bring about "outcome-
based" approaches to domestic as well as foreign policy problems. The impact on US 
South Africa policy ofREGO, a portfolio assigned to Vice-President Gore's office, comes 
under analysis at the end of Chapter Six. 
The fact of the many layers of authority inherent in the bureaucratic approach does 
present some limitations for the researcher, it must be added, as unless research is carried 
out from within the policy process, how can these dynamics be observed? The task of 
piecing together from the outside the different players and processes and politics behind 
US policy is difficult. Insofar as first-hand accounts from participants in the bureaucratic 
policy process and from well-infonned policy analysts constitute "the facts," as gained via 
the research interview process as well as the literature, these accounts fonn the basis of 
analysis in Chapter Six, but must be assumed to be less complete than the accounts that 
will surface in the memoirs of officials in the years to come. 
With these theoretical assumptions in mind, the discussion turns to the analytical 
tool on which much of this study relies for its insights: that of issue-area analysis . 
. 1.4 Issue-Area Analysis 
Without an organising principle to guide the study of foreign policy, the political 
landscape of a particular nation during a particular time in history, while observable via 
historical records and media reports, remains little more than a plethora of facts and faces.' 
To further bewilder the observer, as earlier noted, nations relate across a variety of issues 
(some of which attract more public interest and activism than others, and some of which 
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involve greater conflict at the policymaking level than do others), creating contours in 
policy -- changes in tone, or in depth of commitment to a stated policy line, or even in the 
direction (for instance, towards disengagement) of policy. These contours exist, and must 
be accurately reflected in any "map" of the foreign policy of one nation towards another 
for that map to be useful to the analyst and policymaker. Different methodological 
approaches have organised information, or constructed maps, along the lines of the 
structure of the international system or of various national governments, or along the lines 
of geographic size or location, level of development, or political ideology of those nation-
states, in order to discern patterns and refine theory. This study would like to suggest 
however, with other writings in recent years, that "variations in processes and outcomes 
of foreign policies within and between states" might usefully be seen to be "not between 
countries so much as between issue-areas" (Evangelista, 1989: 147). The present aim of 
seeking to discern and understand the policy of the US toward South Africa in the 1994-
1998 period is well served by such an issue-area approach. This position is based on the 
foregoing discussion of the importance of integrating "second-image" approaches into the 
study of international relations, and on the fact of the increasingly multi-faceted nature of 
US policy toward South Africa in the post-Cold War and post-apartheid period. A tool to 
indicate the net effect of US policy actions with regard to engagement/disengagement will 
give further value to the analysis, as well as some basis for projections about the likely 
direction US policy may be taking. 
1.4.1 Rosenau's Pre-Theory 
Introduced into the discourse on foreign policy analysis by James Rosenau in 
1966 and 1967, issue-area analysis arose from the "compelling evidence that horizontal 
systems reg, national governments] function differently in different areas" of policy, and 
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that indeed "vertical systems" may even form in the international arena along the lines of 
"issue-areas" (Rosenau, 1971: 141).14 Rosenau built his "pre-theory" of issue-areas on 
earlier writings on public policy which aimed inter alia to explain why one political 
system might appear both elitist and pluralist in the same period, depending on the issues 
at hand (eg, Dahl, 1961).15 Rosenau defined an issue-area as a "cluster of values" facing 
allocation, following on Easton's conception of politics as the "authoritative allocation of 
values" (Easton, 1965:50). Building on that and later definitions, this study defines an 
issue-area as a distinct set of disputes over various interrelated political goods, the 
disputes sharing in common certain characteristic qualities. Political goods here refer to 
Rosenau's "values" requiring allocation and can range from commodities of trade to tariff 
barriers, territory, status or sovereignty, all being items over which policy must be made. 
Thus, in short, an issue-area is a set of similar policy disputes. 
Theorists, including Rosenau, have developed several typologies for classifying 
issues either by substance such as economic, military, or "diplomatic" issues (Brecher et 
al, 1969; Coplin et al, 1973; Hermann and Coate, 1977; East and Hutchins, 1977); by 
situational variables such as high threat, short time and surprise, (Hermann, 1969); or by 
other characteristic qualities such as tangibility, domestic impact, context, salience, or 
dimension (Rosenau, 1966; Lowi, 1967; Zimmerman, 1973; Brewer, 1973; Mansbach 
and Vasquez, 1981). Subsequently, several studies have shown issue-area analysis to be 
useful for the indication of domestic foreign policymaking processes that are most likely 
14While this study does not focus on the vertical systems that fonn internationally, such analysis fonns the 
basis (even ifnot explicitly so) of several lines of inquiry over the past few decades. These include 
Keohane and Nye (1977), Mansbach and Vasquez (1981). For further discussion, see Potter, 1980: 415-
418. 
J5Robert Dahl (1961), ina socio-political "community power" study, found in the policymaking processes 
of the city of New Haven, Connecticut, different compositions of local actors depending on the issue- area 
under consideration -- in Dahl's study, public education, urban development, or nominations for local 
elections. Others contributing to the idea of policy process differing as a function of issue-area were 
Wildavsky (1962), Polsby (1963) and Lowi (1964). The idea, by the 1990's, had developed to the point 
that stipulation of an issue-area theoretically allowed the researcher to link discrete actors, processes and 
even outcomes into a functional whole (Newnham, 1992: 163). 
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to dominate in the resolution of specific issues that arise between nations, based on the 
issue's placement within a range of issue-areas (Brecher et ai, 1969; Brewer, 1973; 
Zimmerman, 1973; Vasquez, 1985; Inkenberry, 1988; Evangelista, 1989; Palmer, 1990; 
Breuning, 1995; Sokov; 1996). When interwoven with historical analysis of the 
dynamics and actors characterising a particular period, issue-area analysis furthermore 
yields insights into likely policy trends, if not necessarily specific policy outcomes 
(Hermann et aI, 1973; Coplin et ai, 1973; Dean and Vasquez, 1976; Mansbach and 
Vasquez, 1981;· Vasquez and Mansbach, 1984; Diehl, 1992). 
While the various strands of theorising have produced different opinions about the 
best way to carry out issue-area analysis, applied at various levels of analysis and for 
different purposes, the basis of this study is the "issue-based foreign policy paradigm" 
suggested by American foreign policy analyst William Zimmerman. 
1.4.2 Zimmerman's "Issue-Based Foreign Policy Paradigm" 
Zimmerman, in a 1973 "research note in search of a general theory," developed 
his paradigm on the basis of work by Dahl and Rosenau and on related writings by 
I 
Wolfers (1962) and Lowi (1964 and 1967).16 Specifically, he sought to clarify more 
precisely what sort of domestic policy processes could be expected to apply in different 
issue-areas, thus allowing the analyst to "stipulate the social science literature most likely 
to facilitate the generation of insights relevant to the prediction of outcomes" 
(Zimmerman, 1973: 1208).17 Zimmerman's assumption in this endeavour was that "there 
16Wolfers' asked "when in the name of analytic parsimony is it justifiable to disregard the impact of the 
internal workings of the state on foreign policy behaviour?" which yielded by implication the conclusion 
that "a crucial detenninant of the policy process is the nature of the issue at stake." Lowi also posited that 
policy processes alter as a function of issue area (or, "arena of power," in his tenninology) and developed, 
over two separate studies on domestic policy (I 964) and on foreign policy (I 967), the four categories of 
issue-areas utilized by Zimmennan. Lowi, however, excluded Type IV (redistributional issues) from 
foreign policymaking. 
17 Zimmennan (p. 1208) refers to literature in public policy outlining "logrolling" (Type I), to writings in 
group theory (Type II), in social psychology and high politics (Type III), and in elite theory and internal 
conflict (Type IV), (See Figure A). 
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exists an enormous range of events ... [in foreign policymaking] for which domestic 
politics as normally understood is immensely relevant," and even argued that "in the large 
majority of 'foreign policy' cases the analysis of policy process is of major concern." 
(p.1205). At a point in the development of foreign policy analysis when the political 
structure of a particular government was "generally assumed" to determine policy 
processes, he also argued that it was possible that "differences in policy process across 
issue-areas within a given state, the United States or the Soviet Union as cases in point, 
may be as great as differences in foreign-policy process within a particular arena of power 
[issue-area] for each" (p.1212). 
While critics point out some' weaknesses in the predictive value of Zimmerman's 
work for the purpose of understanding the external behaviour of nation-states, they 
concede its usefulness in shedding light on the "dynamics of domestic participation and 
conflict" underlying foreign policy (Mans bach and Vasquez, 1981: 40). There is also 
argument that, with context and better operationlisation, Zimmerman's work can be 
fruitfully employed in "focused comparison" studies. (Potter, 1980: 425). Several 
examples of such comparative foreign policy studies exist, utilising Zimmerman's or later 
typologies (Mandel, 1980; Palmer, 1990; Geortz & Diehl, 1992; Breuning 1995). In a 
variation on that theme, and in the genre of several other studies (Brewer, 1973; Vasquez, 
1985; Gowa, 1988; Evangelista, 1989; Sokov, 1996), the following work attempts to 
focus not on several nations holding issue-area constant, but on issue-areas holding 
national context constant. 
In a synthesis of observations by Wolfers and Lowi, Zimmerman developed a 
typology for i?entifying issue-areas in which, as stated by another theorist, "differences in 
the properties of policy itself give rise to differences in the organization of politics and, 
consequently, in the role and influence of societal and governmental actors" (Inkenberry, 
1988: 236). Inkenberry adds that "extending this line of analysis, we can delineate the 
circumstances under which societal groups are likely to dominate the policy process [as in 
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pluralist process] and when state officials are likely to possess more autonomy [as in 
elitist process]." In line with the purposes of this study, such "delineations" can help 
explain why one nation maintains several threads of policy all at once. In addition, such 
classifications revealing policy processes, when presented in conjunction with the facts 
and faces of a particular period (such as how active protectionist groups are, or whether 
Congress is asserting itself in US foreign affairs), illuminate policy directions, as well as 
potential inroads for members of the public (or other nations) wishing to influence US 
foreign policy.18 It is the intention of this study to provide not only the content but also 
the context of Clinton's South Africa policy, in order to learn the implications of the 
policy processes revealed by the Zimmerman issue-area paradigm (see Figure A).19 
Zimmerman's "Issue-Based Foreign Policy Paradigm 
YES 
;/ 
Dealing 
in 
tangible 
goods? 
~NO 
Domestic impact 
symmetrical'? 
YES ----------- NO 
I: Distribution II: Regulation 
\ 
Consensual-pluralisr Conf/icnuJi-pluralisr 
ill: ProtectionlInteraction IT: Redistribution 
~ 
Consensual-<Iirisr 
) 
Conjlicrual-<lirisr 
Figure A 
Source: Zimmennan, William (1973). "Issue Area in Foreign-Policy Process: A Research Note in Search 
of a General Theory." American Political Science Review Vol LXVII, No 4 (December): 1208. 
18 A lobbyist might strategise on ways to move an issue from an elistist issue-area into a more pluralist one 
(where the lobbyist would have more access to decision makers) by introducing tangible political goods 
onto center stage, for instance. In general, issue-area analysis reveals points of access to the policy process. 
19Zimmennan, building on Lowi's discussion of issue areas in foreign policy, placed the four issue-areas on 
a continuum ranging, in value to "decisional participants," from minimum value (0) at one end to maximum 
value.(IOO) at the other end. Three of the issue-areas -- distribution, regulation, and redistribution -- could 
be placed in ascend ing order on the continuum. At either end were the "poles of power and indifference" at 
which elitist pol icy process held sway. At the pole of indifference were issues which "have no perceived 
impact," and at the pole of power were issues which constitute a "threat to the core values of the society." 
He concluded that if, in tenns of process, the politics of protection and interaction are similar, "it ought 
theoretica lly to be possible to treat that continuum as circular and to identi fy and label a matrix" in which 
the two end points reside in the same ce ll (p.1207 and 1208). 
26 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Introduction 
Zimmennan classified issues, or policy disputes, according to two "properties of 
policy": the tangibility of the political goods involved in an issue, and the symmetry or 
asymmetry of the expected domestic political impact of an issue's resolution. Depending 
on the assessment of issues in tenns of these two properties, they were either distributive, 
regulatory, protective/interactive, or redistributive. 
Zimmennan appears to use Rosenau's definition of tangibility, that is, political 
goods are to be considered tangible if they can be "photographed with a camera" 
(Rosenau, 1971: 146).20 Zimmerman is careful to note, however, that an issue might 
involve more than one type of political good (ie, some tangible and some intangible) and 
that the operative distinction is whether or not the goods in question are exclusively 
tangible. Issues involving tangible political goods exclusively, Zimmerman suggests, 
evoke behaviour from decisional actors within a political system associated with pure 
-
"resource allocation," and, following Lowi's classification system, would be either 
distributive or regulatory in nature, with the attendant policy processes (Zimmerman, 
1973: 1208). Both of these issue-areas, Zimmerman infers, involve pluralist 
participation, even if only from leaders of interest groups and constituencies,21 as they 
deal with political goods which can be disaggregated to some degree or another. 
Specifically, political goods in distributive issues are those most easily disaggregated and 
therefore fairly easily parcelled out acceptably to competing parties (that is, in 
20While Rosenau distinguishes between tangible ends, which are photographable, and tangible means, 
which are measured by the extent to which money must be expended to order to acquire the values at issue, 
Zimmerman refers only to the tangibility of the political goods at issue, which are presumably those which 
must be allocated and not those which must be expended in order t9 achieve the allocation. Rosenau's 
'means,' or cost of allocation, may be presumed to be included in the question of the symmetry of impact of 
a foreign policy decision on a domestic polity. This point must be recalled when comparing Rosenau's 
expectations about policy process and tangibility (see Vasquez, 1983: 180). 
21 Lowi in his typology associated distributive issues with a "logrolling" policy process involving 
"unprincipled" alliances between elites with support groups. As this seemed to the author descriptive of 
pluralist activity, given the role of support groups, and appears to involve in Zimmerman's estimation some 
degree of popular activity, the policy process for this issue-area is in this study described as pluralist. 
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Zimmerman's words, to "everyone who counts politIcally," p. 1206), thereby attracting 
participation from those parties in the issue. In foreign policy, examples would be free 
trade agreements, or development or military assistance benefiting the home countries of 
US ethnic interest groups. Regulatory issues involve political goods which can be 
parcelled out with less ease, but remain subject to some disaggregation (eg, trade licenses 
or overseas air routes). Competing parties must jostle one another to change patterns of 
allocation, as there are winners and losers in this zero-sum game, but relatively 
widespread participation continues because there are measurable (tangible) benefits to be 
gained. 
Where intangible political goods enter the equation, according to Zimmerman, 
elite political processes are more likely. Zimmerman credits this to various dynamics. 
He suggests that the political goods in such cases are less subject to disaggregation 
because they involve issues where power and status, either absolute or relative, are 
thought to be at stake. The allocation of such political goods generally effects "classes, 
'peak associations,'" and "movements," rather than narrowly defined interest groups (p. 
1206). While Zimmerman is not specific about causes, pluralist activity is limited in such 
instances, it could be argued, due to the difficulty in specifying possible avenues for 
action or in quantifying short- to medium-term benefits of action.22 Because it is more 
difficult to bring the issues down to bite-sized chunks for the general populace to grapple 
with, mobilisation of constituencies remains limited and elite policy processes reign. As 
was the case with US opposition to apartheid, only when a (viable) tangible political 
option arises and takes centre stage, such as in the 1980's when opposition to trade 
sanctions against South Africa became quantifiably costly for American importers, 
exporters and investors, does pluralist process dominate. Issues involving intangible 
------- ....... - .. -- .. --.-
22Gowa (1988) also notes the difficulty of interest groups in acting in issues involving "public goods" (or 
goods which are not easily disaggregated and therefore bear little "excludability," as with intangible goods), 
due to the "free-rider" problem (pp 20-23). 
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political goods chiefly entail matters other than domestic resource allocation (p.1207). 
Such issues may be interactive or protective, such as decisions about conferring 
diplomatic recognition or most-favoured nation status, or at the other extreme, responding 
to a perceived threat to the core values of the nation, such as war. Or, they may be 
redistributive, such as the current debate over sovereignty in applying environmental 
standards, or redrawing international financial arrangements to disallow unfair advantages 
for developed nations. 
In the operationalisation of the symmetry of domestic political impact, 
Zimmerman is much more specific. He suggests that it is the asymmetry or symmetry of 
the expected outcome of an issue that determines the "intensity of the stakes or values at 
issue," and therefore by inference the degree of domestic contention in the resolution of 
that issue. For instance, "when the dominant perception of all involved is that the impact 
of the decision will be symmetrical in its impact on the values of citizens," a kind of 
"'apolitical' consensual politics" results. By symmetrical he means that "most citizens are 
affected in the same way, regardless of the substance of the decision." In contrast, he 
infers, when there are obvious winners and losers, contention ensues (p.1206). 
Thus in the Zimmerman paradigm, issue-area, determined by the two policy 
properties of 1) tangibility of the political goods in dispute and 2) symmetry of expected 
domestic political impact, stands as the independent variable. That variable determines 
which policy process will dominate. This study adds that the policy process may also 
suggest which direction policy is taking, in the main, and which direction it is likely to 
take, based on the political context of the period in question. 
Zimmerman's approach and issue-area typology are applied in the present work on 
the basis that US policy toward South Africa has many threads and arises from an array of 
domestic factors which are active to varying degrees and with varying effect across the 
range of issues facing that policy in the 1990's. This study, however, makes a distinction 
which Zimmerman did not make, at least not explicitly, in his 1973 introduction: the 
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distinction between interest group politics and bureaucratic processes/politics as elements 
within the "internal workings of the state." While Zimmerman appears to use the terms 
"domestic politics" and "policy process" interchangeably to refer to internal factors in the 
making of foreign policy (p.1205), these two domestic factors are considered separate and 
analysed as such in the· present work. 
1.4.3 Application of the Paradigm to US South Africa Policy 
Four recurring themes in US South Africa policy present themselves from the 
data, both current and historical, gathered over the course of this study. These are 
development assistance,23 trade and investment, security (regional and global), and 
issues o/political symbolism (domestic and global). Issues that lie outside of these issue-
types, this study concludes, are not prevalent in US policymaking with regard to South 
Africa in the 1994-1998 period. That conclusion is based not only on a survey of the 
literature, but also on the interviews conducted for the purpose of this study. 
Each of these themes, or issue-types, can be classified according to Zimmerman's 
typology, based on the content of these types in US South Africa policy. For instance, 
under the issue-type of trade and investment, specific issues will include decisions on 
textile tariffs, or reactions to alleged intellectual property rights violations, or pressure to 
expand trade promotion efforts. This study suggests that these specific issues, while 
placed under one issue-type according to their substance, all share in common similar 
policymaking dynamics due to the domestic impact and the exclusively tangible nature of 
the political goods that characterise trade and investment, as an issue-type, in Clinton's 
South Africa policy. As the issue-types were arrived at inductively, many of the specific 
issues were scrutinised and separated into themes before issue-area analysis began. The 
230evelopment assistance, it should be noted, did not begin in Africa until the early 1960's, and in South 
Africa until the early 1980's. But from the time US aid to Africa became a part of US policy, it has been a 
theme in US policy toward South Africa. 
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discovery that these themes each fit into one of Zimmennan's issue-areas of distribution, 
regulation, protection!interaction, and redistribution (see Table 1), further supports the 
assertion made above that they (as themes) represent the whole picture of US policy 
towards South Africa in this period.24 
Table 1 
The Zimmennan Paradigm and US South Africa Policy 
Matrix Ouadrant I n III TV 
Zimmennan's Distribution Regulation Interaction! Redistribution 
Issue Areas Protection 
Issue Types in Development Trade & Security Issues of Political 
US SA Policy Assistance Investment Symbolism 
Examples of specific Lobbying to Anti-Dumping Annscorl Gaddafi in SAl 
issues from 1994-98 maintain Africa suit vs SA ACRI Afl Af-American 
aid share steel imports linkages 
Exclusively Yes Yes 1N0 No 
Tangible Goods? 
Domestic Impact Yes No Yes No 
Symmetrical? 
Expected Policy Consensual Conflictual Consensual Conflictual 
Process Pluralist Pluralist Elitist Elitist 
24New issues arising in US SA policy after 1998 must not be automatically placed according to substance 
in an issue-type, but must be tested, individually, under the two questions regarding tangibility and 
symmetry of impact before they could be placed .in an issue-area. 
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1.4.3.1 The Four Issue-Types in US South Africa Policy 
Development assistance25 issues in US South Africa policy appear, at the outset, 
to involve tangible political goods whose disbursement abroad has a largely symmetrical 
impact on the domestic political front in the US. This is because the goods involved --
money and services-in-kind -- are tangible, and because patterns of US aid distribution 
have long been established, partly along the lines of domestic political pressures (such as 
that from the American-Israeli Political Action Committee), partly by Cold War 
imperatives (although these had largely evaporated by 1994), and partly by long-term 
policy goals to do with the American drive to spread liberal democracy across the globe. 
As such this issue-type appeared to fit into the distributive issue-area (quadrant I), 
expected to involve a consensual-pluralist mode of policymaking, although that must be 
tested by further analysis. 
US South Africa trade and investment issues also appear to deal in exclusively 
tangible political goods. They are, however, asymmetrical in their domestic political 
impact in that some interested parties in the US lose out to others in the regulation of the 
flows of goods and services. As such, the trade and investment issue-type fits under the 
regulatory issue-area (quadrant II). Further analysis will show whether competition and 
broad interest on the part of US interest groups in post-apartheid South Africa support the 
expectation that a conflictual-pluralist process dominates policymaking in this arena. 
Security issues in US South Africa policy fitted well into the protective/interactive 
issue-area (quadrant III), as an issue-type involving both tangible and non-tangible goods 
and with a largely symmetrical impact on US constituencies. As such, it is expected to 
involve a consensual-elitist mode of policymaking. Regional security on the continent of 
25Development assistance is defined as funding disbursed by the US government for the use of foreign 
governments in pursuing their own economic or political (but not military) development goals in 
accordance with clearly agreed upon project proposals. 
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Africa fits under this issue-type, as do "new" security matters such as international crime 
and terrorism, environmental degradation and the spread of infectious diseases. 
Issues of political symbolism are those which touch on values or perceptions 
important to the US collective psyche and which give rise to strong (but general) 
responses without any necessarily tangible benefits being immediately threatened or 
expected as a policy outcome. These fit into the fourth or redistributional issue-area 
(quadrant IV) based on the asymmetry of their domestic political impact, and the non-
tangible nature of the goods primarily at issue. Foreign policy issues of domestic political 
symbolism, such as those involving an ethnic group's concerns with regard to a "home 
country," or, race relations and official attention to the priorities of African-Americans, 
have redistributional implications. Issues of global political symbolism -- such as 
challenges to the predominance of the US in international political debates -- deal with 
non-tangible political goods and thus would be expected to attract the attentions of 
conflicting elites who are affected by such questions of redistribution -- for instance 
government officials who support a greater role in world affairs and influential 
academicians who do not. Both domestic and global issues of political symbolism are 
therefore most likely to involve a conflictual-elitist mode of policymaking, according to 
the Zimmerman typology. 
The following pages will reveal whether the placement of these issue-types (see 
Figure B), and the policy processes revealed, indeed support the expectations of the 
Zimmerman typology. An additional tool of analysis, described below, will also give 
some indication of the direction under Clinton of US policy with regard to 
engagement! disengagement. 
1.4.4 Indicating Policy Directions: The EngagementlDisengagement Function 
To summarise thus far, this study will employ analysis at the system level to delve 
I 
into international sources of US foreign policy, and at the unit and sub-unit level to 
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"unpack" domestic interest group activity and policy process as a further source of US 
policy. In addition, to offer an indication of the extent of US engagement/disengagement 
from South Africa under Clinton, a third element will be introduced at the sub-unit level: 
an engagement/disengagement function. By showing the "direction" of US policy across 
several instances of policy activity within each issue-type, this study suggests that the net 
thrust of US South Africa policy under the Clinton administration will become apparent, 
as well as likely trends for the short-tenn future. 
ISSUE TYPES IN US POLICY ON sourn AFRICA 
AND THE ENGAGEMENTIDISENGAGEMENT FUNCTION 
Domestic impact 
symmetrical? 
YES~NO 
I: Distribution II: Regulation 
Development assistance Trade & investment 
YES 
Dea~ 
in 
tangible 
goods? 
\ 
NO 
Consmsual-pluralist 
III: Protection/Interaction 
Global security 
Reg ional security 
Consensual-elitist 
Conjlicrual-pluralist 
IV: Redistribution 
Global political symbolism 
Domestic political 
symbolism 
Conjlicrual-elitist 
Figure B 
engage 
disengage 
engage 
J 
disengage 
(Based on Zimmerman's "Issue-based Foreign Policy Paradigm') 
It may have been noted already that, in one sense, the word "directions" here 
refers to the net orientation of the US foreign policy under scrutiny. Of all the various 
pressures to engage or disengage from society and from state sources, which pressures 
triumphed in the period under study with regard to South Africa? What is the path cut by 
that policy in the post-apartheid period? What do Americans as a whole -- within both 
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state and society -- actually intend with regard to South Africa, and are they making it 
happen? In another sense, however, "directions" can be seen to refer to the likely future 
of US policy. Where is US policy heading after Clinton? Does the path take US policy 
deeper into the "partnership" touted by Clinton and Gore? Or, is disengagement the more 
likely future for US South Africa policy? Granted, the path could disappear around a 
very sharp comer in the future, as attested to by the surprising end of the Cold War and 
apartheid in the early 1990's. But many sources of foreign policy, international and 
domestic, will remain in place after the US presidential elections in 2000. Sketching in 
very broad strokes the direction of the current path with regard to engagement, as seen 
from current indicators, offers insight into future scenarios for policymakers both in the 
US and South Africa. In light of the concerns raised in the literature concerning 
predictions about the external behaviour of states based on domestic political dynamics 
across different issue-areas, however, the goal will not be to make conclusive statements 
about future US South Africa policy, but rather to offer some insight into likely future 
directions based on the content and context of policy under Clinton. 
Definitions of engagement and disengagement, it is also important to note, have 
undergone some revision in the post-Cold War period, as American political party lines 
have shifted and economic considerations have come increasingly to the fore. According 
to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, for instance, its survey conducted in late 
1998 among US leaders and the public showed that "economics in general has risen 
dramatically as an important dimension of international activity and US engagement" 
(Reilly, 1999: 1 05). However, while not always explicitly, economics has long effected 
attitudes on US involvement overseas. For instance, in the US the stereotypical 
internationalist in the Cold War period was a Republican who supported military 
intervention but also free trade, while Democrats supposedly sought to protect US 
industry as well as to avoid military interventions in favour of diplomatic solutions. 
There were at the same time elements in the US which opposed free trade but supported 
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military intervention under the policy of containment (the AFL-CIO and other labour 
unions are examples). On the other hand, there were those among the NGO community 
who long supported development assistance (one form of cooperative intervention) but 
opposed what they saw as "imperialist" military and economic involvement overseas. 
The need to state more specifically what is meant by engagement and 
disengagement (or, at least, by the terms in use, internationalism and isolationism) thus 
began to surface long before the 1990's (Wittkopf, 1990:25-27; Braumoeller, 1997:3). 
Several distinctions arose, such as that within the internationalist camp between 
"hardliners" supporting militant interventionism, and "accomodationists" favouring 
cooperative internationalism. Both of these approaches to foreign policy were in contrast 
to isolationists, who opposed both forms of internationalism and chose rather to withdraw 
from world affairs altogether (Wittkopf, 1990: 26). 
Most of these stereotypes have broken down in the 1990's, with Clinton's "new" 
Democrats supporting free trade but generally seeking to avoid military intervention (at 
least until the latter part of his second term), and with Republicans decrying the need for 
any military action overseas without a "Soviet-sized threat" and at times even working 
against the free-trade initiatives of the administration, if perhaps only for political gain.26 
The definition of engagement which holds for this study, and thus for the 
engagement/disengagement function to be introduced below, transcends the more narrow 
roles attributed to isolationist/internationalist stereotypes and remains as stated earlier: a 
policy seeking to enter more fully into cooperative international bonds, which can consist 
of military commitments, commercial ties, political allegiances, or other relations. 
A difficulty in measuring engagement might arise from the fact that both negative 
(or conflictual) and positive (cooperative) interactions are sometimes construed as 
26The failure of the Republican-dominated legislature to pass bills granting the Clinton administration 
renewed"fast-track" powers to speed the finalisation of trade agreements in 1998 is a case in point. 
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engagement. As this study considers only cooperative international bonds as constituting 
engagement (as even military conflict can be seen as a cooperative effort by a group of 
allies who are the aggressors/defenders against a common foe, rather than "engagement" 
with the enemy), this difficulty falls away. This deflnition is supported by the 
observation that, in any case, negative or conflictual interactions (especially when 
prolonged) do not usually lend themselves to improved bilateral relations. Indeed, it has 
been shown that, depending on the importance of the issue over which negative 
interactions take place, and on the importance of a bilateral relationship in the eyes of US 
policymakers, such negative interactions can throw the balance against deeper 
engagement in a downward "conflictive spiral" (Vasquez and Mansbach, 1984:414-
415).27 Such erosion of cooperative engagement may, it would seem, occur 
incrementally despite intentions to the contrary. The positive/negative balance across 
issue-areas, in cases of "expendable" relationships, might even serve as a litmus test for 
deserting a policy of engagement, although this hypothesis must form the basis of a 
separate study. As South Africa is not a major ally nor trading partner of the United 
States, any study of Washington policy toward Pretoria must, however, bear this 
possibility in mind. 
In this study, following on the disaggregation into issue-areas will be a further 
distinction to demonstrate whether speciflc policy actions taken within each issue-type 
engendered engagement or disengagement, bilateral cooperation or conflict. This 
distinction will be graphically represented via a vertical continuum alongside the issue-
type matrix, upon which points above the midline will indicate a contribution toward 
engagement or cooperation, and points below, a contribution toward disengagement or 
conflict (see Figure B). As such, it will demonstrate the thrust of interest group and 
bureaucratic activity, two major domestic sources of US foreign policy, with regard to 
-- ---- --------------
27 See also Coplin and O'Leary, 1971; Brewer, 1973: 106-107, for discussion of issue salience and context. -
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engagement. Set against the standard of the stated policy of the administration, this 
exercise will yield a picture of the effective direction (in both senses of that word) of US 
South Africa policy in the late 1990's. It may also give insight into some of the causes of 
the "rhetoric vs reality gap" touted by several Africanists, a gap which plagues US 
foreign policy the world over. 
1.5 Research Methodology 
As an exploratory study seeking to generate insights and questions for further 
research in a field where little literature exists, this attempt at integrated analysis of US 
South Africa policy using a modified "issue-based foreign policy paradigm," was both 
deductive and inductive. The study began with certain theoretical approaches from 
which, over the course of the research, specific lines of inquiry were deduced and 
explored, discarded or retained. At the same time, consistent with inductive research, 
patterns or theories were allowed to emerge from the data and analysis over the course of 
the study. As suggested in the literature, a "reciprocal relationship between data and 
theory" thus enabled the author to "generate propositions in a dialectical manner," 
permitting "use of a priori theoretical frameworks, but...keep[ing] a particular framework 
from becoming the container into which the data must be poured" (Lather, 1986: 267). 
Finally, the patterns or theories which emerged were correlated with the deduced lines of 
inquiry, and the result was a set of initial conclusions about a "fit" between the two. 
Where data appeared not to fit, definitions were reexamined, and explanations attempted. 
Continued mismatches were allowed to remain as evidence of the need for further 
theorising. 
In order to further insure the validity and reliability of findings to the extent 
possible in qualitative research, the study employed triangulation, seeking convergence 
from a diverse set of information sources. Different sources of data included the 
analytical and historical literature, government documents, interviews, first-hand 
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observation of official bilateral interaction, media coverage, and polling data. The 
availability of raw data under the latter was more limited than expected, but some polling 
results were finally obtained from sources in the US. Otherwise, analysed polling data 
was utilised, and cross checked against other relevant examples. As there were no polls 
directly focusing on US South Africa policy in the period under study (although there 
were a few questions about Nelson Mandela in early 1994), US sentiment on the matter 
was gleaned from the wider literature and from the interviewing process. 
The literature review was largely conducted through the University of 
Stellenbosch via the sophisticated referencing technology available in the library, 
although less systematic review was also conducted in Washington, DC, and over the 
Internet. The major focus was on the literature dealing with US policy towards South 
Africa, with a secondary focus on issue-area analysis in the study of foreign policy. 
The interviewing process centred on a series of semi-structured, uniformly 
designed interviews with foreign policy analysts, practitioners, theoreticians, and 
commentators in both South Africa and the US, as well as over the Internet. Interviews, 
which were for the most part preceded by provision of a precis of the study proposal and 
the interview questions, and an informed-consent form for signature, were conducted over 
the period 1995-1998. Interviewees ranged from US embassy officials in Cape Town and 
Pretoria and representatives of the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to 
journalists, academics, lobbyists from the African-American and US business 
communities, and former and current US foreign policy officials.28 The latter consisted 
28Several American business people operating in South Africa were approached, late in the research 
process, for informal interviews regarding their perceptions of US commercial policy and whether the US 
embassy or foreign commercial service had been of assistance to them in their reentry or setting-up process 
after 1994. None, except for a representative of Levi's Jeans, had availed themselves of the embassy or FCS 
services, and so none (except Levi's) felt they could comment. Levi's had found the FCS very helpful, it 
appeared. The fact that the author obtained contacts via the American Chambers of Commerce, and not 
through the US embassy, in order to avoid a bias in favour of the US government, means that there may be 
more interest in the FCS than indicated by this unstructured survey. However, the fact that those contacted 
had apparently found their way into the South African market on their own begs the question as to whether 
the FCS efforts to attract and assist US business have been more or less key to the influx of American 
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mostly of representatives from several of the policy-making bodies dealing with US 
South Africa policy in the current period, particularly under the auspices of the US-South 
Africa Binational Commission. These included the office of the Vice President, the 
National Security Council, the White House Office on Science and Technology, as well 
as the Congress, the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense, and the Agency for 
International Development and the US Trade and Development Agency. A list of these 
interviews at the end of this study, ordered chronologically and numbered for ease of 
reference, includes several respondents who wished to remain unidentified, and who 
appear as "confidential interview #n" in the footnotes. 
The interviews were structured around a series of six open-ended questions 
developed around the themes of the research proposal. Respondents were allowed to 
answer the questions in their order of preference, if they so requested. Otherwise, the 
questions were addressed from question A to question F (see below). If there were 
questions the respondent wished not to address at all, these were skipped, although there 
was an attempt to learn something in answer to those questions via other questions, or at 
least why the respondent did not want to address the question. The questions used in the 
interviews were as follows: 
A) What domestic political concerns do you see surfacing most powerfully in America and perhaps 
affecting US policy toward South Africa? 
-among the foreign policy-making establishment 
-among the public 
B) How do you see the US-SA Binational Commission? 
- in relation to US foreign policy in general, and as a policy tool 
- in relation to US foreign policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa 
With your insight into current US South Africa policy implementation, what strengths and weaknesses is 
the BNC showing? 
C) What changes since 1994 do you see in Washington with regard to US policy toward South Africa? 
- in interest groups 
- in bureaucratic politics and processes 
businesses into South Africa. This must, however, form the basis for a separate study. 
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D) What do you think about isolationist tendencies in America in the 1990's? What indicators can you 
name to support your opinion? 
E) What specific policy choices or political events in South Africa do you envisage would adversely affect 
US perceptions of South Africa? 
F) What do you perceive to be the major international challenges facing 
the US at present, and how do you rate South Africa's importance in view of these? 
When possible, complementary material was sought from the respondents, as 
well. 
The inevitable biases that inform any research, qualitative or quantitative, 
surfaced and resurfaced throughout this study. Despite rigorous debate and a self-
imposed attempt to unseat a few long-held prejudices about the pluralist nature of US 
policymaking, for instance, basic assumptions remained the same. Also, having been 
grounded through earlier studies in the perspectives of US policymakers, the compulsion 
to come up with policy prescriptions from an American viewpoint, rather than with 
reasoned conclusions on the basis of objective analysis, was strong. Careful scholarly 
guidance, as well as research across the spectrum of opinion in recognised areas of bias, 
have hopefully prevented these biases from distorting the findings to an unacceptable 
degree. 
1.5.1 Delimitations of the Study 
The usefulness of this study, beyond an early and in-depth presentation of US 
policy towards post-apartheid South Africa and analysis to discern likely directions in that 
policy, is limited to the application, with some innovation, of issue-area analysis. 
Application of the Zimmerman paradigm was augmented by 1) incorporating the 
distinction between interest group activity and bureaucratic activity into the "domestic 
political" aspect of foreign policymaking, and 2) adding an engagement/disengagement 
function to indicate direction of pressure from each of the actors in each of the four issue-
areas. 
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The findings of the study are limited by the fact that it does not include analysis of 
every "domestic source" of influence on US foreign policy. There is, for instance, no 
examination of the news media or of electoral politics on US South Africa policy. Nor is 
every exogenous factors considered, such as pressure on the US from the Organisation of 
African Unity to focus less on South Africa and more on other African nations. These 
omissions are more a factor of limited scope than of any derogation of the importance of 
those factors. That fact does not, however, diminish the value of this study insofar as the 
analysis, the author maintains, offers not only an in-depth study of the effective South 
Africa policy of the Clinton period (up to December 1998), but also a much improved 
understanding of important sources of US South Africa policy in the 1990's and therefore 
of likely future directions of that policy. In addition, new applications of established 
tools, adjusted to yield further insights, are useful for analysis elsewhere on the American 
foreign policy landscape. 
1.6 Conclusion: The Key in Hand 
To review, the intention of this study is to exariiine both the international context 
of US South Africa policy in the 1990's and to demonstrate the content and directional 
thrust of two "domestic sources" of US South Africa policy in the post-apartheid period, 
as well as the importance of issue-area analysis to such an endeavour. Special attention is 
devoted to the US-South Africa Binational Commission, not only as a signpost of US 
engagement policy in the present but also as an illustration of the experiment in 
"reinventing government" under the Clinton/Gore administration. 
Having provided the key to the map, as it were, for this exploration of the 
contours of US South Africa Policy under Clinton, analysis will first move to the 
international context within which that US policy, and any ensuing analysis, must be 
situated. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A Transformed World: 
The Global Context of US South Africa Policy 
in the 1990's' 
The world in which US South Africa policy finds itself at the end of the first 
millennium has been compared to a layer cake: a unipolar military top set upon a tripolar 
economic middle, set upon a bottom layer characterised by "transnational 
interdependence" and consisting of diffuse and overlapping power relations. I According 
to this view, the US as the unrivalled military leader sits at the top; the second layer 
consists of the US, Europe and Japan (the three together accounting for two-thirds of the 
world's economic product); and the complex web of links across national boundaries, 
spurred by booming world trade in goods and finance and the new fluidity of the post-
Cold War world, comprises the third and bottom tier. 
At the end of the 1990's, however, some would argue that the top layer is no 
longer military but economic,2 that the sustained growth of the US economy, ~ombined 
with fluctuating European indicators and the economic crisis in Japan, has left the US 
unrivalled there as well (Brzezinski, 1997: 24; Zuckennan, 1998: 31), and that the 
possibility of the third, bottom layer imploding in a "global crisis of capitalism" is not 
only all too real,3 but gravely challenges much previous theory about the world and the 
power relations that exist therein (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 23). 
I See Joseph Nye's "layer cake" illustration (Nye, 1992: 88). 
2Steel, Ronald. "A New Realism." World Policy Journal Vol XIV No 2 (Summer 1997):3; Sanger, David 
E. "Foreign Relations: Money Talks, Policy Walks. War. Peace. Aid. All Issues Are Trade Issues." New 
York Times (I5 January 1995): E-I; and, Friedman, Thomas L. "Yesterday's Man." New York Times (19 
March 1995): E-15. 
3See Roche, David. "This is not 1929: The global crisis of capitalism will be painful but not disastrous." 
Time (26 October 1998): 62. 
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Indeed, the proposition of a renewed American hegemony at the end of the 
twentieth century does seem increasingly irrelevant in light of the generally recognised 
fundamental and irreversible intertwining of the world's nations over the last fifty years. 
As the one nation in a position of military, economic and (in the vacuum left by the 
demise of communism) apparent ideological primacy, it is true that the US might have the 
resources to shut out international threats of military intervention, economic competition, 
and even cultural antipathy. But no nation has the power to escape global warming, 
oceanic despoliation, nuclear winter, or (short of prohibiting world travel) pandemics of 
as yet undetected infectious diseases, all of which loom large, and which would loom 
larger still in a future of unacknowledged international mutual vulnerability. In short, 
even given the asymmetry of that mutual vulnerability, some form of "partnership" 
between the world's nation-states would seem a matter of rather more short-term and 
overriding national interest than previously recognised by geostrategists the world over. 
Realists have been forced by intellectual integrity to confront the "new" reality of 
the world in the 1990's. Power, or at least military, economic, and ideological power, 
cannot be seen any longer as the only determinant of a country's good fortune. 
Interdependence -- the situation of asymmetrical mutual vulnerability referred to above --
has begun to touch even the most "powerful" nations as the United States. Due to these 
developments, as discussed in the introduction, this study is based on a modification of 
realist theory which seeks to address aspects of international relations which do not 
feature in classical and neorealist theory. Specifically, although maintaining the realist 
premise that self-interest remains the motivating factor behind national behaviour, this 
study agrees with three statements posited in the theory of "complex interdependence" 
first articulated by Keohane and Nye in the late 1970's. These are that 1) military issues 
are not most important but rather feature among the most important of international 
issues, along with economic, new security and other concerns; 2) military power is not 
assumed to guarantee outcomes in every situation; and 3) the "transnational" relations that 
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have blurred lines within and between nation states affect policy outcomes, as do other 
domestic factors. 
2.1 New Requisites: Three Factors 
While differences continue among theorists about the impact of such thinking, 
beyond dispute is the fact that there has been a transformation in the state of world affairs 
at the end of the twentieth century. Underlying that transformation, and central to 
changing US foreign policy agendas, have been three major factors. These are, presented 
in no particular order: 1) the advent of a unipolar world, 2) a reduced US economic 
advantage over other leading economies relative to the immediate post-World War II era, 
and 3) globalisation -- or the widening and deepening of relations between and across the 
boundaries of the world's nation-states. The result has been a new set of requisites in. a 
world hardly recognisable to the US foreign policymaking establishment. Each of these 
systemic factors has implications for US policy in general; each has implications for US 
policy towards South Africa in particular. 
With the foregoing discussion of modified realism in view, the analysis moves to 
these three factors in the international political economy of· the 1990's which underlie 
changed US foreign policy. 
2.1.1 Factor I: The Advent ofUnipolarity* 
Unipolarity arrived. It was not expected, as such, at such short notice. And US 
foreign policy has yet truly to recover. The United States may, in fact, find a multipolar 
world dawning before it does recover, as economic considerations rise in the estimation 
-----------------------
*The concept of polarity, which during the Cold War was used to describe the magnetism of the competing 
preponderant military entities of the international system over their respective "satellites," is less accurate a 
metaphor where there is only one such state and nations are no longer perceived as "orbiting" around 
opposing guarantors. Nevertheless, as the sudden demise of the Soviet Union has left·the US with the 
legacy of security obligations and attitudes spawned during the Cold War, polarity remains, for the time 
being, a useful concept. 
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of a nation's power and as the overlapping security concerns of the twenty-first century 
begin to erode the importance of military competition between states. 
2.1.1.1 Soviet Disintegration 
With major implications for the international system and within a matter of 
months, the Soviet Union, representing for the US the threat of communist aggression in 
the international system -- disintegrated in the early 1990's and with it, the policy 
framework that had underpinned US foreign policy since the end of the second World 
War. Gone were the clear imperatives of the Cold War that had directed American 
foreign policy and US international relations the world over. In the place of those 
imperatives arose a confusing plethora of competing regional priorities, economic trends 
and political crises, and the need for new tools of foreign policy with which to approach 
the several new security concerns of the new era. 
The end of the bipolar world that had existed In the international system 
throughout the second half of the twentieth century was evident by 1989 when the Berlin 
Wall fell without Soviet resistance. The subsequent process of democratisation in the 
nations behind the Iron Curtain led to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and, by 1992, to 
the break up of the Soviet Union. Even before that, when conservatives seeking to 
maintain communist rule in Moscow attempted a coup in August 1991, their failure 
signalled the end of the communist experiment throughout the world, Africa included. 
Although the reinstated Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev would not survive the 
tumultuous changes in Soviet politics a further year, his policies of glasnost and 
perestroika had ushered in a new era in international politics: a unipolar world. 
2.1.1.2 Security Challenges in the 1990's 
The US, militarily unmatched the world over but with its economy brought 
somewhat down to size and its influence in world affairs in a commensurate condition, 
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became a lone -- some would say reluctant5 -- global hegemon. For a time, there was talk 
of a new, "kinder, gentler" world order in which old animosities and the threat of nuclear 
war would no longer take centre stage. But world events would soon dispel such 
optimism. The prospect of political anarchy in the disintegrating Soviet Union gave rise 
to the spectre of massive unregulated nuclear arsenals. The outbreak of brutal internecine 
fighting in the former Yugoslavia, the intractability of warlord conflict in Somalia, and 
genocide in Rwanda all seemed to defy international solution. In the midst of this 
"chaos," there seemed little will to act on the part of the United States. The United 
Nations and its peacekeeping forces, already overextended, came under further demands, 
even as the US, its largest donor, squabbled internally over its UN dues arrears. With 
foreign aid in general disrepute, the non-governmental organisations attempting to 
address the social ramifications of conflict around the globe fell further behind. At the 
same time, organised crime took advantage of newly opened economies, pandemics 
became an increasing threat, and international terrorism struck within America itself, 
posing new security concerns which challenged traditional military approaches to 
security. And the US, apparently adrift without a rival, threatened to withdraw back into 
"Fortress America" in the face of its own domestic political requisites. 
However, whether through the enlightened self-interest of a hegemon seeking to 
preserve the status quo, the largess claimed by two successive Clinton administrations,6 
or the realisation that with or without their government, Americans would remain 
engaged internationally, the US policymakers had to some degree stepped out of their 
domestically-preoccupied mood by the late 1990's. With international disengagement no 
longer a viable option but the emerging American foreign policy consensus far from 
clear, a few specific security goals have become evident. 
5See Haas, Richard (1997). The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War. Washington, DC: 
Council on Foreign Relations. 
6See, for instance, remarks from Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (1995: 373), and from Secretary 
of State Madeleine Albright (1996: 11). 
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2.1.1.3 US Security Goals in the 1990's 
Nuclear weapons remain central to US security policy. With the fading of the 
Cold War policy of nuclear deterrence, US geostrategists turned to focus on the 
imperative to halt nuclear proliferation, especially in view of the nuclear arsenal left 
behind after Soviet dissolution. However, at the same time, under the "Stockpile 
Stewardship Programme" the US pledged to spend $45 billion over the next ten years on 
computer simulation and "sub-critical" nuclear testing for the purpose of developing 
further its own nuclear arsenal in anticipation of possible threats in the next century. In 
the meantime, the US has for the most part sought to control international processes in 
this area which have produced both the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 
signed by 149 nations since September 1996, and the review and extension a year earlier 
of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1967, during which South Africa played a 
major role in obtaining several new signatures.7 The subsequent testing of nuclear 
devices by India and Pakistan in mid 1998 elicited strong criticism from the US, in spite 
of the fact that Clinton has yet to receive Senate approval for final ratification of the 
CTBT. Strong incentives exist for American policymakers to encourage South Africa to 
again wield its moral authority in this field, gained by being the first nation to renounce 
nuclear weapons and destroy its stockpiles. Opportunity for such influence exists, 
especially in the fact of South Africa's three-year chairmanship of the reinvigorated Non-
Aligned Movement, beginning in 1998, and the leverage it has as such to bring India and 
Pakistan, both NAM members, back into the international fold. On the other hand, in 
light of the fodder the tests in South Asia presented to US congressional conservatives, 
eager to reincarnate Reagan's Star Wars programme, the damage may already have been 
7For fuller discussion of US policy and of South Africa's role, see Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen, 
1998: 11-14. 
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done.8 More bipartisan support exists for US leadership in gammg international 
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, which President Clinton 
specifically mentioned, along with nuclear weapons, in his general State of the Union 
address to ajoint session of Congress in February 1997.9 
In terms of conventional weapons, as with other major military powers the US 
now appears to be aiming at an increased capacity to wage conventional, short-term wars 
to effectively contain regional conflicts, and has adjusted defence spending accordingly. 10 
In regions where perceived strategic interests are relatively minor, such as in Africa, 
American efforts are directed at encouraging regional powers to take responsibility for 
containing local conflict -- relieving, among other things, the burden on the US militarily 
and financially. The African Crisis Response Initiative can be seen as a product of this 
line of reasoning. II 
With regard to traditional alliances, however, the US appears to wish to retain 
control over the management of conflict involving North America and Europe. 
Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, following an agreement reached 
between NATO and Russia in 1997 regarding NATO membership for states bordering 
Russia, is on track, alternately blasted as retrogressive Cold War thinking or visionary in 
its provision against future large-scale war (Holbrook and Danner, 1997/98:100-102). In 
any case, enlargement has formed a major focus of foreign policymakers from 
Washington to Moscow during Clinton's tenure (Goldgeier, 1998: 87). The resulting 
extension of NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, offered in 
8See Stremlau, John. "Chance to put India on spot." Cape Times (7 July 1998). 
9See Clinton (1997: 6). For details of the CWC, see Kegley and Wittkopf, 1997: 465. 
10 According to Kull, Destler and Ramsay (I997: 4), US defence spending declined II % from 1985-1989, 
and another 17% by 1993, but "thereafter, defense spending has stabilised." 
II The initially negative responses of several African leaders, including Mandela, to the idea of a US-
sponsored peacekeeping force were made partly on the grounds that such a force could create the 
impression that participating African states are acting as surrogates of the United States. While the ACR! 
has gained more credibility by joining up with similar initiatives by Canada, France and the UK, there are 
still many political hurdles to cross before it is fully accepted. See Chapter 4 for a fuller discussion of the 
ACR!. 
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July 1997, allows for subsequent expansion of US military influence over an even greater 
portion of Eurasia. Whether or not NATO enlargement is indeed "imperial overstretch" 
(Kennedy, 1988: 515; Calleo, 1998: 18) will become evident as the US economy and 
national budget shoulder this new military commitment. 
While no immediate threats to the US have replaced that of the Soviet Union, the 
rising power of China constitutes another concern for US policymakers. Having quietly 
embraced capitalism since before the 1990's, this enigmatic giant to the east is less a 
worry for the time being, however, than the more antagonistic "rogue" states scattered 
throughout the international system. The US maintains a list of such countries, many of 
whom openly support terrorism which is often aimed at American targets as 
representatives of the West, or of the non-Islamic, world. Nations such as Iraq and Libya 
fit in this category for the US, as do Syria and Iran. Relations with the latter, as well as 
with Cuba under long-time adversary Fidel Castro, show some signs of thawing under the 
Albright State Department, however. 12 There were also significant concessions to Libya 
concerning where terrorists charged with the 1986 Lockerbie air bombing would be 
tried. 13 The 1999 NATO campaign, led by the US and the United Kingdom, to stop 
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in the Balkans has been the second test for the post-Cold War 
international configuration (after Iraq in 1991 and at various other points under Clinton), 
but has left much to be desired in terms of international diplomacy and cooperation. 
Unipolarity may disappear as quietly as it arrived, and almost as quickly, as other 
great powers in the international system -- Germany, China, perhaps again Japan -- rise to 
challenge US supremacy economically, and as the hegemony based on military primacy is 
eroded by the growing independence of Europe in the absence of an enemy from which 
such large-scale protection is needed. Even given the enlargement of NATO, the 
12See, for instance, "Clinton eases a little on Cuba." Cape Times (20 March 1998). 
I3See "Albright sees Lockerbie Families." Cape Times (22 July 1998). 
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multipolarity of the pyramid's middle layer may indeed come to characterise the power 
distribution of the world more generally as the new millennium approaches. 
2.1.2 Factor II: Relative Decline and Relative Growth 
In the current era of sharp international competition for markets and goods, it may 
be difficult to remember that at the end of the second World War, the United States' 
economy towered over any other in the international political economy. Comprising 
about 5 percent of the world's population, the US in 1950 held 49 percent of the world's 
international financial reserves, produced 53 percent of the world's petroleum output, and 
boasted a labour productivity three times the world average. Its gross domestic product 
accounted for 50 percent of the world total. 14 In brief, the US was the undisputed 
hegemon of the non-communist world. 
Following the reconstruction of Europe under the Marshall Plan, however, and 
with Japan free to devote its defence budget to improving productivity and market share, 
the dramatic advantage enjoyed by the US in the immediate post-war period soon faded. 
The 1970's saw the collapse of the Bretton Woods currency arrangement, two OPEC-
orchestrated oil shortages which severely rocked the US economy, and a shrinking of US 
market shares in many sectors. By 1980, the US share of international financial reserves 
had fallen to 7 percent and its share of world petroleum production to 14 percent. US 
labour productivity had declined to only one and a half times the world average. US 
GDP had at the same time fallen to below 30 percent of the world totaL! 5 In the eyes of 
some theorists, American hegemony was in severe decline (eg, Keohane, 1984: 179, and 
Kennedy, 1988: 525). Others, however, disagreed (eg, Strange, 1982: 341; Russett, 1985; 
Huntington, 1989: 39). Indeed, by the late 1990's, the US seemed to have regained its 
14Statistics from Keohane, 1984: 196 and 197, and from Brzezinski, 1997: 23. 
15From Keohane, 1984: 196 and 197. 
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economic primacy, although perhaps, in the words of Kennedy, not any longer as "the 
entity whose performance puts it in a class by itself, hopelessly beyond the reach of any 
would-be competitor" (Kennedy in Heilbroner, 1989: 35). Is, in fact, the rest of the world 
"catching up" with the US economically? And, with the turnaround in the US economy 
after the 1992 recession, is America able to truly recover from its malaise to take on a 
"second American Century"? The evidence remains ambiguous. 
In the early part of the 1990's, indicators supporting declinists views were strong. 
The US, for instance, had from 1980 to 1990 moved from being the world's largest 
creditor nation to being its largest debtor nation. 16 With the US federal deficit 
burgeoning out of control and international market share still slipping to Japan and 
Germany, 17 US economic prospects were as dim as its political mood was desultory. At 
the same time, the optimism in Europe and Asia was palpable. 
2.1.2.1 European Fluctuations 
In Europe, growth had accelerated, unemployment was falling, and the fruition of 
many years of work toward European unity seemed imminent. One economist declared 
in 1992 that "future historians will record that the 21 st century belonged to the House of 
Europe." I 8 "Europhoria," however, ran aground on the subcontinent's long-term 
structural problems which surfaced again toward the mid 1990's, after which 
"Eurosclerosis" set in with a vengeance. High unemployment returned and looked set to 
remain. Only the election of new leaders in Germany, France and Italy provided some 
promise for structural changes toward the end of the decade. 19 
16 Kegley and Wittkopf, 1995: 219. US Department of Commerce statistics for 1998 showed the US 
international debt had continued to rise throughout the 1990's, reaching $1,288 billion as of March 1998. 
17 According to Fry, Taylor and Wood (1994): 259, "indeed, in the late 1980's, total annual US exports 
were surpassed by Germany and were only somewhat higher than Japan's." 
18Lester Thurow quoted in Krugman, 1998: 32. 
19See Geary, James. "Now for the Hard Part." Time (12 October 1998): 35-41. 
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Partly as a result of the new international structure, and partly due to declining 
economic indicators and political contingencies at home, members of the European Union 
had already begun to pull back from traditional military and economic commitments in 
several areas in the developing world, including former colonies in Africa. The EU 
announced plans, for instance, to break up the Lome Convention into separate economic 
agreements to be negotiated with the three ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) regions 
benefiting from the Convention since 1975. Such agreements would be on an "entirely 
new basis. ,,20 France, in particular, dramatically scaled down its historical commitments 
in Africa after the new Prime Minister Lionel Jospin decried the "failure of France's 
Africa Policy" in the wake of US-South Africa mediated talks to settle Zaire's crisis in 
mid-1997.21 The Zaire/Congo mediation effort was not only "the first major event in 
Africa where France was totally absent," according to political analysts, but also "marked 
the end of an era for French influence in French-speaking Central Africa. ,,22 
The increasing integration of the economies of Europe and the euro, introduced in 
January 1999, are expected to mount some challenges to to US primacy and the long held 
assumption that dollars are the currency of choice in international transactions. One 
analyst predicts that "as much as $1 trillion of international investment may shift from 
dollars to euros... [and] volatility between the world's key currencies will increase 
substantially" (Bergsten, 1997: 83). Another expects that "after 50 years of [financial] 
hegemony ... the creation of the euro will usher in a new monetary order ... a shift from 
dollar dominance to a global currency 'duopoly'. ,,23 Ultimately, however, the euro may be 
"bad for the dollar, but good for America," as "the more stable and reliable the euro 
20See "ACP summit urges EU to maintain aid." Cape Times Business Report (7 November 1997). 
21 See Walsh, James. "Ailing States of Sleaze - With BrazzaviIle's upheaval, Paris starts to rethink its see-
no-evil policies in Francophone Africa." Time (23 June 1997): 61. 
22See "France 'losing its influence in Africa'." Cape Times (8 May 1997). France has already announced 
that it will reduce its troops stationed in Africa by 40 percent as part ofa downsizing of the French military, 
as well (Block, 9 October 1997). 
23 See Friedrich, Klaus. "Dollar Diplomacy." Time (26 October 1998): 61. 
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proves to be, the more the dollar will be required to show similar sound stewardship" 
(Walker, 1998: 3). 
2.1.2.2 Asia in Free Fall 
In Asia, the economic success of Japan and several other newly industrialised 
countries (NICs) was legendary by the early 1990's. From 1992, however, Japan 
experienced slow growth, exacerbated when the stock and real estate "bubbles" generated 
by the financial excesses of the 1980's burst. Investor confidence plummeted even further 
as subsequent investigations uncovered corporate and government corruption. Further 
stagnation, and then crisis, followed, and Japanese resistance to structural change appears 
to have thwarted recovery in the short tenn (Lincoln, 1998: 57). Japan, with the second 
largest economy in the world at the beginning of 1998, appeared for the foreseeable future 
to have lost its role as premier challenger to American economic primacy. 
Other Asian economies, in the meantime, were reeling as the currency collapse 
beginning in Thailand in mid-1997 continued to spread. Capital flight incapacitated in 
turn the economies of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and to a different but still 
damaging degree, that of South Korea (the 11 th largest in the world), with a speed that 
shocked even the financial world. The emerging-market nations in the region, labelled 
"tigers" for their phenomenal rates of growth throughout most of the 1980's and into the 
1990's, were impelled to rely on special IMF bail-out funds, with the attendant 
controversial structural adjustment programmes, and will most likely take years to recoup 
their losses (Feldstein, 1998: 33). 
China is another possible economic contender in the region, based on a population 
of 1,200 million, a growing per capita GNP, and increasingly open markets. For the time 
being, however, China remains among the world's low-income economies, as classified 
by the World Bank (World Development Report, 1997). 
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2.1.2.3 America Resurgent 
Even before these setbacks for Europe and Asia, many analysts who decried the 
claims of US decline and loss of hegemony (see Strange, 1982; Russett, 1985; Nye, 1989; 
Huntington,1989; and Kotkin, 1989) seemed vindicated when in the early 1990's the US 
economy turned up. Having undergone rigorous downsizing and modernisation from the 
mid-1980's, US industries had regained their competitive edge internationally, although a 
strong dollar and other factors have perpetuated a dismal trade deficit throughout most of 
the decade.24 A further boost came with the dawning of the information age when the 
technological advantage held by the US jettisoned most talk of economic decline, in 
absolute terms at least. In California alone, for instance, Silicon Valley -- an 80 km 
corridor running south from San Francisco and the centre of much of the technological 
and software innovation underlying the semiconductor, personal computer and Internet 
industries -- added roughly 50,000 jobs in 1996 in what has been described as the "largest 
single creation of wealth and economic activity in such a short period. ,,25 
Until the delayed response of the American economy to the financial woes 
troubling much of the globe -- evidenced in a slowed growth rate in the second quarter of 
1998, which lowered projections marginally to just over 2 percent for 1998 -- it appeared 
to several analysts that visionary monetary policy on the part of Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan had broken the traditional business cycle of boom and bust, of 
growth and recession, in the US (Weber, 1997: 71; Zuckerman, 1998: 19). The US 
continues to enjoy its longest period of steady growth (2 to 3 percent annually since 
1992), record unemployment (at 4.7 percent26 in mid-1998, the lowest in 23 years) and 
24The us trade deficit stood at $38.8 billion in 1992 and had risen every year since the election of 
President Clinton. Mail and Guardian (21-27 February, 1997). Worse, a November 1998 report from the 
USTR predicted a $240 billion deficit for the year, due to declining US exports to Asia and other troubled 
r~ions and to the strength ofthe dollar. Cape Times Business Report (5 November 1998). 
2 From Business Week, quoted in "Millionaires typical 'as a sunny day' in Silicon Valley." Cape Times (21 
August 1997). . 
26The unemployment rate among African-Americans, it must be noted, is 7 percent, a difference which 
shows up the uneven distribution of the US recovery and which has some significance for US South Africa 
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minimal rates of inflation (less than 2 percent). Greenspan, however, issued warnings by 
mid-1998 that the US economy could not "remain an oasis of prosperity" amidst the 
turbulence of a world "experiencing greatly increased stress,,,27 and proceeded shortly 
thereafter to lower US interest rates by one quarter of one percent. With regard to US 
government debt, fiscal policy under Clinton and the Republican Congress of House 
Speaker Newt Gingrich produced a $9.5 billion surplus in the 1999 budget, the first 
surplus for three decades.28 
Other analysts acknowledge America's reduced economic advantage, but argue 
that the economic advantage held by the United States at the close of the second World 
War was "disproportionately high". These analysts also suggest that the current US share 
of the world's GDP -- roughly 30 percent -- is more in line with the long-term American 
global share over the past century, and sufficient to retain global economic primacy even 
in the face of renewed competition from economic powerhouses like Germany and Japan 
(eg, Brzezinski, 1997: 23; Bracken, 1997: 17). 
2.1.2.4 Africa Emergent 
With the demise of communism and the loosing of the structures of Cold War 
alliances, Africa, newly freed from the client status of that era, began to emerge from its 
era of "despots and kleptocrats" as the 1990's progressed. For many observers, the age of 
the "African Renaissance" had dawned. Thabo Mbeki's romantic term for the increased 
pride in African nationalism -- and the increased economic growth rates on the continent -
- captured the imagination of many, both romantic and pragmatic. Africa began to garner 
increased attention for completely new reasons, such as the end of apartheid and a 
policy, especially with regard to aid and reducing trade barriers. See Chapter 4 for discussion of the state of 
the African-American community in the 1990's. 
27 See Rebello, Joseph. "Fed 'not averse' to interest rate cut." Cape Times Business Report (7 September 
1998). 
28This surplus, it is important to note, comprises not only increased revenues due to economic growth, but 
also cuts in such programmes as welfare, foreign assistance, and perhaps UN dues. 
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peaceful transition in South Africa, and the 10 percent growth rate achieved by Uganda 
under Yoweri Museveni from the mid 1990's. It also began attracting capital again, even 
if at a cautious pace. US policymakers have become among the most vocal Africa 
promoters, pointing out on every possible occasion the more than 25 African nations in 
which democratic elections had been held since the early 1990's.29 South Africa features 
at the top of many American business interest lists as a potential investment destination, 
and the continued stabilisation of the South African economy under the ANC's Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution policy has increased confidence in spite of US business' 
concerns over crime and certain trade practices. 
While that optimism might seem to have been derailed by the turbulence in 
Central Africa and by Kabila's autocratic hold on power in the new Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, as well as by the fact that even South Africa is battling with falling 
currency values and rising interest rates, on the whole there has been much to substantiate 
calls for "Afro-Optimism" to replace the pessimism of past decades. And while the "New 
Bloc" of four east African nations -- Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Eritrea -- may be less 
than effective in stabilising Africa while the latter tWo are engaged in conflict over 
borders, their earlier unified action with regard to Kabila and General Omar Bashir of 
Sudan did catch the eye of US policymakers and other Africa watchers (Connell and 
Smyth, 1998: 88; and Smyth, 1998: 87). Detractors of this optimistic view of Africa 
fault the lack of multiparty democracy and continuing reports of human rights abuses in 
several of the African nations under "new leaders." But most analysts appear to find 
some encouragement in South Africa's democratic renewal, especially in light of South 
Africa's economic might on the continent. 
29Regina Brown, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, pointed this out at a 
congressional forum on trade vs aid in October 1997, as did Secretary of Commerce Bill Daly at a 
luncheon in Cape Town when he was in South Africa with President Clinton in March 1998. 
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The fact of Secretary of State Albright's visit to Africa shortly after her installation 
in January 1997, and that of President Clinton in early 1998, i~ evidence enough of 
increased official US interest. Still, the relative insignificance of Africa in US foreign 
policy over the decades of the Cold War creates a hurdle to US engagement there, as do 
the negative images created by years of famine and civil-strife news coverage. Total trade 
with Africa is minimal. In 1997, US exports to Africa equalled less than 1 percent of 
total US exports, and imports from Africa only 1.9 percent of the US total imports -- and 
much of that consists of US importation of Nigerian oil. However, new interests in 
Africa -- in the potential markets represented, in the need for cooperation to confront the 
burgeoning crime syndicates that are shifting their focus from Russia and eastern Europe, 
and in the hope provided by South Africa's experiment in multiracial democracy -- are 
driving new initiatives out of Washington for increased engagement on the continent. 
The US appears to hold particular interest in South Africa's potential as a stabilising force 
against armed conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa as well, perhaps through the leadership of an 
African peacekeeping force such as that envisioned under Clinton's Africa Crisis 
Response Initiative. 
2.1.2.5 Lost Leverage 
Even as the US is reconsidering its regional priorities around the globe, such as 
that toward Africa, it faces another dynamic of its reduced economic advantage in the 
wo.rld economy: a greater willingness by friend and foe alike to challenge America's 
leadership role. Examples abound in the years since the early 1970's, in almost every 
arena of US relations with the world. 
Reuters reported in mid-1996 that "there are growing signs that the US, as the sole 
remaining superpower, is having trouble in getting others to follow its lead," and cited the 
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European Union's threat to retaliate against the US for imposing sanctions on foreign 
firms investing in Iran and Libya.30 In another example, the World Trade Organisation 
was due to review US legislation which sought to limit foreign investment in Cuba 
following a complaint of US extraterritoriality by the European Union. That stand-off 
was only defused when the US offered to maintain a waiver on the legislation until 
amendments could be made.31 
The response of other G7 leaders to advice from President Clinton that they 
follow the US economic model of the 1990's, proffered at their summit in Denver in June 
1997, was as negative as their reaction to his suggestion that they don boots and jeans for 
the summit banquet. Le Monde responded with an editorial entitled "Imperial America" 
and the French Prime Minister, addressing the National Assembly in Paris, criticised the 
"hegemonic tendency of the United States." France defied US anti-terrorist legislation 
later that year with a $2 billion French investment in Iranian gas fields, after which 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright bemoaned the lack of convergence in US-European 
perceptions, saying "It is of great concern to us that our friends and allies don't get it." 
For the French and other nations -- including South Africa -- it seems that the issue is not 
one of engaging with states deemed by the US to be sponsoring terrorism such as Iran, 
but of asserting their own sovereignty.32 
One analyst has asserted that, based on the US failure to isolate Tehran and 
Baghdad and to bring Israel back in line with the 1993 Oslo peace accords, traditional US 
allies are now "more resistant to Washington's presumptive leadership than at any point 
since 1945.,,33 Another example is the 1998 creation, against US objections, of an 
30See "Bill and his Elk." Cape Times (14 August 1996). 
31 See Branegan, Jay. "Trading Truce: the U.S. and Europe back off a trade fight over Cuba - and spare 
the WTO." Time (28 April 1997). 
32Marshall, Tyler. "Allies Want Sovereignty in Dealing With Rogue States." Los Angeles Times (I October 
1997), and "'We'll sell to whom we want: Mande1a rejects US warnings on anns deal." Cape Times (16 
January 1997). 
33See Karon, Tony. "US fails to put screws on Israel." Cape Times (15 December 1997). 
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international war crimes court under the auspices of the United Nations. The US opposed 
the court -- which was supported by 120 nations, including South Africa and the major 
allies of the US -- on the grounds that US soldiers might be indicted for crimes based on 
"political motives" after carrying out military duties under UN or other peacekeeping 
missions around the world. The prominent South African jurist Richard Goldstone 
represented many, it seems, when he said that if the US did not "change its mind" it could 
not "resume its position of leadership on behalf of international justice. "34 
2.1.2.6 A Question a/Will? 
Americans, on the other hand, even before the end of the Cold War had begun to 
question the financial and political costs of leadership. The US had, for instance, since 
the end of the second World War carried the burden of world financial stability. As such 
it had been seen to be "willing and able to furnish an outlet for distress goods, maintain 
the flow of capital to would-be borrowers, serve as a lender of last resort in financial 
crises, maintain a structure of exchange rates, and coordinate macroeconomic politics" 
(Isaak, 1991: 18), as befits a hegemon. US willingness to carry on with this burden has, 
however, been called into question since the late 1980's and the wind down of the Cold 
War. With the annual average GNP growth rate of Japan, Europe, China and the NIC's 
consistently outstripping US growth rates (from the 1970's until the 1990's, that is), why, 
some in the US asked, was the US continuing to bear the responsibility -- and the costs --
of hegemony? The US showed classic signs of a hegemon in decline in that it began 
acting like an "ordinary country," no longer willing (or able to afford, it seemed) to 
tolerate "free riding" by those countries paying little or nothing to sustain the international 
34See Goldstone, Richard. "A Court that needs a Fair Trial." Time (3 August 1998). 
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system, nor to "subordinate its national economic interests to the pursuit of political 
harmony" in the world political economy (Mastanduno, 1991: 81).35 
By sheer size of market,36 however, the US does retain a degree of control over 
the current trade regime, as well as a vested interest in seeing it remain liberal. There also 
appears to remain an expectation on the part of other economies that the US will act to 
stabilise world commodity and financial markets, by dint of its size and residual clout.37 
The expanded purview of the World Trade Organisation may diminish this expectation 
over the coming years, however, as do the increasing role of the United Nations in 
peacekeeping and a renewed focus on World Bank and IMF solutions to third world debt 
in other spheres. The establishment of the G 7 in the mid-1980's to coordinate 
macroeconomic policy sought to diminish the US role in the currency exchange realm, as 
well. 
The bottom line is that the US has not lost its economic dynamism, yet it is 
unlikely to resume the towering advantages of the immediate post-World War Two 
world, and thus its near complete hegemony over the capitalist world (which, by now, is 
most of the globe). This is not only because the rest of the world's economies are on their 
feet and expanding, too, when viewed over this past half-century, nor because the US as a 
sole superpower has, by definition, less magnetism due to the loss of a major and 
35Examples of this include protectionist legislation such as Helms-Burton, reticence to pay UN dues, 
reductions in foreign assistance, and congressional opposition to US funding to bail Indonesia out of its 
financial crisis oflate 1997. 
36 According to the World Bank's Development Report, 1997, the US had the largest of the world's "high-
income" economies and its population (1995 figures) stood at 263.1 million, more than twice that of Japan. 
US imports outstripped any other country's at the value of$I,082,260 million in 1995, despite the fact the 
US ranked sixth in terms of per capita GNP. US exports also topped the list at $969,220 million. 
37In one example from June 1997, then-Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto called on the US to 
"engage in efforts and in co-operation to maintain exchange stability so we will not succumb to the 
temptation to selI off Treasury bills and switch our funds to gold." ("Wall Street", Business Day, 1997). In 
another, a WTO official observed that "If the US leads, things get done. It it doesn't, then nothing gets 
done" (Walsh, August 1997). In a third, one economist asserted that "Only Greenspan can save the global 
economy as it goes into a tailspin," Sunday Independent (30 August 1998). 
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threatening rival. It is also because the increasingly interdependent nature of the 
international system militates against such a resumption. 
2.1.3 Factor III: Globalisation 
Before and throughout these political and economic "tectonic shifts" of the 1990's, 
another revolution has been weaving its way through the world political economy in the 
second half of the 20th century: globalisation. An amorphous term applied to a range of 
phenomena, globalisation for the purposes of this study refers to the widening and 
deepening of transnational linkages which exist among the world's nations. Controversy 
surrounds more than the term, of course, as political and economic analysts debate 
whether globalisation and the ensuing growth of financial capital markets is beneficial for 
all or only for the wealthy elite of developed and developing COlL'ltries alike (eg, 
Richardson, 1995, Murphy, 1993; Robinson, 1996; and Falk, 1997). Should or can 
globalisation, and the erosion of the nation-state system it engenders, be controlled? Is 
globalisation not actually rather just an "Americanisation" of the world economy?38 As 
this discussion is limited to the effect of changes in the global context on US foreign 
policy toward South Africa, there is neither space nor time to fully address these 
debates.39 This study would be incomplete if it did not take note, howey.~r, of the world's 
deep, complex and growing interdependence, as it constitutes a major characteristic of the 
international milieu in which US South Africa policy is made. 
38This assertion from a French trade unionist, as well as discussion of other points of controversy, can be 
found in an article by James Walsh, "One World Divided." Time (7 July 1997): 37-40. 
39For further discussion, see Nel, Philip. "The Political Consequences of Global is at ion." A paper prepared 
for the South African Bureau for Economic Research conference on Globalisation and The South African 
economy: a medium term perspective. (13 November 1998). 
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2.1.3.1 High Tech and Growing Liberalisation 
The technological innovations of the second half of this century laid the 
groundwork for the process of globalisation. What was begun with transoceanic 
telecommunications and air travel has exploded -- through developments in, for instance, 
satellite, fibre optic, and microchip technologies, and in the application of these in, for 
instance, cellular phones, electronic mail and teleconferencing -- into a myriad of cross-
national dealings at every level. Facsimile machines enabled instantaneous transmission 
of documents around the world, and electronic mail cut the cost of such transmission to 
that of a local telephone call. In addition, international news networks such as CNN 
could bring scenes from events such as the Gulf War to television screens around the 
world in real time. Through such transformations, the 1990's have prompted predictions 
of a "Placeless Society" (Knoke, 1996: 20) as well as fears of a "transnational 
Frankenstein monster" beyond the control of its creators (Hoffman, 1995: 177). 
The liberalisation of world markets has also been key to the process of 
globalisation. Indeed, in the words of one analyst, "technology makes globalisation 
feasible; liberalisation makes it happen."40 Since the end of World War II, a dramatic 
rise in world trade has occurred as stronger economies have increasingly offered their 
goods on the world market and as tariffs and other impediments to trade have been eroded 
under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade 
Organisation, GATT's successor since 1995. This deepening liberalisation spread wider 
as capitalism repeatedly filled the vacuum of dissolving communist states around the 
world from the 1980's. By the mid 1990's, Harvard University's Jeffrey Sachs points out, 
capitalism had "spread to 90 percent of the world's population, since almost all parts of 
the world are now linked through open trade, convertible currencies, flows of foreign 
40See van Nieuwkerk, Anthoni. "SA's foreign-policy challenge." Mail & Guardian (20-23 December 
1996). 
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investment, and political commitments to private ownership as the engine of economic 
growth. ,,4 1 
This development has translated into a 24-hour stock market accessible 
instantaneously via the internet, for instance, and pundits portend such phenomena as an 
unprecedented equalisation of prices through "global shopping" in a "friction-free" 
marketplace.42 Theorists alternately warn that globalisation threatens to relegate labour 
. to the lowest end of the power spectrum, as unprecedented labour flexibility and capital 
mobility render strikes a nearly-empty threat in the quest for higher wages, or they project 
the disappearance of "cheap labour" as import tariffs disappear and manufacturers 
everywhere have to reach a global standard.43 The "Coca-Colonisation" of the third 
world achieved by multinational corporations through increased knowledge of local 
markets is already apparent, welcomed by some and decried by others. The phenomenon 
of the "unhinged" MNC, located in one nation, majority-owned by members of another, 
and selling its services or products worldwide simultaneously, has elicited increasing 
concern about the ability of anyone nation-state to regulate these mammoth and well-
organised international entities. In fact, MNC's not only blur the lines between nations, 
they also constitute a formidable non-state actor in the anarchical international system. 
Does all this mean the end of the nation-state as the linchpin of international 
affi · ? aIrS. As stated in the introduction, for the time-being, while nationalism and 
protectionism still abound, it would seem not (Drucker, 1997: 171). But it does mean 
that governments of nation-states must integrate the impact of MNC's and other 
transnational actors and processes into their policy formulation and into multilateral 
equations. 
41See Sachs, Jeffrey. "A common-sense approach will put SA's economic miracle within reach." Sunday 
Times Business Times (I October 1995). 
42Gates, Bill. "Vigilant will be able to find bargains on the Net," Sunday Times Business Times (7 June 
1998~ . 
43See D'Angelo, Audrey. "Cheap labour will be a thing of the past, says outgoing Sacob president." Cape 
Times Business Report (6 November 1997). 
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With the convergence of advances in the development and application of 
technological innovations and the spread of "global capitalism," the complexity of 
transnational relations has grown exponentially at the close of the twentieth century. One 
indicator of the increasingly integrated world political economy is the degree to which 
world trade has outpaced world output. (See Table 2) With this convergence, the 
economic stability of one nation depends increasingly on that of the world, as evidenced 
in the ripple effect on several economies of Asia's 1997 financial woes. Clinton, in his 
State of the Union address earlier that year noted, for instance, that 2 million US jobs 
depended on exports to Asia alone.44 Indeed, even the US, "although still the largest 
national economy and by far the world's greatest military power, is increasingly subject to 
the vicissitudes of a world no nation can dominate."45 
Annual Percentage Change Table 2 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Growth of World Output and Trade, 1981-1996. 
Since the early 1980's, the growth of world trade consistently has outpaced the growth of world economic 
output. As a result, states' domestic welfare has become more tightly intertwined as states have become 
more closely integrated into the globalising world political economy. (Source: Kegley and Wittkopf 
(1997): 261.) 
44See Clinton, William J. "America's Leadership Role In The 21 st Century." US Foreign Policy Agenda 
Vol2 Nol (March 1997). An electronic journal of the US Information Agency. 
45See Barnet, Richard J. and Cavanagh, John. Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World 
Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Quoted in Kegley and Wittkopf, 1997: 272. 
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2.1.3.2 Globalisation and Policy Process 
The process of globalisation affects not only the world in which nations must 
make foreign policy; it has also affected the policymaking process itself. Although many 
of these technological innovations remain largely inaccessible for citizens of the 
developing world, change has reached into almost every nation's diplomatic practice. 
"These innovations -- the jet airplane, CNN, the cell phone, and personal computers -- all 
change the pattern of our thinking," noted one policymaker. "There has been a paradigm 
shift .. .In fact, we can expect 2 or 3 more paradigm shifts over the next two generations of 
diplomats. "46 Foreign policymakers the world over find themselves working without the 
limitations (or breathing space) of time and distance that once defined their mode of 
work. Apart from the direct impact of advanced telecommunications and real time news 
coverage on the work of foreign policymakers, the interwoven nature of the world itself 
has changed the content and the process of foreign policymaking. Factors previously 
considered extraneous to foreign policy now impinge significantly. Policymakers must 
now consider that the world is linked not only politically and strategically, financially and 
commercially, but also epidemiologically, ecologically, and demographically. . The 
problems accompanying the spread of disease, environmental degradation and displaced 
and burgeoning populations have been compounded by an increase --, concomitant with 
the increased liberalisation of trade -- in international crime and terrorism. 
Concepts such as intellectual property rights, those controversial rights protecting 
what has gone on inside someone else's head, enter into international trade relationships. 
South Africa has twice since Mandela's election found itself on the US Trade 
46Gingrich made these comments during his address, on "Diplomacy in the Information Age" at 
Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 7 October 1997. Not widely regarded as an internationalist, 
Gingrich was the 1997 recipient of Medunsa's Nelson Mandela Award as an "ardent engineer of the current 
policy of expanding economic links with Africa." He expects the next two generations of US foreign 
policymakers to experience "changes in diplomacy comparable to those of the sixteen~h century after 
introduction of the printing press." Gingrich made these comments during his address on "Diplomacy in the 
Information Age" at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 7 October 1997. 
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Representative's watch list for alleged IPR violations; once for trademark infringements, 
most notably against McDonalds restaurants, and secondly for perceived loopholes in the 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997 allowing, the US 
claims, pharmaceutical patent violations. 
Perhaps even more important than the inclusion of these factors in policy 
formulation, however, has been the acknowledgement, at the highest policymaking levels, 
that these problems cannot be solved unilaterally but require multilateral, even global, 
cooperation. Hence such unprecedented attention in foreign policy circles, for example, 
to the UN Earth Summits of 1992 and 1997, called to address environmental hazards such 
as global warming and tropical deforestation, and to "Cites" (the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species). The latter attracted attention at the US 
presidential level in 1997 for the controversy over Zimbabwe's appeal to sell off its 
accumulated stocks of ivory. Heads of government likewise addressed the June 1998 
"Drug Summit" in New York, where the "global war on drugs" came under 
reconsideration after an appeal to the UN by several international leaders in various 
fields, including former South African parliamentarian Helen Suzman. One result has 
been the international involvement of such traditionally national agencies as the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and the Departments of Education, Labor, and Transportation. 
The fact that the Secretaries of the latter two departments accompanied President Clinton 
on his 1998 tour of Africa, for instance, demonstrates this growing overlap between 
domestic and international policymaking at the institutional level. 
What has been the stance of US policymakers to this process of globalisation and 
the resulting world of increased transnational complexity? In seeking to elucidate US 
foreign policy towards post-apartheid South Africa in particular, this study turns next to 
the overarching terms of US foreign policy in the midst of the world of the 1990's. 
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2.2 The Emerging American Response 
With the end of the Cold War, a reduced American economic advantage, and the 
growing integration of the world political economy, the United States finds itself in a new 
role vis-a.-vis the international community. Several policy frameworks have been punted 
in Washington to fill the vacuum left after the unexpected demise of the world's only 
other superpower, even as America's own influence has continued to decline. Some, like 
George Kennan, author of the US Cold War policy of "containment," asserted in 1994 
that "what you need are not policies --much less a single policy. What you need are 
sound principles: principles that accord with the nature, the needs, the interests and the 
limitations of our country." Other suggestions from the policy-analytic community 
ranged from renewed disengagement, or "isolationism" (Kauffman, 1995), to the 
enlargement of US military alliances (Brzezinski, 1996); from an aid-centred focus on 
"pivotal states" (Chase, Hill and Kennedy, 1996) to a trade-centred focus on "big 
emerging markets" (Brown, 1995). The emerging theme of Clinton's second-term foreign 
policy team appears, amidst all these, to be the consolidation of America's self-appointed 
role as the "indispensable nation" to the expanding liberal democratic international order 
of the 1990's, a theme built on traditional goals and on new requisites. 
Domestic politics and policy processes, as discussed earlier, play an important 
role in defining and then filling out the broad strokes of overall policy guidelines in US 
foreign policy. Discussion of those domestic factors follow in subsequent chapters, after 
the following brief overview of the major themes that have characterised the post-Cold 
War foreign policy debate. These themes, or proposed policy frameworks have, for the 
most part, fallen under the concepts of 1 )international disengagement, 2)enlargement, 
3)key nation approaches (pivotal states, and big emerging markets), and 4)the promotion 
of liberal democracy. 
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2.2.1 International Disengagement 
Few campaigns have jolted the US foreign policy community in Washington, DC, 
as did the vociferous calls for disengagement which Congress made after the Republicans 
gained majorities in both the US House of Representatives and the US Senate in the 1994 
midterm congressional elections. The Clinton/Gore administration, having tapped into 
the same disengagement sentiment with its focus on the domestic economy in. the 
presidential elections of 1992, was nonetheless unprepared for the demonstrated 
groundswell of opposition to an expanded US international role half-way through its first 
term. 
First, the 104th Congress opposed US military engagement in foreign conflicts 
such as the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda -- pointedly reminding the US public of the 
1993 debacle in Somalia, where 17 Americans were killed and dragged naked through the 
streets of Mogadishu by chanting mobs in full view of CNN cameras. Congress, and 
especially the powerful Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, 
also called into question US commitment to multilateral bodies such as the United 
Nations. The US dues arrears of $1.3 billion has yet to be fully paid to the UN, even 
with a new secretary general at the helm and reform measures underway since 1998.47 
Foreign assistance similarly came under fire, especially as Gingrich's "Contract with 
America" gained prominence. Gingrich led a charge to balance the US federal budget, 
long a bone of contention in Washington, but even more so since the federal debt had 
passed the $5,000 billion mark in the aftermath of the Reagan years. 
By early 1996, Gingrich's revolution had foundered on the rocks of public 
backlash when the budget standoff between Congress and the administration caused a 
series of prolonged federal government standstills from late 1995. But the drive to cut 
budgets had already caused much damage to US engagement abroad. For months there 
47See Karon, Tony. "Uncle Sam, the delinquent debtor." Cape Times (5 January 1998). 
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was little support for the few VOIces raised in favour of spending on overseas 
involvements, especially foreign assistance which had, in any case, begun to lose 
credibility as an effective use of US funds. When welfare at home was being cut, what 
legislator could justify sending dollars abroad when there was no impending threat to 
national security? Another casualty, on some points, was international trade, as 
protectionist elements within the US played on the fears of Americans feeling the squeeze 
through the vulnerability of US markets to foreign investors and consumers. The 
legislative climate of the 104th Congress was demonstrated by passage of acts such as the 
Helms-Burton and D'Amato bills seeking to isolate Cuba, Iran and Libya, but also by 
protectionist legislation aimed at long-time trading partners from Europe to Japan.48 
Subsequently, as previously discussed, disengagement sentiment has largely given 
way to the budgetary optimism of the late 1990's and the growing awareness among the 
Congress and public of several benefits of international trade. Through the campaigns to 
gamer support for the North American Free Trade Act and the Asia Pacific Economic 
Conference, first Bush and then Clinton made major inroads against protectionism, the 
results of which could be seen in such facts as the initial bipartisan sponsorship of the 
Africa Growth and Opportunity legislation in 1996. However, a few significant US 
policymakers -- and the memory of their campaign -- continue to limit US international 
involvements to some degree, as demonstrated by the withdrawal of the Africa Growth 
and Opportunity legislation (blamed on protectionist lobbying) in late 1998, in order to 
prevent a likely failure of passage in the 105th Congress. 
2.2.2 Enlargement 
From within the traditional US foreign policy community came calls not only to 
remain engaged, but to enlarge the US presence abroad, particularly by expanding 
48See Nivola, 1997: 38. 
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membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to include newly democratic 
nations of eastern Europe. As discussed earlier, this policy has constituted a high priority 
for both Clinton administrations and, by late 1997, had resulted in the extension of 
membership to the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary -- with several other nations 
waiting in the wings. Proponents of the policy placed great weight on bolstering cross-
Atlantic cooperation as well as stability on the Eurasian continent -- especially in light of 
the economic chaos in eastern Europe and Russia following the fall of communism, and 
the prospect of future competition from the nascent superpower in the east, China. As 
perceived among the "grand geostrategists," enlargement was the antithesis of 
disengagement and epitomised a new era of US engagement, albeit on new terms. Those 
terms included the need for reform in the United Nations and cuts in US foreign 
assistance, as well as resources to address the "new security" issues such as organised 
crime and international terrorism, which threaten newly liberalised nations with violence 
as well as economic disruption. As one prominent publication expressed it in early 1998, 
"with the threat of major war at least temporarily in abeyance, national security planners 
are just as likely these days to be thinking about a Colombian drug gang or a Russian 
mafia kingpin as a tank division or a territorial dispute. "49 
The cost of the expanded security umbrella may yet prove prohibitive, however 
(Perlmutter and Carpenter, 1998: 6). The question, in that case, will be whether to curtail 
NATO expenses, or to sacrifice other US foreign policy priorities. These priorities might 
include other forms of military cooperation, such as the proposed Pacific atomic energy 
community (PACA TOM) or the African Crisis Response Initiative still under discussion, 
or an increased focus on "key nations" of the developing world. 
49See "National Security in Flux." Introduction to articles on security in The Washington Quarterly Vol 21, 
No 1 (Winter 1998): 83. 
71 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Global Context 
2.2.3 Key Nation Approaches 
During the Clinton years, two "key nation" approaches have surfaced as potential 
guides for US policymakers with regard to the developing world. These are the "pivotal 
states" approach and the Big Emerging Market initiative of the late Secretary of 
Commerce, Ron Brown. South Africa appears on both these lists,50 and as such has 
received a great deal of US attention, epitomised by the Gore-Mbek~ Binational 
Commission but also by the numerous high-level business and government delegations to 
South Africa since 1994, including that of President Clinton in March 1998. 
2.2.3.1 Pivotal States 
According to the pivotal states approach (Chase, Hill and Kennedy, 1996), with 
regard to the developing world and in view of downward pressure on US foreign 
assistance levels, "it is vital that America focus its efforts on a small number of countries 
whose fate is uncertain and whose future will profoundly affect their surrounding 
regions." By channelling scarce foreign assistance to these pivotal states, the US would 
seek to guard against future costs of regional conflict, humanitarian crises such as famine 
or disease, or even economic and political collapse. This approach follows from the 
assumption that, while "the United States must [firstly] manage its delicate relationships 
with Europe, Japan, Russia, and China, the other major players in world affairs," it is 
also important to note that "America's national interest also requires stability in important 
parts of the developing world" (p. 33). For the US foreign policymaker, the pivotal states 
strategy sought to integrate new security issues, such as migration, overpopulation and 
environmental degradation, into the "realist emphasis on power and military and political 
security" of the traditional, state-centred framework. Outside of that framework, 
50Chase, Hill and Kennedy identity as pivotal states Mexico and Brazil; Algeria, Egypt and South Africa; 
Turkey; India and Pakistan; and Indonesia. On the big emerging markets list of the US Department of 
Commerce are the Chinese Economic Area (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan); ASEAN, India and South 
Korea; Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil; Poland and Turkey, and South Africa. 
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advocates claim, such global issues might otherwise be neglected, as long-term and 
intangible threats, because of their failure to form the basis for "a compelling case to the 
American public for an internationalist foreign policy" (p. 36). 
Indeed, with regard to South Africa, Clinton's first National Security Adviser, 
Tony Lake, saw not only an emerging force for economic growth, democracy and stability 
on the African continent, but also an opportunity for African-Americans to develop 
positive ties with the African continent, which would "be good for both Africa and 
America ... " (Lurssen, 1996). Mbeki, however, on a visit to the US in early 1996, urged 
against cutting aid to other nations in Africa in favour of increased assistance to South 
Africa, warning that such reductions would result in increased migration, greater 
international drug trafficking and crime, and higher disease rates in the region, placing a 
greater burden on South Africa. 
While the pivotal states framework summed up the reasoning behind the initial 
$600 million in aid promised South Africa by the Clinton administration in 1994 
following the inauguration of Nelson Mandela, the sense of rising disengagement 
sentiment and an increasing emphasis on "trade, not aid" as a means to develop world 
economies has moved the US to rather emphasise South Africa's place among the top ten 
big emerging markets. 
2.2.3.2 Big Emerging Markets 
The Big Emerging Markets (BEM) initiative, introduced in 1995 by the late 
Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown, can be seen as a manifestation of the increased 
emphasis on commercial concerns within US foreign poIicymaking following the end of 
the Cold War. Dovetailing with similar investment trends in the private sector, the 
initiative focused official and public attention on ten foreign markets identified as 
providing "particularly great" opportunities for American business. The initiative did not 
offer aid, but rather a series of conferences and trade delegations to encourage business 
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contacts, and the establishment or strengthening of US foreign commercial service offices 
to expedite the processing of export licenses and other redtape which inhibits business. 
The BEM website pointed out that with a combined GDP of over $2 trillion, the BEM's 
accounted for as large a share of world output as Germany and the United Kingdom 
combined, and predicted that "over the next two decades, the markets that hold the 
greatest potential for dramatic increases in US exports are not our traditional trading 
partners in Europe and Japan, but...rather .. .in the ten Big Emerging Markets.,,5! 
Brown, an African-American who "readily admitted that he had a special attitude 
toward South Africa," also believed that "economic empowerment for [South Africa's] 
enfranchised but impoverished black majority was the best way to boost the new 
democracy." At the same time, the US pledged to work in South Africa to "create new 
trade and investment opportunities as well as export-related jobs for Americans.,,52 
Many voiced concerns, however, over the impact of focusing exclusively on the most 
promising regions or markets in the developing world, pointing out the deleterious effects 
of neglecting economic development in the surrounding nations. In one attack on "key 
nation" approaches, a commentator stated that "concentrating ... on the states with the 
greatest economic potential is like sending coal to Newcastle. These nations [already] 
receive the lion's share of trade and private foreign investment..." (Pinstrup-Andersen, 
1996: 165-6). Others decried the "divide-and-rule" effect such favouritism caused, 
especially in Africa where nations such as Uganda and Ghana appeared more often to be 
scrambling for US business rather than building regional trade. 
5! See < http://www.stat-usa.gov/itabems.html> 
52"Ron Brown was South Africa's Friend: Commerce Secretary saw economic empowerment as the basis 
for the fledgling democracy's success" See <http://mainstreet.t5.com/peoplew.htm#Ron Brown (22 April 
1996). 
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2.2.4 Promoting Liberal Democracy 
The emerging theme of Clinton's second-term foreign policy team amidst these 
and other proposed policy frameworks -- some competing, some complementary53_-
appears to be the consolidation of America's self-appointed role as the "indispensable 
nation" to the expanding liberal democratic international order of the 1990's. 
Encapsulated in the term "democracy promotion," this policy framework has taken 
precedence over others, partly because it has long been a tenet of US foreign policy, even 
if only implicitly, and partly because it easily incorporates many of the themes that have 
surfaced to guide foreign policy since the 1992 election. 
Clinton, in a campaign speech in 1991, called for "an American foreign policy of 
engagement through democracy.,,54 While that ideal has since been through the mill of 
disengagement sentiment and the 104th Congress, the promotion of democracy remains 
the touchstone by which Clinton forms his ideas about foreign policy priorities. As 
portrayed by the Clinton team, democracy promotion involves not only support for 
democratic reform in developing countries and newly liberalising countries, but also for 
increased liberalisation of markets in what is seen as a natural convergence between 
democratic governance and free-market economies worldwide. While it appears that in 
some instances, the latter is allowed to precede the former for the sake of "increasing the 
pie" and providing for a stable domestic polity before democratic reforms are initiated --
as in Uganda where one-party rule is accepted while the eight percent growth rates 
stabilise the economy -- the goals appear to be viewed as parallel. 
In its earlier conception, democracy promotion -- or Wilsonianism, as it is often 
called, after an early proponent, US President Woodrow Wilson -- focused on the 
humanitarian merits of politicalliberalisation. The Clinton administrations have added a 
53See Nacht (1995) for an overview of several other proposed policy frameworks, such as Richard Haass's 
"Realism Plus," James Schlesinger's "Selective Involvement," and William Maynes' "Spheres ofInfluence." 
54From a speech at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 12 December 1991, entitled, "A New 
Covenant for American Security." 
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more pragmatic tone to the policy, often pointing out that democracies tend not to go war 
with each other, not to produce large numbers of refugees, not to engage in terrorism, and 
tend to make better economic partners (Carothers, 1995: 13). Democracy promotion. 
easily incorporates the dual policy track of enlargement and key nation approaches, 
although the required resource outlay for each specific instance of these policies has been 
preceded regularly by controversy from a budgetary point of view. By securing the new 
liberal democracies of the former Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union, by leading China and 
other "recalcitrants" via expanded trade links deeper and deeper into capitalist waters, and 
by encouraging the consolidation of liberal democracy where it has begun throughout the 
developing world, however, the US aims to reduce security threats, increase economic 
gain, and at the same time remain "at the centre of a world of irs own making" 
(Inkenberry, 1996: 91). 
Critics may point out the many areas in which Clinton-style democracy promotion 
has proved ineffective, such as in Somalia, or has been placed second behind security 
concerns, such as in North Korea or Iraq (Carothers, 1995: 24), or has even increased 
pressure on many developing economies (Arrighi, 1994). In the face of these criticisms, 
Clinton advisors have appeared to have little trouble reconciling other priorities with an 
overall theme of democracy promotion, however (Talbott, 1995; Albright, 1997). The 
confident tone with which Clinton suggested at the 1997 G7 meeting that the American 
economic and political model should be adopted worldwide is a case in point, aithough 
that tone has been somewhat subdued in the aftermath of the currency crashes later that 
year. The adverse developments on the currency markets served to anlplify objections 
over the ill effects for emerging markets of global capitalism, and the US role therein, 
from such quarters as Malaysia whose premier called US policy a "new colonialism."55 
But not until the US economy slowed down (briefly) in mid-1998 did US policymakers 
55See Mahathir (1997): 4. 
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seem to take heed. The need to restructure the international financial system topped 
several agendas at international forums subsequently, but beyond activating IMF 
assistance programmes, little has been done to change the structures of global capitalism, 
due no doubt to the renewed vigour of the US economy and the principles of liberal 
democracy which have supported it. US policymakers seem immune to charges that the 
US must lead a process of change in the international financial institutions such as the 
IMF and the World Bank, where by virture of its predominant economy it has a dominant 
role, if the developing world is not to collapse and take the international system with it 
(Bush and Szeftel, 1995).56 
The focus of the Clinton/Gore administration on the promotion of liberal 
democracy has elicited objections from within the policy-analytical community as well, 
from the "old Democrats" for the deemphasis under Clinton of humanitarian goals, 
relative to other periods of "Wilsonianism," which seems to have accelerated the decline 
of aid to the third world. In other quarter, objections arise over the danger presented to 
traditional foreign policy goals by what is seen as an excessive "commercialisation" of 
US policy (eg, Nivola, 1997: Huntington, 199757). Although administration officials 
deny that trade will replace aid altogether and also insist on the need to maintain a strong 
US defence, commercial considerations have undeniably come to the fore in foreign 
policymaking under President Clinton. One of his first moves after gaining office, for 
example, was to create the White House-based National Economic Council (NEC), 
56Policymakers are also not open, it would appear, to ideas such as those presented by theorist William 
Robinson. His analysis of democracy promotion presents it as providing the rationale for US leadership 
over "new fonns of control accompanying the rise of global capitalism." Under this US leadership, an 
"emergent transnational elite" from among the international community employs "consensual domination" 
to achieve hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, and to promote neoliberalism and the polyarchy which most 
Americans take for democracy, to the detriment of the majority of the world's population. (Robinson, 1996: 
634). 
571n this treatise on "The Erosion of American National Interest," for instance, Samuel Huntington decries 
the rise ofmulticulturism and the ebbing of assimilation in America, which has allowed commercial and 
ethnic interests to take over where national interest held sway under the threat of the Soviet enemy. 
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intended to serve as a counterpart to the influential National Security Agency. The NEC, 
designed to coordinate the various US national and foreign economic policymaking 
bodies, has yet to gain the political leverage of the NSA, but stands as a significant 
signpost to administration goals. Further indications of the commercial bent of US policy 
can be seen in the flurry of government-sponsored trade delegations and international 
economic infrastructure projects with an overt focus on gaining contracts for US 
companies. These demonstrate not only the intent of the current administration to spread 
the US gospel of economic recovery by export, but also to provide the American 
economy with growing markets for both goods and services, as in the case of the BEM 
strategy. Clinton stated as much when he pointed out that "in a departure from the 
behaviour of previous administrations of both parties, we have unashamedly been an 
active partner in helping our business enterprises win contracts abroad."58 The 
ramifications of this overt push for US benefits does not sit easily with critics 
Clinton's frustration with congressional denial of "fast-track authority" in order to 
expedite trade agreements negotiated by the executive branch is partly a function of this 
commitment to the merits of free trade and international linkages -- although cynics might 
also point to the desire of the administration to override congressional prerogatives for 
political gain. But even without "fast track," which looks unlikely during Clinton's watch 
due to protectionist elements within his own party,59 the administration has appeared 
determined to reduce trade barriers throughout the world. Besides the massive web of 
trading agreements between the US and the EU, the US is party to the Asian Pacific 
Economic Conference and, in its own hemisphere, seeks an expansion of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A) and even establishment of a free-trade area of 
the Americas by the year 2005.60 The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act may yet 
58See the BEM website < http://www.stat-usa.gov/itabems.html> 
59See Ogden, Christopher. "A Grownup at State: Clinton will set policy; Albright will dominate 
implementation. n Time (16 December 1996): 34. 
60See Regenstreif, Gary. "Americas pledge free trade by 2005." Cape Times Business Report (20 April 
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provide for a Southern Africa Free Trade Agreement by the year 2005, .as well, if it is 
passed during the 106th Congress. 
2.3 Conclusion: Implications o/Global Change/or US South Africa Policy 
As the US adjusts to new requisites in the closing years of the twentieth century 
and to its own changed position in the international arena, what are the implications for 
US policy toward South Africa? What dynamics have these three factors -- unipolarity, a 
reduced US economic advantage and globalisation -- introduced into the equation? 
Firstly, in a post-Cold War and unipolar world, it would seem that South Africa 
may have lost whatever strategic significance it previously held for the US, as South 
Africa need no longer be supported as a bulwark against communist aggression in Africa, 
nor as a strategic port from which to ward off naval attack from the Indian Ocean around 
the Cape of Good Hope. On the other hand, global developments have created new 
concerns. Ethnic discord having replaced economic ideology as the major cause of war in 
the past ten years, the South African miracle of negotiated transition to a black majority-
ruled African nation is perhaps foremost among the reasons many policymakers are 
watching South Africa closely. South Africa's leadership among the developing world on 
the issue of nuclear non-proliferation has garnered the attention of US national security 
officials, as well. South Africa also features in the US strategy to build partnerships with 
regional leaders in order to address other "new" security concerns such as environmental 
degradation, international terrorism, and the effects of huge populations displaced by civil 
war or famine on several regions around the globe. 
In an era of increasingly "commercialised" US foreign policy and of growing 
international interdependence, South Africa is again a significant player in US equations. 
As a "big emerging market," South Africa was cited in late 1996 on a "short list" of seven 
1998). 
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especially promising emerging markets, next to China, Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia, and 
South Korea. As several of these have since experienced severe stress economically, the 
BEM label may become less of an asset than was intended, but the fact remains that 
Clinton, or at least his Secretary of Commerce, has maintained the spotlight on South 
Africa for US trade and investment. The perceived gains from securing an economic 
foothold in South Africa, as "one of the last untapped markets" globally, were obviously 
significant to warrant such attention.61 The withdrawal of France from much of 
francophone Africa leaves openings for increased US economic activity on the rest of the 
African continent, as does the Africa Growth and Opportunity legislation under 
reconsideration in 1999. Such linkages across Africa would, in turn, increase the US 
stake in a South Africa which is stable, prosperous, and willing to take on responsibilities 
for maintaining stability in its region and beyond, even if South Africa remains unwilling 
to act as a "surrogate" of the United States. 
Indeed, US reticence to commit American troops abroad without clear strategic 
imperatives -- a tendency dubbed the "Somalia Syndrome" after the 1993 debacle there --
translated into greater importance in US policy of regional powers such as South Africa. 
While Pretoria has made tentative moves to lead in regional conflict situations, it has 
refrained from involvement in peacekeeping efforts on the continent, including the US 
African Crisis Response Initiative. Mandela declined involvement in the latter on the 
grounds of protecting African sovereignty from the threats he perceived inherent in the 
original formulation of the ACR!. Current negotiations between the US and South 
61 The vulnerability of South Africa's currency on global financial markets, which became patently clear 
after the rand lost nearly a quarter of its value in a few weeks in mid 1998, has only just begun to change 
South Africa's prospects for continued growth, although worries about a collapse similar to those in Asia 
have passed. See Barber, Simon, "SA economy in better shape than most emerging states." Business Day 
(7 October 1998). 
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Africa, after further consultation and adjustments to the ACRI, may yet result in South 
African involvement in this area, however. 
With regard to development assistance, due to the reduced American economic 
advantage over the rest of the world, and in the current climate of pessimism with regard 
to the effectiveness of past aid efforts, the US is most likely to continue to reduce aid to 
the developing world, including South Africa. Pretoria has been less affected by that 
policy due to the special aid package promised after Mandela's inauguration, but in any 
case is expected to "graduate" from aid in the next few years. Regarding the United 
Nations, the IMF and the World Bank, which may well playa role in South Africa's post-
apartheid economic recovery, it appears that until US reservations about the management 
of funds by multilateral bodies (especially the UN) are put to rest, US contributions may 
continue to decline, if they are paid at all. 
The impact on US South Africa policy of the changed nature of US foreign policy 
priorities and processes are clearest in the content and operations of the Gore-Mbeki 
Binational Commission. The BNC is focused not just on security and on limited 
assistance in education and human resource development, but on trade, on sustainable 
development initiatives in South Africa, on law enforcement cooperation to combat the 
encroaching illicit drugs trade and other organised crime, and on such projects as 
increased access to advanced technology in South African schools. More detailed 
discussion of this mechanism in US South Africa policy follows, as well as an evaluation 
as to how well the BNC goals have been fulfilled. 
Negative implications for South Africa in current US policy are greatly 
downplayed in official statements, but have plagued relations since 1994. US laws which 
seek to limit trade with states deemed to be sponsoring terrorism (such as Syria, Iran and 
Libya), and with Cuba, the last bastion of communism in the western hemisphere, 
impinge on South Africa's role as an independent actor and leader in the developing 
world. South Africa has felt the wrath of US anger over close relations with Libya's 
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Muammar Gaddafi, over proposed anns sales to Syria, over a proposed oil storage deal 
with Iran -- both eventually dropped by South Africa -- and earlier over the doctor 
exchange program which continues between Cuba and South Africa. The high political 
cost for South Africa of deepening political and economic ties with the US on a bilateral 
basis may grow as regional actors and other multilateral bodies such as the G 15 take a 
harder line against such relations with America, as well. 
President Clinton, in his March 1998 speech to the South African parliament, 
sought to reassure South Africans that "America wants a strong South Africa; America 
. needs a strong South Africa. And we are determined to work with you as you build a 
strong South Africa." What is the policy of the US toward South Africa beyond this 
simplistic statement? A deeper understanding of that policy is important for policy 
analysts on both sides of the question, as the decisions made at this juncture in South 
Africa's history are too important to build on unneccessarily incomplete analysis. 
This chapter has endeavoured to set out the international context for US South 
Africa policy in the 1990's, as well as American responses· to global changes and the 
implications for that policy. The following chapters will set out the history behind and a 
detailed account of Clinton policy toward post-apartheid South Africa. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Historical Context 
For US South Africa Policy under Clinton 
Over the two hundred years since America first established diplomatic relations 
with the Cape Colony, South Africa has moved from relative obscurity in the US to 
notable prominence among nations for its example of peaceful transformation and non-
racial, democratic promise. In 1869, for instance, the US Postmaster General sent out a 
circular to his staff warning of someone "purporting to be Postmaster-General of the 
South African Republic ... attempting to circulate letters carrying postage stamps of that 
country in the United States." As the postal department had "no record of any such 
place," the activity was deemed "fraudulent" (Rosenthal, 1938: 176). And yet, in the late 
1990's, South Africa features among the few nations with which the US has established a 
vice-presidential binational commission, and has played host to leaders from several of 
the world's leading nations, including President Clinton, since the election of Nelson 
Mandela as president in 1994. The relative lack of importance that South Africa has held 
in US foreign policy for all but a few periods in history is important in considering the 
durability of current levels of engagement. How deep is US interest, in fact? 
The following historical overview sets the scene for the more detailed account and 
analysis of US South Africa polICY under the Clinton presidency. Traditional security 
issues associated with the Cold War will serve as a starting point, especially as the legacy 
of this conflict remains intact in many aspects of US policymaking in the late 1990's. The 
issue of race, as played out in the rise of anti-apartheid activism in Washington and the 
national movement it generated -- culminating in the historic overturn of the Reagan veto 
of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986 -- forms a second critical contextual 
point for Clinton's South Africa policy. While US public sentiment on South Africa has 
often turned on the race issue more than any other, US policy has more often been swayed 
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by the arguments of American business interests, who have long added weight to official 
arguments for US engagement policy. Thus trade and the. social forces behind this most 
tangible of issues fOnTIS a third focus of the chapter. Finally, discussion will focus on the 
issues which proved decisive in the 1992 US presidential elections, such as the need to 
regenerate the faltering US economy, on the new generation brought into policymaking 
with the election of President Bill Clinton, and on the implications of these for South 
Africa. Throughout, US South Africa policy was -- and continues to be -- qualified by 
questions of US domestic concerns and by bureaucratic processes in policymaking, as 
shall be demonstrated in subsequent chapters. 
3.1 The Cold War and South Africa 
From the end of the second World War until the early 1990's, US policy towarc;ls 
South Africa, and towards the nations of Sub-Sahara Africa* generally, was framed by 
American relations with respective European colonisers, and then -- with the advent of 
African independence beginning in the late 1950's -- by direct competition with the Soviet 
Union for allegiance among African nations. 
The march of communism across eastern Europe over the post-war years, the 
imperative to reconstruct war-tom western Europe, and the brewing conflict in Southeast 
Asia which would become the Vietnam War, were of much greater concern to American 
policymakers in the late 1940's and the 1950's than were African affairs. As the Cold 
War developed, however, South Africa often featured from among African nati6ns as an 
ally in the US stand-off with the Soviet Union. With its staunch anti-communist 
leadership, its geographical position at the tip of Africa along an important sea through-
route, and its military capacity to thwart communist aggression in the region, South 
*Henceforth Africa will be used to refer to the nations of Sub-Sahara Africa, as the northern-most nations of 
the African continent are treated in US policy as part of a separate region. 
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Africa formed a natural partner in America's quest to contain communism. In those early 
years of the Cold War, despite the rise of apartheid in Pretoria, the US accepted South 
African assistance in the US-led Berlin airlift, and successfully lobbied South Africa for 
support against communist forces in Korea (Schraeder, 1994: 194). Joint military 
manoeuvres in southern Africa and large scale arms sales were all part and parcel of the 
US preparation for a major East-West military confrontation,2 as was growing 
cooperation in intelligence gathering between the CIA and its South African counterpart.3 
Trade was not limited to arms, of course, and the US commercial relationship with South 
Africa developed significantly in the early post-war years as American business took 
advantage of South Africa's immense mineral wealth as well as the profitability of 
importing its off-season fresh produce. 
3.1.1 Countering Communism vs Opposing Apartheid 
The 1960's, however, began with a shift in focus for US policy. The focus 
projected from the outset of the Kennedy/Johnson administration was one of opposition 
to apartheid in South Africa, and engagement with Africa in general -- especially in light 
of the need to gain a footing on this continent before the Soviet Union or China gained 
dominance in the wake of African decolonisation. Noting in one .campaign speech that 
the US had "lost ground in Africa because [it] had neglected and ignored the needs and 
aspirations of the African people," Kennedy moved quickly to increase diplomatic 
2For instance, access to the fonner British naval base at Simonstown was considered critical, in exchange 
for which the US Defense Department organised joint military manoeuvres with the South African Navy. 
And in 1952, the US agreed to sell over $112 million in anns (mostly fighter aircraft) to the South African 
military (Schraeder, 1994: 195). 
3The installation of US tracking stations by NASA deepened the relationship further. In addition, during 
the 1950's, the US and South Africa entered into an agreement whereby South Africa would sell to the US 
its entire output of uranium oxide, an important element in the development of US nuclear devices. 
Subsequently, between 1952 and 1966, the US would spend over $1 billion on South African uranium 
products. Schraeder (1994: 196) points the reader to a hearing of the US House subcommittee on Africa, 
US Business Involvement in Southern Africa (Part II), May-December 1971, 92nd Congress, 1 st Session. 
Washington, DC: GPO, (1972): 40-76. 
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activity in several newly independent African nations, as well as aid levels.4 At the same 
time, restrictions were placed on certain aspects of military cooperation with South 
\ 
Africa, and Pretoria's objectionable racial policies precluded the establishment of both an 
aid mission and a government-to-government Peace Corps programme. However, 
contradictory messages abounded.5 US policymakers seemed to be seeking a balance 
between engaging with South Africa on a cooperative basis for the sake of countering 
communism in Africa, on the one hand, and pressuring Pretoria to abandon apartheid, on 
the other. The result was a lack of clarity in US South Africa policy, which eventually 
came to resemble that of Kennedy's predecessors.6 
Moreover, by the mid 1960's, it became accepted wisdom that Kennedy's high 
level of interest in Africa generally was, from a strategic point of view, unwarranted, as 
Africa came to be perceived as "one of the world's striking examples .... of the failure of 
the appeal of communism in new nations. ,,7 South Africa's importance as an ally 
diminished, and aid to the rest of Africa declined. 8 In the bureaucratic process of 
reviewing US foreign policy that often accompanies a new administration, however, 
4Between 1958 and 1962, US aid to Africa increased from $11 Om to $519m, comprising roughly 2 percent 
of total US overseas aid before this policy decision, and 8 percent after. 
50n the one hand, the US imposed restrictions (a voluntary anns embargo) on the sale of US anns which 
could be used for internal security in South Africa, demonstrated a greater willingness to join international 
condemnation of apartheid in UN resolutions, and issued limitations on joint military exercises and US ship 
visitations to Cape Town. At the same time, US policy allowed "business as usual" contact with South 
Africa on trade and investment, nuclear collaboration, and intelligence cooperation, as well as the sale of 
weapons to Pretoria deemed to be "in the interests of international peace and security" (Mokoena, 1993: 
xxi). Also, after having pressured South Africa into deferring its planned incorporation of Namibia (then 
South West Africa) in April 1964 with the suspension of South African investment loan applications and the 
threat of sanctions, the US then approved the delivery of reactor fuel for South Africa's nuclear power plant, 
SAFARI-I, in February 1965 (p 16). 
6F or instance, in 1960, following the Sharpeville incident of March that year, the official US reaction --
which was a statement to the effect that the US "deplored" this instance of violence in South Africa -- was 
followed by backpaddling, as the statement was apparently issued without necessary bureaucratic clearances 
and was later "disowned" by Secretary of State Christian Herter. It also raised the ire of the Defense 
Department. See Schraeder (1994: 198). 
7"U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace" (1970). Report to the Congress by 
Richard Nixon, President of the United States. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (February 
1~:M. . 
80ver the decade from 1963 to 1973, total US aid to Africa declined 60 percent, from $519m to $286m 
(Clough, 1992: 9). 
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Richard Nixon's foreign policy team did include a review of US policy on South Africa in 
early 1969 (one of only 61 policy reviews conducted).9 The result was a relaxation of 
several constraints on the relationship imposed under Kennedy/Johnson. Trade continued 
apace, I 0 unhindered except in the arms and nuclear field. 
It was not until the fall of Portugal in a 1974 coup d'etat in Lisbon, and the 
ensuing sudden decolonisation of Angola precipitating a civil war, that policymaking 
towards the region regained any priority status in Washington. Over the next two years, 
covert support for two pro-western factions in Angola and intelligence-sharing with South 
Africa on the matter entangled the US in the region's conflict. South Africa, believing it 
could count on US backing, launched its own military campaign to insure a pro-western 
government in Luanda, and the Soviet Union responded by rushing to the aid of Cuba in 
support of an opposing faction. Washington, however, was prevented from doing the 
same on South Africa's part by domestic legislation terminating the CIA's paramilitary 
. campaign in Angola in 1975. 11 Americans, having just suffered defeat in Vietnam, were 
in no mood to send their troops to Africa to fight another guerrilla war. South Africa was 
forced to withdraw in early 1976, and Angola came under the rule of a pro-communist 
government, already recognised by several neighbouring African states. 
US concern grew with the subsequent triumph of Soviet-backed revolutionary 
forces in Mozambique, and the threat of a pro-communist government coming to power 
9This review included the famous "tar baby option," so named for the fear many in the State Department 
had that it would engage the US inextricably with South Africa at a time when such engagement would be 
detrimental to US relations in the region, but which became the basis for policy under Nixon. 
10US direct investment in South Africa rose from $778 million in 1970 to $1,668 million in 1976, more 
than doubling. Trade figures for this period were relatively difficult to come by, and appeared almost to 
have been deliberately omitted from the records of the government over this period. The author's search 
through the National Security Archives, looking at US South Africa bilateral trade, found a gap between 
1967 and 1986. See Mokoena, Kenneth. South Africa: the Making of US Policy, 1962-1989. Alexandria, 
V A: Chadnyck-Healy, Inc. (1991). Other sources, quoting in rand when the rand was worth more than the 
dollar, show an increase in SA imports from the US of R469.3 million in 1971 to R811.8 million three years 
later, in 1974. South Africa exports to the US rose commensurately, from RI21.1 million in 1971 to 
R429,7 million in 1975. (Africa South of the Sahara, various annual volumes.) 
IIThis legislation, known as the Clark Amendment, is detailed in Schraeder (1994: 47-48). 
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in civil-war torn Southern Rhodesia!Zimbabwe. In response, US policymakers (including 
some members of Congress) embarked on a major effort to preclude further Soviet 
footholds in southern Africa and began to downplay any criticisms of apartheid in favour 
of diplomatic consultation with South Africa on such issues as majority rule in Southern 
Rhodesia! Zimbabwe, and independence for South West AfricalNamibia. 
3.1.2 From Confrontation to Constructive Engagement 
The violent response of the South African government to the Soweto uprising of 
May 1976 was, however, the next definitive event for US South Africa policy. In 
recognition of that landmark event, and in accordance with the Carter administration's 
early focus on human rights, the US in the late 1970's began to demonstrate a much 
greater willingness to confront South Africa over apartheid, especially after the death in 
detention of black consciousness leader Steve Biko. 12 The US actively opposed 
apartheid in the UN via two successive African-American US representatives, Andrew 
Young and Donald McHenry. Yet in Carter's short four years in office, he was unable to 
shift the focus in southern Africa off national security concerns as he had originally 
espoused, especially in light of marxist threats to Mobuto's Zaire in 1977, Cuban-Soviet 
interventions in the Horn of Africa in 1977-78 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979. US-South Africa trade, meanwhile, more than doubled between 1977 and 1980.13 
Perhaps the most important contribution of the Carter administration with regard 
. to South Africa was its lead in drafting UN Resolution 435 regarding Namibian 
independence. Efforts by the US-led "Contact Group" to craft a mutually acceptable 
12The Carter administration, for instance, removed South Africa from the list of countries with which the 
US enjoyed "nonnal" relations when it entered office (Schraeder, 1994: 216). In October, 1977, the US for 
the first time supported a UN resolution making the voluntary anns embargo of 1963 a mandatory 
re~uirement of UN members. . 
13South African exports to the US rose from $.9bn in 1977 to $2.1 bn in 1980. Imports from the US to 
South Africa rose from $1.1 bn in 1977 to $2.5bn in 1980. From Background Notes: South Africa (1982). 
The US Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs (July): 6. 
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resolution of this issue, though unsuccessful under Carter due to South Africa's lack of 
faith in promises of Cuban withdrawal from Angola, became the basis for Namibian 
independence ten years later. 
With the resumption of Cold War tensions following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and perceived communist inroads in the third world, South Africa's 
importance as an ally was again highlighted in the early 1980's. The policy of 
"constructive engagement," crafted by Ronald Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, Chester Crocker, attempted to balance the growing antagonism of the 
American legislature and public toward apartheid South Africa with the administration's 
wish to retain strong ties with Pretoria in order, as Crocker saw it, to encourage reform. 
Throughout the first Reagan administration, the policy remained credible in the eyes of 
many policymakers due to such signs of progress as the Lusaka Accord between Pretoria 
and Angola (over respective troop activity), and the Nkomati Accord between Pretoria 
and Mozambique (ending their respective support for insurgent forces in either country), 
both brokered by the US and signed in early 1984.14 There were also efforts in this 
period to channel US economic assistance to develop democratic institutions in South 
Africa and to uplift black South Africans, and to offer this as a sign that the US was 
"working for positive change in South Africa." 15 However, rising popular opinion did not 
accept constructive engagement as anything more than a smokescreen for continued 
collaboration with the last white minority government in Africa, whose response to 
continued civil unrest in South Africa further undermined its own credibility. By late 
1986, in a nearly unprecedented move, anti-apartheid forces in Congress garnered the 
required two-thirds majority to overturn Reagan's veto of the Comprehensive Anti-
14For greater detail on these accords, see Schraeder (1994: 226). 
15See u.s. Assistance: Working for Positive Change in South Africa. Washington, DC: US Department of 
State Bureau for Public Affairs (May 1986). Aid over the period of the two Reagan administrations 
increased from only $40,000 in 1981 to $4.2m in 1982, and to $13.9m in 1986, when a fully staffed USAID 
mission was established in Pretoria just before passage of the CAAA. 
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Apartheid Act imposing economic sanctions on South Africa. In one move, constructive 
engagement was repudiated and the US joined several other nations -- as well as hundreds 
of American individual companies, municipalities, universities and other institutions -- in 
seeking to isolate the South African government until apartheid was ended, regardless of 
Cold War imperatives. In the wake of the US banks' 1985 refusal to "roll over" South 
African loans, the CAAA applied great pressure economically on South Africa to end 
apartheid. 
3.1.3 Cold War Denouement and Legacy in US Policymaking 
Cold War tensions, in the meantime, had begun to show promise of again relaxing 
with the rise to power in 1985 of Mikhail Gorbachev, whose policies of perestroika and 
glasnost opened the way for a series of Reagan-Gorbachev Summits. These meetings (in 
Geneva, 1985; Helsinki, 1986; and Washington, 1987), culminated in the signing of an 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces disarmament agreement between the US and the Soviet 
Union, which marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War. No doubt these summits 
also sent a message to Pretoria that South Africa's value as an ally against the USSR was 
once again on the ebb, perhaps irreversibly. 
Preoccupied with the rapidity of the global changes during the second half of the 
1980's, policymakers in Washington left US Africa policy, for the most part, to the Bush 
administration's low-profile Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman 
Cohen. As the Eastern Bloc disintegrated and the Soviet Union slipped toward 
dissolution, US policy toward South Africa appeared to go on hold -- waiting for the 
outcome of these events and of the changes beginning to occur within South Africa itself. 
The Cold War attitudes among US policymakers which had shaped foreign policy 
for n~arly forty years did not, however, disappear so rapidly. Suspicion of the Russian 
state remained, as did the bureaucratic institutions developed to support US 
preponderance in that rivalry. Even in the late 1990's, many of these attitudes and 
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"standard operating procedures" continued to influence policymaking, and looked set to 
remain in place into the new millennium. For instance, according to one past member of 
the Bush administration who also worked under Clinton until 1994, the National Security 
Council, "an artifact of the ... highly centralised and secretive policy process" of the Cold 
War era, still has primary importance in foreign policymaking generally. Though the 
NSC was created "to deal with the Soviet enemy and reduce the risk of accidental 
escalation," in doing so "America, in some ways, emulated Soviet centralism." That 
centralism is "at variance with America's political traditions," but has not been decisively 
ended, even in the absence of an identifiable enemy. 16 
There have been some changes in the roles and status of such institutions as the 
Departments of Defense and Commerce, as well as an effort to streamline policymaking, 
both of which shall be discussed at length in subsequent chapters, but the basic 
framework for making policy has only begun to be changed in the wake of the 
momentous events of the early part of the 1990's. The implications of this lag between 
world trends and institutional change can be seen in US South Africa policy, both in the 
gap between the rhetoric of "partnership" and the reality of moves toward disengagement 
by the legislature, and in the creation of the binational commission to expedite 
administration goals. 
3.2 Apartheid and US South Africa Policy 
Even during the Cold War, the persistence and codification of racial segregation 
in South Africa, known from 1948 as apartheid, attracted the attention of US opposition 
groups for decades, especially once America's own civil rights movement gained 
momentum. Opposition to apartheid effected relations only superficially, however, until 
the mid-1980's. Following the surrender to public will of the Reagan policy of 
16professor John Stremlau, a member of the Policy Planning office at the US Department of State from 
1988-1994, made these comments in discussion on this dissertation. 
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"constructive engagement" and the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions on 
South Africa in 1986, the anti-apartheid movement spearheaded by African-American 
activists continued to influence US policy somewhat, but had lost momentum by the time 
apartheid officially ended in mid-1994. 
3.2.1 The African American Community and Africa 
Approximately 30 million Americans, and roughly 12 percent of the US 
electorate, are African-American. As such, they constitute a significant constituency in 
US domestic politics. As with any segment of a population, African-Americans hold 
diverse opinions and interests, have a range of educational and socio-economic 
backgrounds, and are not all active or even interested in political, nevermind 
international, affairs. 17 Among politically active African-Americans, however, human 
rights in Africa has long topped the international agenda, and apartheid numbered among 
the worst violations on the continent. 
Domestic political pressure to oppose apartheid began to mount from the late 
1950's as the US civil rights movement, under the leadership of Martin Luther King, Jr, 
and others, gathered strength. 18 But until the 1960's the African-American community 
active on Africa was often plagued by differences of opinion on issues such as whom to 
support in African civil wars and how far and how fast they should go in their demands 
for change in US policy on African issues. Their progress was also stymied by the 
nationalist, anti-communist persecution of the McCarthy era in post World War II 
17Even in 1988, when apartheid was entrenched in South Africa and the anti-apartheid coalition was still 
riding the wave of support following the imposition of US economic sanctions against Pretoria, an ABC 
poll showed that the most salient issues for African-American voters were those related to domestic social 
and welfare concerns such as health care and the "problems of the poor." In this poll, only 6 percent of 
African-Americans cited defense and foreign policy as their chief concern, as opposed to 24 percent of 
white Americans (BoIce, De Maio, and Muzzio, 1992: 73). 
I 8 King led a demonstration in December 1957 denouncing apartheid and calling attention to South Africa's 
refusal to sign the UN Declaration on Human Rights. For more detail on the role of African Americans in 
US Africa policy, see Clough (1992: 29-35). 
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America, during which Africanist sentiment was 'often c'onstrued as "un-American." 
Acc'ording t'o 'one hist'orian-analyst, apartheid provided the c'oalescing fact'or f'or African-
American sentiment in the late 1960's, when America's f'oreign P'olicy was under fire fr'om 
many quarters nati'onally: 
Identity (by black Americans) with Africa particularly and with the fate 'of 
the pe'oples in the third W'orld more generally became much deeper and 
m'ore widespread during the sec'ond half 'of the 1960s. A c'onflati'on 'of 
events, d'omestic and international, reinf'orced. this devel'opment... 
Inevitably as racial internati'onalism intensified and d'omestic race relati'ons 
deteri'orated, black American interest in African affairs f'ocused m'ore and 
m'ore 'on liberati'on m'ovements, especially in s'outhern Africa. These 
struggles, unlike the c'omplex fact'ors underlying the Nigerian civil war, 
which c'oI'ored that tragedy with moral ambiguity, were stark, easily 
c'omprehended, and fitted in well with the n'oti'ons 'of pan-African 
S'olidarity that were growing am'ong American blacks (White, 1981: 88). 
3.2.2 TransAfrica and Sancti'ons 
Little had C'ome 'of the 1962 eff'ort t'o organise a black I'obby 'on Africa at the 
American Negro Leadership C'onference 'on Africa, initiated by R'oy Wilkins, Martin 
Luther King and 'other civil rights leaders. In 1969, h'owever, African-American 
C'ongressman Charles Diggs t'o'ok the chair 'of the H'ouse subc'ommittee on Africa, and in 
1971 the C'ongressi'onal Black Caucus (CBC) was c'onvened 'on Capit'ol Hill t'o work f'or 
increased access by c'oncerned African-Americans t'o the P'olicy process. Further, a 1976 
Black Leadership C'onference 'on S'outhern Africa, called by the CBC, resulted in the 
f'ormati'on in 1977 'of TransAfrica, an African-American I'obby f'or Africa and the 
Caribbean. Under the leadership 'of Randall R'obins'on, an African-American lawyer and 
former administrative assistant t'o Diggs, TransAfrica had by 1980 built up a membership 
'of 1 0,000, representing a large segment 'of inf'ormed black American 'opini'on 'on Africa. 
The Nati'onal Ass'ociati'on f'or the Advancement 'of C'oI'ored Pe'ople, likewise, sh'owed 
expanded activity 'on Africa with its 1976 Task F'orce 'on Africa, which included in its 
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1977 recommendations strong advocacy of disinvestment by American firms in South 
Africa and other economic sanctions, bringing this historically cautious lobby into line 
with emerging African-Affierican interest groups such as TransAfrica. . 
Thus began the groundswell of American opposition to apartheid, which included 
African-Americans and others wishing to promote the cause of human rights. By 1984, 
constructive engagement -- embodying the fact of US-South African cooperation in 
strategic matters and continued economic links -- became the focus of the US anti-
apartheid campaign in and out of Congress. The event which precipitated the last and 
successful drive to impose economic sanctions against South Africa was the introduction 
in September 1984 of a tricameral parliament in Cape Town. This "reform," which 
provided for limited political representation to "coloureds" and Asians but excluded black 
South Africans, was met by waves of civil unrest across South Africa. The Congressional 
Black Caucus in Washington, in conjunction with a broad coalition of groups lobbying 
against apartheid under the leadership .of TransAfrica, led numerous protest marches and 
rallies and finally succeeded in equating support for sanctions against South Africa with 
support for America's own struggle for racial equality.19 Reagan's attempt to preempt 
congressional action by issuing Executive Order 12532, containing a watered-down 
version of the sanctions legislation, succeeded in 1985, but opinions had so polarised a 
year later that a similar attempt in 1986 failed. In October of that year, the CBC carried 
the day as African-American Congressman Ron Dellums' legislation calling for 
comprehensive economic sanctions against Pretoria -- tabled every year since 1971 in one 
form or another -- finally passed in both the House and, in somewhat amended form, the 
Senate. Support in Congress was such that legislators overrode Reagan's subsequent veto 
19David Newsom, who held Crocker's post under Nixon, wrote in 1985 in the Christian Science Monitor 
(18 January) that "the attitudes expressed by Americans about the situation in South Africa have come to be 
a litmus test of an individual's attitude toward race relations in the United States." He also asked whether 
"the playing out of our own politics against the backdrop of the tensions and dilemmas of another country is 
either appropriate or effective." 
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with an easy two-thirds majority in a nearly unprecedented display of unity in opposing a 
president in a foreign policy matter. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA)20 
became law with immediate effect. 
In general, according to polling information, African-American interest in South 
Africa remained high in the years subsequent to the passage of sanctions legislation,21 
although the anti-apartheid lobby lost much of its momentum without a specific focus 
such as sanctions. The business community, whose powerful voice depends less on large 
numbers of public support and more on economic indicators and its access to high-level 
officials, generally kept a low profile throughout the apartheid period. 
3.3 US Business Interests and South Africa 
American business interest in South Africa had begun with the discoveries of 
diamonds and gold in the late nineteenth century, and later increased at the news of 
deposits of several strategically important minerals. While history books note several 
Americans who joined the rush to prospect, and a few who became rich in the process 
(Rosenthal, 1938; Williams, 1948), South Africa's value as a US trading partner and 
investment destination did not match that of nations in Europe, Asia, and even Latin 
America. 
In any case, except for the early years of apartheid, before attitudes on racism 
were challenged in the US itself, US business expressed its interest in South Africa 
quietly. Even by the 1960's the unpopularity of doing business with white South Africa 
under apartheid had became somewhat of a liability. During the 1970's, based on the 
growing objections to US commercial activity in South Africa, US firms operating under 
20See HR 4868, an Act by the 98th Congress of the United States of America to "prohibit loans to, other 
investments in, and certain other activities with respect to, South Africa, and for other purposes." The act 
prohibited, for instance, the importation ofkruggerands, of agricultural goods, iron, steel, uranium, coal, or 
sugar from South Africa, US exportation of computer goods to South Africa, and air transportation directly 
to or from South Africa. The US-South Africa tax treaty was also terminated. 
21 See The Gallop Poll Monthly, No 293 (February 1990): 2-3. 
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apartheid began to adopt non-racial employment practices (sometimes in contravention of 
South Africa law) later known as the Sullivan Principles, and justified their continued 
activity on the basis that they would "remain in South Africa but consciously work for 
change" (Barber, 1973: 295). 
The US government, however, needed little persuading that trade channels with 
South Africa should remain open. South Africa constituted the only major source of 
chrome and platinum, for instance, outside of the Soviet Union, as well as an important 
source of uranium oxide (a critical element in the expansion of the US nuclear arsenal in 
the 1950's). There was also trade in manufactured and agricultural goods, as well as in 
gold, diamonds, and other raw materials. At the time the sanctions debate was gearing up 
in the mid-1980's, South Africa was supplying more than 50 percent of US needs for over 
two dozen minerals deemed of either "strategic" or "critical" importance to US national 
defence.22 
The growing voice of the sanctions movement, as well as the turmoil in South 
Africa itself, began to undermine business interest in South Africa to some extent by the 
mid-1980's. Political turmoil and other risk factors began to overshadow profit. In early 
1984, there was some effort on the part of the American Chamber of Commerce and 
others to actively lobby in Washington against sanctions, which in their view would be 
counterproductive in that they would "inhibit [US business'] ability to maintain 
affirmative action, influence and pressure" in South Africa.23 However, once the widely-
publicised demonstrations organised by TransAfrica outside the South African Embassy 
in Washington began, reframing the debate on moral grounds, those business voices were 
greatly muted. When it came time to defend the role of US business in South Africa -- an 
integral part of the policy of constructive engagement -- during the final debates over the 
22US Department of State, A US Policy Toward South Africa. The report of the Secretary of State's 
Advisory Committee on South Africa (January 1987: 3). 
23See "US Finns Lobby Hill on Anti-SA Legislation." Washington Report on Africa (I March 1984): 40. 
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Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, US business was loath to stand up and be counted 
for fear of being singled out for boycotts by the anti-apartheid lobby. At the same time, 
the protests made it increasingly difficult to do business in South Africa, even when 
American finns applied the fair-employment practices embodied in the Sullivan 
Principles. 
The divestment campaign was equally successful in discouraging US business 
interest and, by 1986, there were restrictions on investments by local government in 19 
states and 68 cities and counties. Various types of restrictions were also adopted by 131 
colleges and universities in the US, affecting nearly $220 billion of assets related to 
pension and endowment funds (Baker, 1989: 31). Much as the business sector supported 
Assistant Secretary of State Crocker behind the scenes, it refrained from backing 
constructive engagement publicly, even following the energetic "public diplomacy" 
campaign on the part of the Department of State and the White House in 1985 and 1986 
attempting to shift the focus of the debate onto the deleterious effects of sanctions for the 
black population in South Africa. In the end, Crocker stood alone in defense of his policy 
of constructive engagement, and could do little to stem the tide of opposition. 
3.3.1 The CAAA and Change in South Africa 
In the seven years of comprehensive economic sanctions on South Africa that 
, 
followed passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, 212 US companies --more 
than the total of all other foreign finns -- withdrew from South Africa completely.24 The 
closure of the Ford and General Motors plants in the Eastern Cape pushed unemployment 
in that region to nearly 70 per cent among the black population. At the same time, 
however, exploratory and off-the-record talks between the Afrikaners in power and the 
African National Congress in exile began in the late 1980's, accredited by many to be a 
240gden, Christopher (1999). "Less Aid, More Trade." Time (24 May): 70. 
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direct result of the slowdown m the South African economy under its increased 
international isolation. 
The surprise unbanning of the African National Congress in early 1990, and the 
subsequent release of ANC leader Nelson Mandela after 27 years in prison, signalled the 
end of Pretoria's attempts to reform -- rather than abolish -- apartheid. Within months, a 
negotiating process began which would lead to a peaceful transition to majority rule in 
South Africa. The Bush administration -- no doubt aware of US business prospects --
was eager to partially lift sanctions shortly thereafter, but he sought to do so with such 
alacrity that the previous anti-apartheid coalition rallied to extend them until a new 
constitution guaranteeing one-person-one vote in South Africa was in place.25 By mid 
1991, however, when only one of the five conditions required by the CAAA for the 
termination of sanctions remained in dispute, Bush announced the administration's 
acceptance that there had been "irreversible" change in South Africa and lifted by 
executive order all punitive measures associated with the 1986 sanctions legislation. 
The negative reaction from the anti-apartheid coalition to Bush's announcements 
was little noticed amidst the public's generally positive perception of change in South 
Africa. By 1992, when Bill Clinton was elected as President of the United States, the 
lobbies which had acted so vociferously on the part of South Africa during the years of 
apartheid seemed to have moved on to other policy issues, in Africa and beyond. US 
business, on the other hand, had begun to press for policies toward South Africa that 
would be conducive to re-investment. Whether or not these two social forces have 
remained active, in fact, and whether new interest groups might have begun to lobby the 
US government regarding US South Africa policy, is the subject of Chapter Five. 
25For greater detail, see Schraeder (1994: 238-242). 
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3.4 1992 US Election Dynamics and Clinton 's First Year 
The domestic political imperatives for candidates seeking the US presidency in 
1992 were partly a function of the global and national dynamics discussed in the previous 
chapter. Added to the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War and fears over 
US international economic decline and interdependence, however, was a sense of social 
malaise in America, based on indicators such as continued racial conflict, rising crime 
rates and deteriorating standards of education, growing federal budget deficits and 
threatened economic recession. As the Foreign Policy Association noted in one 
publication recording US public sentiment of the period, "American jubilation" over the 
demise of the Soviet threat was "marred by continuing uncertainties abroad and an 
undertone of self-doubt at home." Besides the resurgence of ethnic tensions and the 
possibility of anarchy in the former Soviet Republics and satellite states, international 
poverty was still on the rise. At home, the US faced a "shrinking industrial base, a 
deteriorating national infrastructure and widening personal, corporate and government 
debt" which seemed to "undercut free-market capitalism at its moment of triumph." 
These and other troubles noted above were "robbing many people of the faith in the future 
that Alexis de Tocqueville ... called a hallmark of the American character."26 
The importance of these dynamics for US foreign policy lay in the effect it had on 
the national debate as the choice for president drew near. As Bill Clinton and the "New 
Democrats" focused on reviving America by reinvigorating its economy through exports 
and reconstruction, the advantages the Republicans had held over the Democrats due to 
the focus on national security throughout the Cold War finally gave way, in spite of 
George Bush's popularity after the victory in the Gulf War of 1991. The issues had 
changed, and foreign policy (except for trade) was largely forced out of the campaign 
26n us agenda for the 90's: domestic needs, global priorities." In Great Decisions (I 992 Edition), a 
publication of the Foreign Policy Association. New York, NY: 3. 
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debate, at the public level at least. Clinton gained the presidency with what was 
construed by pollsters as a firm mandate to reconstruct America first, a refrain familiar at 
other war-ends (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1996: 551, 539), though troublesome in its 
resonance with contemporary calls for an American withdrawal from the international 
stage (Kauffman, 1995). 
3.4.1 The Vietnam Generation 
. At the same time, Clinton became the foremost representative of "a new and very 
different generation of national politicians, whose formative political experiences were 
civil rights and the Vietnam War, not World War II and containing communism." 27 A 
self-avowed Wilsonian, Clinton during his campaign espoused the goals of recapturing 
American leadership in building a world where democracy and free-trade would insure 
US national security as well as promote respect for human rights. Foreign policy theory 
ran afoul of praxis, however, within months of Clinton'S inauguration. The 
administration's decision to renew China's Most Favored Nation status in May 1993, for 
instance, was among the first signs that human rights would not trump other issues in 
foreign relations. The quagmire feared in Bosnia-Herzegovina also bedevilled Clinton's 
avowed commitment to human rights, as the "ethnic cleansing" by Serbs against Muslims 
continued unabated and the siege of Sarajevo deepened, despite UN resolutions and other 
multilateral diplomatic manoeuvres. Any tentative steps toward US military action in the 
Balkans were halted by the events in Somalia of October 1993, when the humanitarian 
mission initiated under the Bush administration backfired and 17 American soldiers were 
killed in an attempt to capture the powerful Mogadishu warlord, Mohammed Farah 
Aideed. Public opinion immediately appeared to tum against US intervention in Somalia 
and Bosnia, and remained a factor militating against US intervention to stem the genocide 
27 John Stremlau, in discussion on this dissertation. 
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in Rwanda the following year. In the meantime, a late-1993 attempt to restore ousted 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in Haiti failed, even as Clinton was 
backtracking on his campaign promises to change the Bush policy of repatriating refugees 
of that strife-torn neighboring nation. Haitian refugee policy was eventually overturned 
in early 1994, under pressure from the Congressional Black Caucus and TransAfrica, and 
Aristide was returned to power under American military protection later that year, but not 
without considerable public controversy.28 
Clinton did notch up a few foreign policy successes in his first year, the most 
acclaimed of which were in expanding world trade.29 The successful passage of the North 
American Free Trade Act (NAFTA) is largely credited to Clinton's personal interest and 
lobbying. His participation at the meeting of the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum and his role in finalising the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT) were likewise lauded in the press (Drew, 1994: 355). And, in 
the period before the November 1994 mid-term elections (and the switch to Republican 
majorities in both houses of Congress), Clinton set forth his "Open Markets 2000" trade 
initiative. As later noted by Clinton's first Secretary of State, Warren Christopher: "We 
[President Clinton and I] are convinced that political and economic diplomacy are 
indivisible," and that "history will judge this priority [that is, promoting open markets and 
sustainable economic growth] to be a distinctive imprint -- and lasting legacy -- of this 
administration's foreign policy" (Christopher 1995). By June 1994, when trade 
discussions with South Africa began under the auspices of a US-South Africa Business 
Development Council, the Clinton administration -- and especially Secretary of 
Commerce Ronald Brown -- was confident that little stood in the way of anew, 
burgeoning trade relationship between the US and emerging markets the world over. 
28For detailed accounts of Clinton's foreign policy moves in his first two years, see Drew {I 994) and, 
r~arding Haiti, Copson (18 January 1996: 31-34). 
2 The Middle East Peace Accord, though signed in September 1993 at the White House, is not credited to 
Clinton, as it was negotiated by Norway. 
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Brown, the first African-American to hold the top commerce post, as well as that 
of Democratic Party Chairman, applied his leadership skills to giving commerce a highe.r 
profIle in the post-Cold War world. His BEM (Big Emerging Market) initiative, first 
detailed in a September 1993 Commerce Department report to Congress,· formed an 
important element of the Clinton administration drive to strengthen US economIC 
engagement worldwide, and to influence developments within "regional economic 
drivers" whose future directions were considered likely to have "a huge impact on 
regional and global trends that [would] define the post-Cold War era" (Stremlau, 
1994/95: 18). Brown's strong personal interest in South Africa could be seen in his 
emphasis on Pretoria's potential under the BEM initiative. This was the dawning, thought 
Clinton and his team of advisors, of a new approach for US foreign policy. 
3.4.2 First Post-Apartheid US President 
Clinton, first to be elected as US president in a world free of Cold War fears, also 
took up the helm on US South Africa policy after Pretoria's unbanning of the African 
National Congress and the release of Nelson Mandela. George Bush, vice-president 
under Reagan during the years of constructive engagement policy, had little credibility 
with the ANC and even less among civil rights and anti-apartheid activists in the US 
when these developments occurred in South Africa in early 1990, in the midst of his 
presidential term. Clinton, while by no means at the head of any anti-apartheid protests 
as Governor of Arkansas at the time, entered the White House without the baggage of his 
predecessor, and appeared far more attuned to the groundswell of sentiment on the issue 
among the African-American popUlation. Clinton's vice-president, Al Gore, Jr, a Southern 
Democrat who represented the state of Tennessee in the Senate in the mid-1980's, was 
similarly aware of the domestic political dynamics of South African issues. Moreover, 
according to one analyst close to events in Washington at the time, unlike his 
predecessors who had come into office conceiving of US South Africa policy as a 
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"derivative of higher strategic (EastlWest) concerns," Clinton "appeared detennined to 
make his policy toward South Africa another key measure of his break with the Cold War 
past." 
In fact, the early moves of the Clinton administration in fonnulating policy toward 
South Africa had as much to do with race relations in the US as they had to do with 
events in South Africa or around the globe, it would appear. Although it was not until 
1997 that Clinton launched his "One Nation" initiative on race in the US, several 
indicators showed his intention that racial reconciliation in the US would be one of the 
legacies of his presidency. His deliberate placement of African-Americans and other 
minorities in positions of power within his administration was one early indicator. His 
openness to the appeals of the Congressional Black Caucus and other influential African-
Americans on issues in US South Africa policy was another. Indeed, as the South 
African negotiations for a transitional settlement progressed during 1993, it became clear 
that, except for residual worries about the ANC alliance with the South African 
Communist Party, the US was eager to see Nelson Mandela in the seat of power. 
Clinton's pledge of $600 million in US development assistance, announced days after 
Mandela's election, and the ensuing efforts to highlight South Africa's political miracle of 
peaceful transition to non-racial democracy, underlined this support. It was also 
reflective, no doubt, of Washington's relief that Pretoria had largely succeeded in 
avoiding a race war. The consequences for US race relations of a successful "New South 
Africa" could only be positive, it seemed. South Africa became a role model for 
America's own struggle to deal with racial diversity, seized upon eagerly by Clinton and 
Gore. 
Subsequently, several substantive initiatives ensued in US South Africa policy, as 
shall be discussed in the following chapter. However, especially with regard to expanded 
trade and investment, the US could do little about the fact that South Africa must 
compete with other newly liberalised countries for international markets and foreign 
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capital in the 1990's. Nations of the fonner Soviet Union, of eastern Europe and Latin 
America, were far more familiar to US investors than was South Africa, and did not bear 
Africa's reputation as an economic "black hole." The calls on shrinking US development 
assistance from these regions and from the rest of the African continent were, likewise, 
numerous. The prospect that US policy would become little more than making 
encouraging noises in the direction of Pretoria was very real. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The reader may well ask what the Cold War and apartheid have to do with policy 
toward post-apartheid South Africa in the second half of the 1990's, in the midst of a 
changed world, and facing a transfonned South Africa. However, the legacy of the Cold 
War within policymaking institutions, and indeed the American psyche if you will, as 
well as the failure of the US to adequately address its own challenges posed by its racial 
diversity, are factors which impinge greatly on US South Africa policy in the 1994-1998 
period. 
In the forthcoming chapter on the policy of the Clinton/Gore administration 
toward post-apartheid South Africa in the period 1994-1998, current US South Africa 
policy is introduced for reference in the subsequent chapters of analysis. While issue-area 
analysis is not yet employed, the emergence of the four issues-types prevalent in US 
policy toward post-apartheid South Africa prepare the ground for the subsequent 
chapters. 
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A Survey: 
Clinton's Policy towards Post-Apartheid South Africa 
From the successful closure in 1993 of the Kempton Park talks during which 
parties to South Africa's future hammered out a transitional constitution and made 
provision for "free and fair" national elections, through the May 1994 inauguration of 
President Nelson Mandela and the dramatic fly-past of the South African Air Force in his 
honour, the Clinton administration remained more than attentive. In fact, Clinton and his 
deputy, Al Gore, Jr, have expressed more interest in South Africa than had any of their 
predecessors, save Jimmy Carter in the 1970's. Why? Beyond the obvious attraction of 
South Africa's success in navigating a peaceful transformation process, what is the 
rationale behind this attention? 
Perhaps, as many critics assert, US interest has to do with an American drive to 
expand and consolidate a post-Cold War, Neo-Liberal Economic Order, one in which the 
US -- or a transnational elite under US aegis -- retains hegemony and is free to promote 
liberal democracy as the international ideology (eg, Robinson, 1996; Arrighi, 1994; Layne 
and Schwarz, 1993). In that case, the US would be looking to coopt the newly 
democratic South Africa as a surrogate, encouraging Pretoria to become a regional 
hegemon -- albeit always on US terms. While this may be partly true, the previous global 
analysis demonstrates that the US is hardly in a position, on its own, to dictate to a nation 
such as South Africa the terms on which relations must rest. In which case perhaps, it is 
suggested before the following survey of US South Africa policy, US calls for 
"partnership" are rising out of American domestic political dynamics and out of the 
challenges presented to the formulation of US foreign policy by the changed global 
context of the 1990's. 
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Stated US policy towards South Africa, as expressed by the Clinton 
administration through all its various mouthpieces and initiatives, is the starting point for 
drawing up the map of US South Africa policy in the immediate post-apartheid period. A 
look at the various outworkings of this policy includes US initiatives as well as US 
responses to events involving South Africa, with a view to drawing the bold strokes for 
the more detailed and nuanced analysis via the issue-areas paradigm in subsequent 
chapters. 
4.1 Policy Statements 
"America wants ... and America needs a strong South Africa. And we are 
determined to work with you as you build a strong South Africa." These words from 
President Clinton in his speech to South Africa's National Assembly, Cape Town, on 26 
March 1998, sum up the thrust of American policy pronouncements regarding South 
Africa in the post-apartheid period. They are the "stated policy," around which most 
other policy statements can be fitted. The fact of Clinton's visit, the first ever by a sitting 
US president, adds some credence to his words, as do statements and visits by numerous 
other high-level US officials since 1994. 1 Congratulating Nelson Mandela from 
Washington, DC, on his election that year, Clinton outlined America's reasons for placing 
such importance on South Africa: " ... We have important interests at stake in the success 
of South Africa's journey," said Clinton. "We have an economic interest in a thriving 
South Africa that will seek our exports and generate greater prosperity throughout the 
region. We have a security interest in a stable, democratic South Africa working with its 
neighbours to restore and secure peace." And finally, "We have a clear moral interest. 
I These visitors include Vice-President Al Gore, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher and his successor Madeleine Albright, late Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and his 
successor William Daly, and Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, as well as several other members of 
the presidential cabinet. Such a flow of official visitors is unprecedented in US relations with Africa as a 
whole, and with South Africa in particular due to apartheid. 
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We have had our own difficult struggles over racial division, and still we grapple with the 
challenges of drawing strength from our own diversity." 
These three interests -- economic, security, and "moral" -- appear to be the basis 
for current initiatives and responses in US dealings with post-apartheid South Africa. In 
short, the US is seeking in South Africa a "partner" in Africa who will work toward US 
goals, if not necessarily always according to US preferences. Those goals do include a 
world characterised by free-market, liberal democracy, as well as increased regional 
conflict prevention and peacekeeping capacities, all of which would alleviate the burden 
on the US to provide resources for international security and humanitarian purposes in 
Africa. As issues of sovereignty and equal opportunity in world markets continue to 
dominate the agenda of the nations of the South -- of which South Africa is generally 
. recognised as a leader in its own right -- there are some indications that South Africa 
won't always wish to cooperate. Its insistence on continuing close relations with states 
which the US classifies as pariah states is only one example. The refusal of South 
African Health Minister Nkosazana Zuma to bow to US pressure (on IPR grounds) to 
change South Africa's new laws regulating drugs is another. Much of the critical 
literature on US international affairs relates to the inherent pressure of such a large 
economy as America's dealing with such small, developing economies as South Africa's, 
and the responsibility that dynamic places on policymakers in the US to be sensitive to 
such issues as state sovereignty in the "third world" (eg, Arrighi, 1994; Hobsbawm, 1994; 
Bush and Szeftel, 1995). Rather than liberal democracy, US policy is seen in this view as 
"free enterprise imperialism" (Arrighi, 1994). Indeed, there is much to the argument that 
international financial institutions need to rethink current strategies, which have 
obviously not worked in Africa (Leys, 1994), and that the "democratization of global 
institutions ... making them more accountable" to the wider international community may 
be the place to begin (Bush and Szeftel, 1995). No doubt the currency crisis in Asia, and 
the ensuing political and economic decline the region experienced throughout 1998 
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(which occured subsequent to the writing of the works cited above) have increased the 
probability that "demands for a wider system of international representation and a 
reduction in the monopoly of decision-making by the core economic powers may well be 
the site of struggles for independence for Africa and the South in the next century" (Bush 
and Szeftel, 1995). 
From the American perspective, however, according to Clinton's ambassador to 
South Africa James Joseph, the US "respects and strongly supports South Africa's 
sovereignty. It is the fundamental on which our partnership is based." He believes that 
"too many Americans fought too long and too hard for us to engage in any activity which 
would undermine that. ,,2 In the meantime, it generally appears that South Africa has 
chosen to ride in the slipstream of the US push to promote liberal democracy globally, 
seeking greater market shares for its own emerging economy. And the US, for its part, 
continues to express a policy of encouraging deeper US-South Africa ties. Whether US 
policy actions, in the form of initiatives and responses to issues involving South Africa, 
support stated US policy should become apparent after the following overview of those 
actions and the ensuing issue-area analysis. 
4.2 US Policy Initiatives on South Africa 
US South Africa policy from 1994 to 1998 has included several major initiatives, 
each of which include many programmes and projects. The initiatives may be listed as: 
• Increased development assistance; 
• The Investing in People conference in June 1994, at which formation of the US-South 
Africa Business Development Committee was announced. 
• Establishment of the US-South Africa Binational Commission; 
• Trade and investment promotion through the Big Emerging Market concept; 
2Quoted in Hadland, Adrian (\997). "New US interest in Africa destines SA to become a valued partner, 
spats aside." Sunday Independent (November 16). 
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• Attempts to bolster South Africa's regional role through the African Crisis Response 
Initiative and support for South Africa's efforts in conflict resolution in Africa, and 
• the Africa Growth and Opportunity Initiative. 
4.2.1 Increased Development Assistance to South Africa 
Even before Nelson Mandela took up residence at Tuynhuis as President of South 
Africa, Bill.Clinton moved to place the United States at the forefront of foreign assistance 
to help Pretoria build a broader, more inclusive economy, and to address the inequities of 
apartheid. On 5 May, 1994, Clinton announced a three-year, $600 million trade, 
investment and development package to "help the new South African government 
generate jobs, finance housing and health delivery systems, improve education and 
promote good governance." This figure, (even though slightly scaled down by 
Congress3), represented a significant increase over previous levels of US assistance to 
South Africa,4 though it may be only "peanuts" in terms of the South African economy 
(with a GDP of $130bn in 1996) and its needs, and in terms of US aid allotments to other 
regions (in particular to Israel, which received $3bn that year, relative to Sub-Sahara 
Africa's $2.2bn total). 
USAID had, prior to this announcement, begun a thorough "reengineering" of its 
programme in Pretoria, as a pilot project in "reinventing government," having grown 
from a staff of 1 in 1985 to 120 in 1994. It had also developed a Country Strategic Plan 
for South Africa, laying out six "strategic objectives" based on consultation with officials 
and non-governmental organisations in South Africa. These objectives were in the areas 
of democracy and governance, education, health, economic policy capacity, private sector 
development; and housing and urban services. Having already begun the switch from 
3Congress later shot down $200 worth of housing guarantees promised to South Africa, of which $81 
million was later recovered. See Fabricius, Peter. "Brace yourselffor US Vice-President and delegation: 
We should not become complacent about US aid." The Star (30 November 1995). 
4This amounted to an annual increase of 165 percent from 1993 to 1994 in South Africa's USAID allotment 
-- from roughly $80m to $211.7m -- followed by $187m in 1995 and $163.5m 1996. Source: 
"USAID/SOUTH AFRICA: Supporting Sustainable Transformation," USAID Pretoria (June 1997). 
109 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Clinton's Policy 
working exclusively outside the host government in South Africa to funding through the 
host government (prior to 1994, government-to-government assistance was prohibited 
under the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986), USAID also stated that it 
planned to allow the South African government more say in the content of US assistance 
efforts, relative to other aid recipients, due to South Africa's leading economic role in 
Sub-Sahara Africa. 5 At the same time, AID has come out in support of the 
administration's policy to gradually replace aid with trade, and in any case had worked out 
a "graduation strategy" for South Africa on the basis that by the year 2005, South Africa 
should have outgrown its need for such aid.6 
With the inception of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission, much of US AID's 
work in South Africa was again reevaluated for how well it might fit into planned BNC 
structures. Programmes have either been subsumed under the aegis of the BNC (thOUgh 
funded by AID, such as the South Africa Economic Development Fund of $IQOm to 
assist businesses in South Africa with start up and other capital) or remained separate, 
based on suitability and whether projects already had their own momentum (such as a 
large part of AID's education programme). Also, because several US agencies involved 
with the BNC lacked programmatic funding for international projects, USAID has had to 
measure each request for funding from these agencies in light of its own strategic plan 
5This fact, plus continued funding of some non-governmental advocacy groups (under the democracy and 
governance strategic objective) which were challenging the ANC policy on such issues as land restitution 
and affirmative action, were the subject of great controversy in Washington, in the form of the Munson 
report to Congress ("Trip Report: Review of the US Aid Program in South Africa," submitted to US 
Representative Benjamin Gilman (5 November 1996) and later in Pretoria. (ANC newsbrief: "US AID 
BODY HINDERED MANDELA'S GOVERNMENT, SAYS CONGRESS REPORT," Johannesburg (14 
February 1998), website <www.anc.org.za> The report eventually led to some joint review with the ANC. 
6The need for assistance for infrastructure development in the greater southern Africa region will continue, 
and AID has several long-term projects in process in such areas as transport, environmental conservation, 
and agricultural production, run out of its regional mission in Botswana. Also, the US Trade and 
Development Agency, while technically promoting business prospects for American citizens, has effectively 
supported development in the region through efforts such as the Maputo Railway Network project. For 
details on this and other USTDA projects in South and Southern Africa, see USTDA's Infrastructure and 
Industry Opportunities in South Africa, Arlington, Virginia (I 997). Website <www.tda.gov> 
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and the needs of the BNC education committee, which IS co-chaired by USAID's 
administrator, Brian Atwood. 
Table 3: Leading DFA Recipients 
(Obligations, $millions - Ranked according to 1998 allocation) 
FY1996* FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 
(est.) (allocation) (request) 
South Africa 122.4 89.7 70.6 50.5 
Ethiopia 39.8 38 .3 45 .6 37.6 
Uganda 39.6 41.4 44.7 48 .3 
Mozambique 51.3 31.0 38.4 4 1.2 
Ghana 39.3 41.3 38 .2 36.5 
Malawi 33 .8 36.1 36.1 32 .5 
Mali 30.3 32.0 35 .9 30.6 
Tanzania 23.3 18 .7 19 .7 21.6 
Kenya 24 .3 20.2 19.5 19. 3 
Zambia 20.8 17.1 18 .3 19.2 
Senegal 25 .0 23.3 17.3 24.5 
Benin 16.5 13 .9 17.1 15.6 
Madagascar 20.1 18.3 17 .0 16 .5 
Guinea 15 .2 13 .8 16 .9 16.8 
Angola 15 .9 11 .5 13 .0 13.0 
Zimbabwe 23 .3 18 .1 11.8 2.0 
Eritrea 8.4 9.8 10.6 10.0 
(Source: Copson .(1998): 6.) 
111 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Clinton's Policy 
Prior to these developments, from the mid-1980's, US aid to Africa as a whole had 
come under increasing pressure and began a decline which threatened to become 
precipitous under the 104th Congress in the early 1990's. South Africa stood out from 
Africa due to Clinton's 1994 $600 million pledge, a pledge which was politically difficult 
to cut in view of the euphoria surrounding Pretoria's peaceful transition to an ANC-Ied 
government. Thus it easily survived a specific attack from within the House foreign 
appropriations committee which was attempted on the grounds that "some members of 
the new South African government were communists. ,,7 The implications for South 
Africa in the short to medium term of cuts to Africa's US aid allotments generally, 
however, are significant, as the principle foreign aid channel for Sub-Sahara Africa (the 
Development Fund for Africa) includes South Africa's aid allocation and is appropriated 
as one sum (See Table 3). Moreover, while aid may indeed become less important to 
South Africa itself, reduced aid levels will affect South Africa's neighbours, in whose 
economic viability South Africa has a great stake in terms of regional stability, export 
growth prospects, and refugee flows. 
4.2.2 The Business Development Committee 
The formation of the US-South Africa Business Development Committee (BDC) 
was announced at the US-sponsored Investing in People conference in early June 1994, in 
Atlanta, Georgia. This conference, just weeks before a White House Conference on 
Africa where US policy towards the continent was discussed, focused solely on South 
Africa and how the US could participate in the realisation of South Africa's political and 
economic promise. At the signing ceremony inaugurating the BDC, the late Secretary of 
Commerce Ron Brown announced that he and his counterpart in South Africa, then 
7"Bid to cut US aid to SA defeated." Cape Times (27 May 1994). 
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Trevor Manuel, would co-chair this new entity, which many see now as the forerunner of 
the Gore-Mbelci Binational Commission. 
The BDC, as of 1999, remains an autonomous body, consisting of representatives 
from 21 US companies and 21 South African companies "working to eliminate barriers 
and generate an even greater volume of trade" between the US and South Africa, in the 
words of the late Brown. From 1995, its activities have been largely subsumed into the 
trade and development committee of the Gore-Mbeki BNC, which is chaired by Brown's 
and Manuel's successors, William Daly and Alec Erwin. Its focus on the private sector 
has remained key to its mission, although there are signs that its work has been hampered 
by some lack of interest among US business and the more influential firms in South 
Africa. 8 
4.2.3 The US-South Africa Binational Commission 
It was during Mandela's first visit to the US as head of state in October 1994 that 
Mandela and ClInton discussed the establishment of a bilateral forum through which the 
US and South Africa might normalise relations and expand areas of cooperation. The 
result was that in March of 1995, the two countries launched the US-South Africa 
t: 
Binational Commission, co-chaired by Vice-President Al Gore and Executive Deputy 
President Thabo Mbeki, and designed to meet twice a year at alternating venues between 
the US and South Africa. Organised jointly by the US and South Africa (by the US office 
of the Vice President and the National Security Council in Washington, and by the offices 
of the Deputy Executive President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Pretoria), the 
binational commission affords the opportunity for regular contact between Gore and 
Mbeki, and for progress on several joint projects carried out by technical committees . 
. 8The Department of Commerce was having trouble recruiting private sector volunteers to serve the two year 
terms on the BDC (Barber, 9 July 1998), and a previous member of the BDC commented in an interview 
that "the current BDC has few significant South African players on board." 
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The committees -- originally numbering five and focused on trade and investment; 
conservation, the environment and water; human resources development and education; 
science and technology; and sustainable energy -- are co-chaired at the ministerial-level 
In 1996, a sixth committee was formed to deal with agricultural issues. Working groups 
on health and on housing were created in early 1997. A seventh committee, on defence, 
was conspicuous for its absence (probably due to the outstanding Armscor case) until 
Gore and Mbeki created it in July 1997, at the fourth BNC meetings in Washington. An 
eighth committee, to deal with law enforcement cooperation, was announced at the end of 
the fifth BNC meeting in August 1998. These committees meet as necessary between the 
full plenary BNC meetings, and have effectively been required to produce concrete results 
each six months. 
The US holds only one other such binational commission, with Russia, as well as 
semi-commissions with Egypt, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan. While there exist several 
"joint commissions" between the US and other nations, these do not operate at an 
'executive" (ie, vice-presidential) level. The US-South Africa BNC is considered by 
members of the vice-president's staff to be the most substantive of the binational 
commissions, or at least "the biggest in terms of issues addressed."9 While not initially 
designed to deal with issues of policy, nor to be a place where differences would be 
resolved, in practice it has been allowed to be seen as an avenue through which the US 
and South Africa can discuss sensitive issues such as alleged IPR violations, the Armscor 
case, rumours of arms sale to Syria, and South Africa's controversial pharmaceuticals 
legislation. 
Examples of accomplishments touted by the BNC as of the August 1998 meeting 
were a new tax treaty, a new civil aviation treaty, the New Africa Opportunity Fund 
(sponsored by OPIC to attract investment capital to southern Africa), the completion of 
9Confidential interview (#36). 
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250 energy efficient, affordable homes in Kutlawang and Guguletu, numerous exchanges 
for consultation and training, legal and technical assistance with water resource 
management, establishment of the GLOBEIO programme in several South African 
schools, enhanced predictions of EI Nino's repercussions for southern Africa, US market 
openings for South African citrus and proteas and other agribusiness, growing coopertion 
between US and South African law enforcement agencies to curtail drug trafficking 
through South Africa as well as incidents of international terrorism, and support for the 
South African National Youth Commission with the help of US business and voluntary 
organisations. In another example of the BNC activities, an estimated 260 US business 
people attended a two-day South Africa trade and investment conference coinciding with 
the July 1997 BNC meeting in Washington, DC, sponsored by the US Department of 
Commerce, the US Trade and Development Agency, the Export-Import Bank, and the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation. 
The apparent continued momentum of the Gore-Mbeki Commission has surprised 
sceptics, as even over the year-long hiatus before the fifth BNC meeting in August 1998 
in Washington, the commission seemed to keep up its pace of work and "deliverables" at 
the committee level. II Scepticism grew when the meetings, originally planned for 
February 1998 in Pretoria, were postponed twice due to the need for Gore's presence in 
Washington during the US stand-off with Iraq, and then cancelled over scheduling 
conflicts (including Clinton's visit in March of that year). There seemed to have been 
little beyond logisitical difficulties, however, when Gore and Mbeki finally met in 
Washington in August. The two subsequently agreed at the August BNC meeting that 
10Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment, a science and education programme at the 
junior school level that uses the internet to link students, teachers and scientists around the world to share 
data about the earth's environment. 
II At the post-BNC press conference on 6 August in Washington, Mbeki followed Gore's listing of recent 
BNC developments with the statement that "I think this should lay to rest the speculation .. .in South Africa 
about the Binational Commission being in trouble ... As you can see these reports are not correct." Federal 
Infonnation Systems Corporation, Transcript 982180305. 
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the full commission -- the principals, all committees and working groups -- would in 
future meet only once a year, however. The second meeting each year, described as an 
executive meeting of the commission, would include mainly "principals" (ie, Gore and 
Mbeki), with committee co-chairs and functionaries attending on an "as needed" basis. 
Further, at the fifth BNC meeting, commerce officials mooted a US-South Africa 
trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA), and have since set in place such an 
arrangement. In other instances of US foreign relations, the establishment of a TIF A has 
been the first step in the development of free trade pacts. In any case, according to US 
official statements, by providing for regular consultation on "trade concerns" between 
representatives of both governments, a TIF A serves as a "mechanism for resolving 
routine issues at the working level." This may prove to be the most enduring 
contribution of the BNC yet. 
While critics have called on the BNC to expand its focus to cover the issues of 
southern Africa and beyond, officials and other analysts remain certain that the 
development of the bilateral relationship is most important at this stage. 12 Whether or 
not the BNC will survive the promotion of Mbeki to the office of president following 
South Africa's elections in 1999 and the forthcoming elections in the US (in November 
2000) is an open question. Certainly, without the original euphoria of South Africa's 
transition from apartheid and the rapport which Gore and Mbeki reportedly share, it will 
be a different BNC than that of the period 1994-1998. 
4.2.4 The Big Emerging Market Concept 
In launching the "Big Emerging Market" (BEM) initiative, an outgrowth of the 
Clinton administration's National Export Strategy in July 1995, Secretary of Commerce 
12From confidential interviews (# 35, #41), and Pauline Baker (#28). 
116 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Clinton's Policy 
Ron Brown included South Africa as one of ten economies 13 holding particularly great 
potential as markets and investment destinations for US business. With the post-Cold 
War period described as "an era when US foreign policy and national security will 
increasingly revolve around [its] commercial interests, and when economic diplomacy 
will be essential to resolving the great issues of our age,"14 the BEM initiative generated 
substantial interest. And despite the subsequent currency shocks to several of the so-
named economies, the commercial content of foreign policy towards the BEMs, including 
South Africa, remains salient for US policymakers. 
Brown pointed out that already US exports to the BEMs exceeded exports to 
Europe and Japan, and that BEM GDP was 25 percent of that of the industrialised world. 
Their combined GDP of over $2trillion accounted for as large a share of world output as 
Germany and the UK combined. 15 The inclusion of South Africa as a BEM received. a 
mixed reaction on the part of trade specialists in the US, however, as some believed the 
choice was more a statement of political support, or the personal preference of Secretary 
Brown, than one of serious economic interest. As an African-American leader who 
"readily admitted that he had a special attitude toward South Africa" (Mainstreet, 1996), 
Brown was sorely missed after his death in an aeroplane crash near Croatia in April 1996. 
In any case, as one of these chosen markets, South Africa became the subject of 
heightened trade promotion efforts on the part of the Clinton administration both in the 
US and in South Africa. These efforts included the establishment or strengthening of US 
foreign commercial service offices to expedite the processing of export licenses and other 
red tape which inhibit business, and the organisation of a series of business delegations 
13These are: the Chinese economic area (including China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan), India, South Korea, 
Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Poland, Turkey, and the Association of South East Asian Nations 
~Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam). 
4Jeffrey Garten, then US Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, quoted in Stremlau 
~ 1994/95): 18. 
5From the BEM website <www.stat-usa.gov/itabems.html> 
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visiting South Africa. 16 Before his death, Brown appointed lawyer and South African 
specialist Millard Arnold to the Commerce Department's one roving ambassadorial post 
of Minister Counselor, and assigned him to Johannesburg as another signal of US interest 
in South Africa's economic success. 
South Africa has, it would appear, benefited under the BEM programme, as it has 
seen trade with the US grow steadily since 1994. Some observers question whether this 
growth might have occurred in any case, with the lifting of sanctions after Mandela's 
elections, and others point out that trade and investment have not grown nearly as quickly 
as South Africans were led to expect. I 7 Still, the numbers are impressive. From 1994 to 
the end of 1997, US exports to South Africa had grown by 38 percent (from $2.173bn to 
$2.999bn), and US imports from South Africa had grown by 23 percent (from $2.030bn 
to $2.500bn).I8 US companies operating in South Africa had risen to just over 300, 
bringing the number back to the pre-sanctions level. I 9 US foreign investment in South 
Africa rose by $10.8bn in the year May 1996-May 1997 alone, accounting for nearly 30 
percent of all foreign investment in that period.20 While it is true that these increases 
may have been largely due to existing private sector interest in South Africa as an 
investment and export destination, at the very least the BEM initiative served to provide 
official US support for US firms entering the South African market in the early years after 
South Africa's transition. 
The financial crisis which has plagued many of the big emerging markets since 
Thailand's currency crashed in mid-1997 has, of course, caused a serious rethink in the 
16 According to the Department of Commerce South Africa desk officer, speaking in an interview with the 
author in late 1997, there had been a business delegation to South Africa almost every month since 1994. 
17 From a meeting with David Bridgman, then executive director of WESGRO, an investment promotion 
aiency for the Western Cape, South Africa, 24 August 1998. 
I Based on the official statistics of the US Department of Commerce. Exports are listed at F.a.s. value 
(Free alongside ship), which excludes the cost ofloading and transporting and insuring the goods. Imports 
are listed at customs value. 
I9From an Investor Responsibility Research Center report of August 1998, Washington, DC. 
20From an Investor Responsibility Research Center report of July 1997, Washington, DC. 
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BEM strategy. Private investors have led the way back into the more traditional markets 
of Europe and the US, at least for the short to medium term, it appears.21 While general 
fears over emerging market volatility have had some adverse effect on South Africa's 
investment figures, South Africa's few dizzying weeks of falling rand values and capital 
flight in mid- 1998 have not, however, received the negative reaction that the crisis in 
Asia received. Credit agencies continue to rate South Africa's economy as "stable" and 
commend the government's commitment to "prudent fiscal and monetary policy.22 
The BEM initiative seemed largely to have wound up by late 1998 in any case,23 
although when Brown's successor William Daley travelled to South Africa with President 
Clinton in March 1998 he assured South Africans that the initiative was still alive and 
weU.24 Much of the work of the initiative, it seems, has been absorbed by the Binational 
Commission, which includes the US-South Africa Business Development Committee set 
up under Brown. What remains is the BEM label, which mayor may not be an asset in 
light of the performance of other "emerging markets" in the late 1990's, but which has, iIi. 
the meantime, no doubt lent to greater US commercial interest in South Africa. 
21 See Gwynne, S.C. "What a Drag! Economic Troubles in Asia, Russia and Latin America Threaten the 
US. Time (14 September, 1998): 28. 
22Investment firm Moody's renewed South Africa's investment-grade debt rating in early October, 1998, as 
did Duff & Phelps in late September, even after the tumultuous events of the previous months. See Barber 
(25 September and 7 October 1998). 
23 A search of the US Government's BEM website, for instance, shows the latest update as September 
1996. Also, in an October 1997 interview with the Commerce South Africa desk officer (see interview list), 
the issue of BEM's was not even noted as one of the major concerns of US policy towards South Africa. 
"Commercial policy-wise ... what comes to mind," he said, "is the future of the GSP (generalised system of 
preferences) programme and the Africa initiative (announced June 1997 by President Clinton) .. 
24 At a luncheon in Cape Town hosted by the Cape Chamber of Commerce, Daley and two African-
American cabinet members, Secretary of Transport Ronald Slater and Secretary of Labor Alexis Herman, 
addressed South African government and business leaders on the continuing effort of the Clinton 
administration to promote South Africa among US business leaders at home. Also present at the luncheon 
were several members of Congress backing the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and CEO's of major US 
corporations. 
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4.2.5 The African Crisis Response Initiative 
US interests in seeing South Africa lead the southern African region, and indeed 
the continent, into greater stability through economic prosperity are expressed through 
each of the developmental and commercial initiatives discussed above. Another aspect of 
US policy, embodied in its African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), is its interest in 
building African peacekeeping capabilities, and encouraging South Africa to take 
leadership in conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts on the continent. This initiative 
might be seen to reflect an increasing reluctance of the US to carry, in the words of one 
South African-based commentator, the financial burden of being "sole guarantor of the 
international security system," as well as America's search for "multilateral approaches to 
security concerns" and for "alliance with regional hegemons. ,,25 Such a reluctance would 
mirror, within the security issue-type, the changes in US policies with regard to the 
international financial system discussed in chapter 2. 
The ACRI began as an attempt to address the potential for further bloodshed in 
central Africa after the genocide in Rwanda in the first half of 1994. The US had done 
little to act during that crisis, due mainly to the aforementioned "Somalia syndrome"-- the 
aversion of the US public to sending US troops to fight in Africa after the death of US 
peacekeepers in Mogadishu in 1993. Originally touted as an "African Crisis Response 
Force" (ACRF) during the visit of Clinton's first Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, 
to Africa in late 1996, the idea was rejected by several African leaders -- including 
Mandela -- as an American attempt to build a standing African force for US purposes. 
South Africa, in particular, was concerned "not to appear to continue the policies of the 
previous government, which engaged in military and economic destabilisation of 
neighbouring states," nor to go ahead of regional attempts to address conflict resolution.26 
25See comment in Broderick (1997), and also in a forthcoming publication on US-South African relations 
in the new millennium, edited by Jim Broderick, Gary Burford and Gordon Freer, Johannesburg. 
26"Mandela wary of plan for intervention force." Cape Times (II October 1996). 
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Since the appointment of Clinton's second Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, 
and of her Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice, the US has 
undergone further consultations on African peacekeeping with African leaders, the United 
Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, as well as with other developed nations 
involved in generating peacekeeping capabilities in Africa.27 The US has maintained 
throughout discussions that its objective in the ACRI is "not to create a standing African 
army," but to "enhance the capacity of African nations to respond to humanitarian crises 
and peacekeeping challenges in a timely and effective manner" by creating "rapidly-
deployable, interoperable units from stable, democratic countries" throughout the African 
continent. 28 Over time, the US envisions that African nations would develop standby 
control structures which would operate in cooperation with the donors, sub-regional 
organisations, the OAU and the UN to field the peacekeeping units.29 In addition, the US 
would ask each participating nation to sign an end-use and non-transfer agreement to 
ensure any equipment supplied is used only for peacekeeping and humanitarian purposes 
and that it is kept at the ready for such purposes. 
During 1997 the US began peacekeeping training In Senegal, Uganda, and 
Malawi, with plans to begin training in Ethiopia, Mali and Ghana by the following year. 
Thus far, the training sessions have reportedly included the media and NGO's operating in 
the locale who expressed an interest, not only as observers but also as role-playing 
participants.30 The training sessions, which last 60 days, include provision of "non-
27The latter include the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Nordic 
countries. Most of these offered either troops or logistical and training support in the short-lived Zaire 
peacekeeping plan abandoned in the face of an apparent settlement between Laurent Kabila and Zairean 
president Mobuto Sese Seko. Mobuto's government was later toppled when the agreement broke down and 
Kabila took power by military force. 
28From the testimony of Ambassador Marshall F. McCallie, US Department of State Special Coordinator 
for the African Crisis Response Initiative, before the House Subcommittee on Africa, 1 October 1997. 
29From Ambassoador McCalIie's testimony. 
30See congressional testimony by Vincent Kern, prepared for 1 October 1997, House Subcommittee on 
Africa, regarding the ACRI. 
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lethal" equipment31 and training in the establishment of checkpoints, perimeter security, 
convoy security, the processing of displaced persons, and other tasks traditionally 
associated with peacekeeping operations .. 
While the Clinton administration pursued this initiative with great energy before 
the impeachment trial of late 1998, plans for future training operations were in any case 
on hold until ACRI funding was approved by the US Senate (funding was assured only 
through late 1998). there are also administration concerns that the US and South Africa 
are not seen to be "ganging up and pushing the idea on others."32 However, without the 
participation of South Africa, as the African "heavyweight" with the political credentials 
to lead such an initiative, there is concern that it may eventually fade. Careful bilateral 
consultations throughout Africa will continue while US and South Africa develop their 
defence relationship through the BNC committee on defence, it appears. Clinton added 
his own personal support to the initiative when he visited Africa, and appealed for wider 
support among African nations. In the meantime, South Africa appears to be watching 
and waiting. According to one South African official dealing with the US, Pretoria's 
response to ACRI "will probably be positive in the long run,"33 but the political cost of 
such a response, in terms of South Africa's relations on the continent, appears too high for 
the time being. 
4.2.6 The US Africa Growth and Opportunity Initiative 
South Africa is not the major focus of the Africa Growth and Opportunity 
Initiative, which promotes trade and economic reform on the African continent as an 
alternative to traditional development assistance and has taken the form of proposals from 
31 Non-lethal refers to equipment such as standardised communications gear, night vision binoculars and 
load-bearing equipment, as well as ammunition for purposes of training ("and training only") in defensive 
marksmanship. See Kern testimony, as above. 
32Confidential interview (#39). 
33Confidential interview (#7). 
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the Clinton administration and parallel legislation sponsored by the bipartisan African 
Trade and Investment Causus within the House of Representatives. The initiative, 
however, does contain important provisions which effect South Africa, both directly and 
indirectly. While the legislation failed to make it through both houses of the US 
Congress under the 105th Congress, which ended in late 1998, there appears some 
potential for success under the newly elected 106th Congress. 
With regard to benefits for South Africa, both the Clinton and legislative 
proposals call for an extension of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), for 
instance, which provides duty free access to the US market for the importation of eligible 
items from developing countries. The 1998 legislation (HR 1432) attempted to extend 
the GSP for qualifying Sub-Saharan African countries beyond the present year-to-year 
basis, until the year 2007 (Sec 9(c)). Whereas in 1995, South Africa saved only $6m in 
duties under GSP,34 in mid-1998 South Africa's exports of unwrought gold and other 
items gained duty-free status, increasing significantly South Africa's stake in the GSP 
system.35 In another example, South Africa could gain up to 100,000 jobs36 under 
provlSlons in the legislation calling for duty-free access to the American market of 
African textiles and apparel, and a no-quota status on these items ahead of the 2005 
abolition of quotas under World Trade Organisation rules (Sec 8). 
Several other provisions37 of the legislation seek to benefit South Africa's 
neighbours and other African nations to the north, encouraging economic growth on the 
continent and thereby, according to liberal democratic thinking, the prospects for political 
34See Barber, Simon. "US preferential system comes out of hibernation." Business Day (26 September 
1996). -
35See Barber, Simon. "US duty review set to boost trade." Business Day (6 July 1998). 
36"Africa Trade and Opportunity Act 'will create 100000 clothing jobs'." Cape Times Business Report (25 
March 1998). 
37These provision include $150m from OPIC for a private equity fund (the New Africa Opportunity Fund) 
for investment in Africa (excluding South Africa), a $500m infrastructure fund, and a free-trade area 
between the US and eligible African economies by the year 2020. 
123 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Clinton's Policy 
stability and peace in Africa. The initiative has, however, run into opposition both in the 
US and in Africa, notably from South Africa in early 1998, on the grounds of placing 
conditions inappropriate to Africa on nations seeking to qualify for the proposed benefits. 
These conditions include "progress toward establishing a market-based economy" which 
is defined by various indicators such as "the protection of property rights" and removing 
"restrictions on investment," as well as requiring membership in the World Trade 
Organisation and compliance with any IMF programmes or obligations (sec.4 (a) and 
(b)). TransAfrica and other Africa lobbies (in opposition to other leading African-
Americans) voiced similar concerns, but other lobbies -- notably the textile lobby and 
organised labour -- opposed the legislation on grounds that it threatened US exports and 
jobs.38 Even after South Africa decided to support the legislation, with assurances that 
the "conditionalities" would be interpreted favourably through subsequent regulations, 
and even though there were provisions protecting against transshipment of goods from 
other markets (where labour was cheap, such as in Asia) through Africa, the legislation 
eventually lost momentum and was withdrawn in late 1998 to be reintroduced afresh in 
1999. 
There have, in any case, been tangible benefits already from the initiative. The 
first has been the raised profile of Africa in US foreign policy circles -- for reasons other 
than war or humanitarian crisis. For instance, the announcement of the Africa Growth 
and Opportunity Initiative was preceded by unprecedented activity surrounding trade and 
investment with Africa in the US congress and administration. A mid~April 1997 
conference between legislators and African business representatives and officials 
indicated African support for the bill,39 which was introduced as HR 1432 later that 
38See <www.citizen.org> for the lobbying efforts of the Public Citizens Global Trade Watch, a 
Washington, DC coalition of labour and industry protectionist groups. 
39US Infonnation Agency's Jim Fisher-Thompson reported on this conference in "Africans Respond 
Favorably to McDennott Trade Bill." USIA File ID: 9704210 1.AAF (21 April 1997). 
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month.40 HR 1432 followed submission by the administration in February 1997 of its 
"Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy for the Countries of Africa" as fulfilment 
of requirements flowing from US legislation implementing the Uruguay Round of 
international trade negotiations. The administration formally launched its adjusted 
"Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa" at the mid-1997 summit of 
the G7 (or the G7+, as it included Russia). The announcement of an African Economic 
Forum, to be hosted in Washington by the US Secretaries of Commerce, Treasury, and 
State, planned for December 1998 and similar to fora the US shares with the Pacific Rim 
states and Latin America, also holds some promise. This forum is purported to bring 
African finance and trade ministers of the "most strongly reforming" nations of the 
continent together to discuss, among other things, the Africa Growth and Opportunity 
legislation and how to improve it for reintroduction.41 
The Africa Growth and Oppurtunity initiative, perhaps more than the others, 
demonstrates the tension US policy must hold between singling out South Africa --
whether in military cooperation against communism, in confrontation over apartheid, or, 
in the 1990's, for special trade and investment efforts -- and incorporating South Africa 
into an overall approach to the Sub-Saharan region. While South Africa will benefit 
under the Africa Growth and Opportunity initiative, the fact that it has not been the focus 
of the initiative may be intended as a lever in US policy toward greater Africa. 
The above initiatives underline the stated policy of the Clinton administration 
toward post-apartheid South Africa. Policy is likewise expressed in US responses to 
international dynamics, often with telling effect. 
40 An initial attempt to pass similar legislation through Congress in 1996 failed at an early stage. See 
Dagne (April 1997) for details. 
41This announcement came from an unnamed Clinton official, quoted by Simon Barber in "Africa growth 
act 'is dead for the year'," Business Day (15 October 1998). 
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4.3 US Responses to South A/rica 
US South Africa policy as expressed through responses to events involving South 
Africa is less clearly defined than that expressed through policy statements and initiatives. 
It is in this category that the US has dealt with specific issues in ways perhaps 
unpredictable based on stated policy. But there are also instances where US responses 
underline the interests of the US as expressed in Clinton's speech in May of 1994, the 
"economic, security, and 'moral'" interests in South Africa's success as a sound, nonracial, 
and free-market democracy. 
The most salient responses in US South Africa policy over the period 1994-1998 
have been in four categories: l)the Armscor case and, related to that, 2)South Africa's 
ongoing relations with "rogue" states such as Syria, Libya, and Iraq; 3)the Nuclear 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review and extension; and 4)commercial disputes over 
perceived or threatened trademark violations in South Africa (eg, against McDonald's 
restaurant and US pharmaceuticals firms) and unfair trade practices (examples in this 
study are US chicken and South African steel dumping charges). 
US engagement policy has been hampered, and not derailed, by these differences 
of opinion between the US and South Africa; the conflicts that have arisen over the 
1994-1998 period, except perhaps the Armscor case, seem to be "teething problems" in 
the expanding political and commercial relationship more than anything else, from the US 
point of view. Whether or not South Africa can continue to expand the relationship in 
spite of these conflicting perspectives, in view of its relations with other nations of Africa 
and of the developing world, is likely to become more apparent as its new government 
refines its own foreign policy. Such a question should form the basis for a separate, 
though perhaps parallel, study. 
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4.3.1 Annscor 
The Armscor case, involving charges against South African finns for anns 
smuggling during the apartheid-era, was a "thorn in the side" of US-South African 
relations until its resolution in mid 1996, and even in 1998 continued to plague their 
defence relationship as they sorted out the resulting compliance programme and "agreed 
to disagree" over "rogue" state relations. The insistence on the part of the new South 
African government that it not be held responsible for the sins of the apartheid past was 
equalled by that of the US on maintaining the ban on US anns technology sales to South 
Africa until amends were made. 
South African anns manufacturing giant Armscor, its affiliate Kentron, and Fuchs 
Electronics were all charged in 1991 with operating front companies in the US which 
illegally acquired sensitive weapons technology, using fraudulent "end-use" certificates, 
and then organised the re-export of that technology to South Africa in the late 1980's. In 
one case, Fuchs allegedly used illegally-acquired American artillery shell fuse technology 
to make anns that were then sold to Iraq in 1990. The fact that US soldiers were 
deployed against systems based on that technology in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq 
made persecution of the case a non-negotiable in the US, even after installation of a new 
government in Pretoria. The ANC government, on the other hand, refused to bow to the 
steep fines (of over $60m) nor to the idea of the compliance programme allowing US 
investigators access to any South African defence facility and to anns dealers' customer 
files. It also contested the jurisdiction of the US courts in the matter. 
Finally, in discussions between Vice-President Gore and Deputy Executive 
President Mbeki during Mbeki's visit to Washington for the second round of BNC 
meetings, there was a breakthrough and a signed agreement followed in early 1997. The 
US reduced fines considerably (to $1.5m for ArmscorlKentron and $1O.5m for Fuchs), 
and the South Africans agreed to implementation of an internally designed and enforced 
compliance programme, to be approved by the US Department of State and lasting five 
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years. During that period, any revelations of illegal activity would result in prosecution 
under US federal law. By March 1998, the US lifted the last debannents on US anns 
technology sales to South Africa. 
The implied mistrust of South Africa's anns industry, especially with regard to the 
"end-use" of US military technology, stood in contrast to the close relations implied by 
formation of a binational commission and the expansion of trade ties in almost every 
other area. Yet US insistence that the Armscor case was not to be surrendered is an 
important footnote on US South Africa policy in the 1990's:· security concerns remain 
important, even in a field as lucrative as military technology. 
4.3.2 South Africa's relations with "Rogue" states 
Just before the Armscor agreement was signed in February 1997, rumours of 
pending South African anns sales to Syria reached the US Department of State. Reacting 
quickly, US officials informed the offices of Thabo Mbeki that US law prohibited foreign 
assistance to any state selling weapons to terrorist-sponsoring, or "rogue" states. Thus 
began a volley of diplomatic arrows, shot mostly through the press, between the US and 
South Africa, the former chiding South Africa for even considering entering into any such 
deal, and the latter defending its right to sovereignty. 
The basis for this conflict, and for similar US reactions to South African 
diplomatic relations with Libya and Iran, as well as with Iraq and North Korea and to a 
lesser degree with Cuba, is the rising US concern over international terrorism and its 
increasing impact on US national security. In view of the bombing of the World Trade 
Center in New York City in early 1993 by Arab extremists, and several other incidents 
perpetrated by either American nationals in the US or by foreign nationals against US 
troops and civilians outside the US, the US passed new counterterrorism legislation in the 
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form of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.42 This legislation 
tightened restrictions on the export of defence materials to 'nations deemed by the US to 
be state sponsors of terrorism, and extended that restriction to US allies receiving foreign 
assistance (sec 326). 
Decision on the South African sale to Syria was quietly deferred, relieving the US 
of the pressure to follow through on its threatened suspension of aid. While there is 
provision in the anti-terrorism legislation for a presidential waiver in cases considered 
"important to the national interests" of the US, apparently this did not apply. 
South African relations with Libya have been more nuanced, taking the form of 
formal diplomatic relations and respective visits and honours from Mandela and Libya's 
Muammar Gaddafi, in defiance of US signals opposing such contact. Mandela has 
repeatedly publicly confirmed his commitment to Libya, stating that South Africa would 
"never renounce [its] friends," including Gaddafi, "no matter how unpopular they may be 
with [the US]."43 Libya had been one of the states that assisted the ANC during the 
apartheid years in exile. 
Iran, an additional former ANC ally under apartheid, is also South Africa's major 
oil supplier. But while South Africa continues to conduct cordial diplomatic relations 
with Tehran, a deal to store Iranian oil off South Africa's west coast was stalled in late 
1996, blamed in part on US objections. The deal would have provided R750m annually 
to Pretoria's state funds, but remained subject to "commercial and diplomatic 
acceptability," and was subsequently referred for environmental assessments, seen by 
some observers to be "a political device to delay a final decision.,,44 Clinton, at this 
42Subsequent bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and of the Planet 
Hollywood Res~urant in Cape Town, in mid-1998 appear to have further strengthened US resolve to 
counter international terrorism. The US itself bombed suspected terrorist installantions in Afghanistan, 
weeks after the embassy bombings, in a controversial countennove. 
43"Mandela 'thinking of asking' Gadaffi to SA." Cape Times (I2 February 1996). 
44See Lamont, James. "Back to square one on Iran oil deal." Cape Times Business Report (16 September 
1996). 
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point, had just signed into law controversial legislation punishing foreign companies 
investing in oil or gas ventures in Iran or Libya.45 
South Africa's 1998 establishment of diplomatic relations with Iraq and North· 
Korea is apparently also of concern to the Clinton administration. Mbeki explained the 
ties, in response to a question from the press following the August BNC meetings, as 
necessary due to the fact that the next meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (of which 
Iraq and North Korea are members) was to be hosted by South Africa later that month. 
Gore, on the other hand, responded simply that "where we have disagreements, we work 
through them respectfully and privately. "46 
US policy on South Africa's relations with Cuba appears to have undergone some 
reformulation in the wake of Pope John Paul's visit to Havana in early 1998. Before that 
visit, the US continued to voice disapproval of the ongoing ties between Cuba's Castro 
and South Africa (albeit increasingly quietly),47 which included a government-to-
government agreement providing Cuban doctors to fill vacancies in South Africa. Moves 
toward capitalism on the part of Cuba in 1997, as well as a recognition that communism's 
threat to the US was truly dead, have made inroads into the staunch anti-Castro lobby's 
hold on US policy, it seems, and Clinton's announcement that the US is prepared to ease 
sanctions against Cuba, even if only for "humanitarian" purposes,48 would indicate less 
tension over South Africa's close ties with Cuba in the future. 
45The US law, which met with an outcry from European leaders charging extra-territoriality, has been 
quietly sidelined by the administration, which, after a near show-down with the European Union before the 
World Trade Organisation over similar legislation on trade with Cuba (the Helms-Burton law) in April 
1997, offered to consider waivers of the Iran-Libya law. 
46From the post-BNC press conference on 6 August in Washington, Federal Information Systems 
Corporation, Transcript 982180305. 
47"US soft-pedals on SA's ties." Cape Times (15 February 1996). 
48"Clinton eases a little on Cuba." Cape Times (20 March 1998). 
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4.3.3 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension 
The US response to South Africa's stance on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation 
has been much more in line with the positive, embracing rhetoric of the major US policy 
initiatives noted earlier. While Armscor may have been a "thorn in the side" of US-South 
African relations, American pronouncements on South Africa in the wake of the 
AprillMay 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference created the sense that the two 
nations were taking great strides ahead in their defence relations. 
The US sought indefinite extension of the existing treaty on nuclear non-
proliferation, under which the developed world could maintain some control over the 
spread of nuclear weapons while ostensibly working to reduce its own stockpiles. South 
Africa, as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of developing nations, faced 
a difficult decision in that NAM was opposed to such an extension, favouring instead 
only a fixed period extension, for the purposes of future negotiations that might change 
the status quo under which NAM countries were at a distinct disadvantage. However, the 
US was clear about its expectations that South Africa should support the US line.49 
South Africa, having voluntarily disposed of its own nuclear weapons stockpile in the 
early 1990's and sworn off development of future nuclear weaponry, was in a strong 
moral position to lead NAM countries along a similar path. The impetus behind the fact 
that in the end South Africa lobbied for the US position, and persuaded NAM to go along 
with it, is a matter of ongoing analysis.50 From late 1994, indications were of closer US-
South Africa cooperation in the nuclear field, as the US announced conclusion of a 
bilateral treaty with South Africa on adherence to the Missile Technology Control 
Regime Guidelines, and publicly supported South Africa's pursuit of membership in 
several important nuclear regimes (the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, 
49Based on reports in the Washington Post (17 April 1995), "the American ambassador to South Africa 
~uietly warned the South African elite what was expected from them." See Nel et al (1998): 13. 
OSee, for instance, Black, Ian (1996), Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen (1998), and Vesely (1998). 
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and the successor entity to the Multilateral Coordinating Committee (COCOM)51). The 
US provided powerful incentives for South African allegiance in this field with its 
promises of aid and trade, as well. 
In any case, the US was glowing in its praise following South Africa's stance at 
the NPT conference. Speaking at the first meeting of the US-South Africa Binational 
Commission in late 1995, Vice President Gore proclaimed that "clearly South Africa has 
a tremendous amount to offer the United Sates and the entire world. Your leadership on 
the issue of nuclear non-proliferation provides a model for the rest of the world. ,,52 
4.3.4 Commercial Disputes 
While overall, US commercial policy has been to promote South Africa as a trade 
and investment destination for US business, there have arisen several disputes which have 
threatened to undermine that stance. Among these were a much-publicised law suit 
brought by McDonald's restaurant of the US in 1995, and, in 1997, objections of the US 
pharmaceuticals lobby, Pharma, to South Africa's new Drug Control Act. Both of these 
disputes have received considerable attention from the Clinton administration, which has 
applied pressure on the South African government to create more US business-friendly 
conditions in South Africa. Other cases, involving tariffs on US chicken exports to South 
Africa and anti-dumping duties on South African steel in the US, have been trade 
disputes of a more traditional nature. While the latter seem to underline the growing 
normalisation of US-South African commercial relations, there has been concern that 
such tensions will rock the current consensus in the US supporting favourable policies 
toward South Africa. 
51 See US, South Africa to Create Binational Commission. White House statement and fact sheet. 
52Gore Praises South AFrica's Leadership on Nuclear Non-Proliferation. United States Infonnation 
Service (5 December 1995). 
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The McDonald's case arose from the use of the famous trademark name by a 
Durban businessman, who was able to register the familiar name and accompanying 
golden arches for his own restaurants because the American McDonald's had not operated 
in South Africa during the years of US sanctions. When the US firm -- whose worldwide 
turnover of R96 billion in 1995 exceeded the value of all South Africa's exports for that 
yearS3 -- sought to establish restaurants in South Africa, it sued for trademark 
infringement. At first, McDonald's lost its case on the grounds that under South African 
law, the Durban businessman had done no wrong. This, as well as similar cases 
involving other American trademark names such as "Toys R Us" and "Burger King," 
resulted in the US Trade Representative placing South Africa on its "watch list" of 
countries deemed insufficiently respectful of US intellectual property. Secretary of 
Commerce Ron Brown raised the issue at a December 1995 meeting of the US-South 
Africa Business Development Council, saying that "we are concerned that· American 
companies are encountering real problems on the trademark front." McDonald's later 
received a favourable judgement on appeal, and South Africa was "provisionally" 
removed from the watch list in 1996 on the basis of its undertaking to adjust South 
African intellectual property laws along the lines of World Trade Organisation standards. 
By 1997, the USTR had dropped South Africa from its watch list, but even then the 
International Intellectual Property Alliance, the main US lobby on the issue, was pushing 
for South Africa to receive "special mention" until South Africa passed the relevant 
legislation. 54 Further allegations of software, book and video piracy continue, even with 
the passage of South Africa's Counterfeit Goods Act in early 1998. 
Meanwhile, progress on IPR issues made through the McDonald's case was 
eclipsed by controversy over the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment 
53 Herbert, Ross. "McDonald's stonns the market." Cape Times Business Report 
~13 November 1995). 
4Barber, Simon ."US trade officials take much better view of SA." Business Day (7 May 1997). 
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Act of 1997. The legislation, which Minister of Health Nkosazana Zuma defended as 
critical to providing affordable medicine to South Africans, allows for "parallel imports" 
of patented medicines, outside of the marketing channels of the patent holder, taking 
advantage of the lower charges on these medicines from such countries as India. Pharma, 
the pharmaceutical industry lobby in the US, has made representation to Congress, the 
White House, the Department of Commerce and the US Trade Representative, claiming 
the law stands in violation of South Africa's World Trade Organisation commitments. 
South Africa reappeared on the USTR watch list in April 1998, and in July, the US 
announced that it would withhold trade benefits promised on certain South African 
minerals and machinery until "substantial progress" had been made in addressing US 
concerns with the new pharmaceuticals law. While implementation of the law has been 
delayed because of a constitutional challenge from local industry, the USTR is 
considering declaring its own official dispute before the WTO. 
Other commercial disputes include charges of unfair trade practices. In one 
example, confusion arose when after an agreement reached through the BNC committee 
on agriculture to increase US poultry access to the South African market in later 1996, 
US chicken exporters began selling chicken at prices far below South African market 
levels. Industry representatives from both the US and South Africa appeared on the brink 
of a dispute, but on closer investigation found that the price differential was due not to 
unfair pricing but to an "efficiency backlog" of 27 percent between South Africa and the 
US poultry industries. Thus, even with the general tariff of R2.20 per kilogram, the US 
chicken prices remained very competitive.55 
The case of South African steel has proved more acrimonious, and flies in the face 
of US policy promoting free trade. Anti-dumping suits against South Africa's Iscor and 
Highveld were suspended in 1997 after the South African steel producers agreed to 
55Maharaj, Ravin. "US chicken dumping row continues." Cape Time Business Report (4 December 1997). 
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charge a floor price for their steel plate on the American market. But in late 1998, new 
suits are likely as US producers face a new wave of cheap imported steel products due to 
the collapse of several steel-producing economies, such as Russia, Japan, Brazil, and 
South Korea. Iscor may be forced to reduce its share of the US market for cold-rolled 
steel below 3 percent in order to escape the charges. US policymakers are likely to be 
caught in a dilemma between defending free trade, and raising tariffs or imposing quotas 
in order to satisfy the powerful steel industry in the US in an election year. 
At the same time, US officials continue to call for a lowering of barriers to trade 
in South Africa. Besides calling for an end to some tariffs, the US is critical of South 
Africa's lack of anti-trust legislation, regular customs duty delays, and slow pace of 
privatisation. The US Trade Representative, in her 1998 foreign trade barriers report, 
gave South Africa a poor rating for the third year running, noting that anti-competitive 
practices prevailed in South Africa over 1997. Perhaps more fundamental to the 
investment climate in South Africa, however, have been the concerns expressed regarding 
crime and the instability in the labour sector. The former concern is behind the formation 
of the eighth BNC committee on law enforcement, and behind previous efforts of the FBI 
and other US law enforcement agencies to support South Africa in this area. 
These disputes and concerns do not in fact dominate US commercial policy 
towards South Africa, however. Instead, they underline the growing normalisation of 
US-South African commercial relations. While there have been concerns that such 
tensions will rock the current consensus in the US supporting favourable policies toward 
South Africa, that scenario is unlikely in light of the overall thrust of US policy, as 
expressed in stated US policy and in the several US policy initiatives discussed above, 
and in light of domestic political activity on trade issues. 
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4.4 Conclusion: New Issues, Enduring Issue-Types 
Sanctions and apartheid are gone as issues in US South Africa policy in the late 
1990's, as are Cold War concerns about Soviet expansion in southern Africa. US 
conceI1lS about race relations at home and American influence abroad -- whether through 
military, commercial, or development means -- remain, however, inherent in US foreign 
policy formulations on South Africa. It is the fact of enduring issue-types which allow 
insight into the sources and likely direction of US foreign policy, via the issue-area 
paradigm. The issue-types distilled from application of issue-area analysis to US South 
Africa policy earlier in this study -- based on the questions of tangibility of political goods 
at issue and of the symmetry of domestic political impact -- are those of development 
assistance, trade, security, and political symbolism. The foregoing chapters demonstrate 
that these issue-types can be seen as enduring; the forthcoming chapters will demonstrate 
just how significant they are to a deeper understanding of US policy. 
The following pages move into analysis of US South Africa policy in the 1990's 
based on the framework of the above four issue-types, first through the perspective of 
domestic political sources of policy -- public opinion and interest group activity -- and 
then from the perspective of governmental sources of policy -- bureaucratic processes and 
politics. This step moves this study from the international and national levels of analysis, 
where the focus is on the contextual sources and broad strokes of US South Africa policy 
over the period 1994-1998, to the sub-national level of analysis, where policy contours 
become more apparent. Such study will aim to discern the depth of support in US society 
for continued engagement in South Africa, and the direction of policy actions taken by 
government in the period under study -- whether engendering or discouraging further 
engagement. Issue-area analysis of these domestic sources of US policy will thus round 
out the picture of the likelihood of South Africa as a salient feature in US foreign policy 
at the start of a new century. 
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Disengagement Sentiment, the American Public, and 
US policy toward Post-Apartheid South Africa 
Nearly simultaneously, US foreign policymakers and the US anti-apartheid 
coalition declared victory over their respective foes as the crumbling of apartheid in 
South Africa coincided with the end of the Cold War worldwide and the emergence of a 
new set of parameters in international relations. These dramatic developments have 
produced new dynamics in US domestic politics affecting foreign policy, one of which 
has been a mixed picture of public sentiment on international disengagement. While 
disengagement sentiment has not been directed at Pretoria, per se, it does have important 
repercussions for US policy towards post-apartheid South Africa. 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, the following analysis at the sub-unit 
level will operate from the assumptions that US policymaking as a whole is characterised 
by pluralism, but that the degree to which public opinion and interest group activity 
contribute to the formulation of policy is largely dependent upon the nature of the issues 
involved. As detailed in earlier chapters, interest groups and public opinion have been 
undeniably of great importance in past US South Africa policy, perhaps never more so 
than in 1986 when, even over a Presidential veto, Congress -- under extreme public 
pressure -- enacted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. With the normalisation of 
relations between the US and South Africa in the 1990's, however, is there still interest in 
South Africa among the US public .and their representatives in the national legislature? 
What role do interest groups and public opinion play currently in the different issue-types 
present in US policy on South Africa, and do the findings support the suggested patterns 
of Zimmerman's issue-area paradigm? Where domestic politics do playa major role, in 
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which direction -- toward or away from engagement -- are different interest groups 
pressing policy? 
Support for disengagement among Americans, already mentioned as part of the 
US response to global factors affecting US foreign policy in the second chapter, comes 
under more detailed scrutiny in this section. As defined earlier, disengagement refers in 
this study to a policy of shaking off or loosening of cooperative international bonds, 
which can consist of military commitments, commercial ties, political allegiances, or 
other relations. A closer look at the activities of the national legislature over the 1994-
1998 period, as well as polling data and other indicators, begins to reveal the thrust of US 
sentiment on the issue of international disengagement in post-Cold War America. 
Following the discussion of engagement/disengagement sentiment, the chapter turns to 
analyse interest group activity on South Africa policy over the 1994-1998 period within 
the framework of the Zimmerman paradigm. 
5.1 A Disengaging American Public? 
By the end of 1994, not only was the US foreign policy machinery casting about 
for a new paradigm for foreign policyrnaking, but for the first time since the end of the 
second World War, a Democratic president was coupled with a Republican majority in 
Congress, and the latter's main agenda seemed to be disengagement abroad. The 104th 
Congress under the leadership of House Speaker Newt Gingrich, engaged in their own 
fierce budget debate to cut expenditures at horne and abroad, had little time for 
international organisations or foreign assistance, never mind the continent of Africa. In 
any case, with the inefficacy of past aid efforts in Africa under the spotlight, Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee Chair Jesse Helms reportedly charged that expending US 
resources on Africa was like "pouring money down a rat hole." 1 The newest members of 
1 Interview with congressional staff member Lester Munson, # 22. 
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both the House and the Senate were especially opposed to "entangling alliances," fighting 
against both the enlargement of NATO and sending US troops to Bosnia.2 Several 
interest groups ran vocal campaigns against further trade liberalisation,3 and public 
opinion polls appeared to show support for reducing America's commitments overseas.4 
Viewed from abroad, the US populace seemed to be closing its shutters, more concerned 
with domestic issues of economy, moral decay, anti-government terrorism, and crime 
than with the international order of the 1990's. 
Several aspects of US foreign policy reflected this perceived opposition to 
engagement on the part of the American public. Appropriations for the "150 account" 
which covers spending on international affairs for the US government, including 
contributions to multilateral organisations, declined by more than 25 percent between 
1991 and 1997, from $25.5 billion to around $18.8 billion (Nowels, 1997b: 6). The 
budget covering the Department of State's basic operations was cut by 17 percent between 
1993 and 1997, down to $2.6 billion -- which resulted in the closing of 30 US embassies 
and consulates around the world.5 And foreign aid spending declined 36 percent between 
1991 and 1997, from $18.2 billion to $11.5 billion (Nowels, 1997b: 17). 
Public sentiment, on the other hand, appeared to begin to shift in the post 1996 
period, away from support for disengagement and towards support for engagement. This 
apparent shift has been attributed to the concurrent economic upturn in the US (which 
despite the financial crisis sweeping the globe, in 1998 had not yet stalled) and a greater 
2Doherty, Carroll J. "New Generation Challenges Established Orthodoxy: Accused of isolationism, 
younger Republicans say they're just turning to domestic, district needs." Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report Washington, DC Vol 54 (3 February 1996): 306-307. 
30pposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement was rife, for instance, not only from labour 
groups protecting US employment, but also from groups worried about increased illegal immigration into 
the US (Deese, 1994: 18). Also, see Baer, M. Delal, "North American Free Trade. " Foreign Affairs (Fall 
1991): 132-49. 
4See polls from 1993 cited in Steel (1995), and the 1994 survey by the Chicago Council on Foreign 
Relations cited in Schlesinger, Jr. (1995). . 
5US Department of State, The FY 1998 International Affairs Budget Request (February 1997): 6. 
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appreciation of the benefits of free trade among Americans.6 For some analysts, 
however, it has been not so much a change in sentiment as a re-interpretation of earlier 
signs from the public. Eugene Wittkopf, for instance, writes credibly that polls from 
1993 and 1994 supposedly showing increasing sentiment for disengagement among the 
American public were incorrectly interpreted, and that in fact Americans generally have 
remained supportive of engagement. "Rethinking [America's role in the world] does not 
mean rejection," he asserts. "Polling organisations have asked Americans since the 
1940's if they 'think it will be best for the future of the country if we take· an active part in 
world affairs or if we stay out.' In 1947, 70 percent said active involvement would be 
best; in 1994, 69 percent echoed that sentiment" (Wittkopf, 1996: 93). Steven Kull of 
the US-based Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIP A) agreed that "the 
assumption that the [American] public has become parochial and isolationist IS a 
misinterpretation of a more complex trend." He contends, based on his own findings, that 
while "the overwhelming majority of Americans want the US to move away from playing 
the hegemonic role in the world -- being the 'world policeman' -- and carrying a 
disproportionate share of the burden of promoting economic development and 
maintaining world security ... the public is not, however, seeking to retreat from the 
world." Kull proposes that Americans would like to see international organisations 
strengthened in order to . increase their effectiveness and to take over many of the roles 
carried by the US during the Cold War years, and that "provided others are carrying their 
fair share," Americans are ready to support such a system (Kull, 1995/96: 102-3). 
6See Gwynne, s.c. (1998). "What a Drag! Economic Troubles in Asia, Russia and Latin America Threaten 
the U.S." Time (14 September): 31: 
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5.1.1- The "Foreign Policy Gap" 
Indeed, a series of polls conducted by PIP A and published in 1997 showed up a 
"foreign policy gap" between policymakers and the public in the US, revealing 
misperceptions held in Washington which have apparently plagued policymaking on 
foreign assistance~ trade, peacekeeping and other aspects of US engagement abroad. 
According to this account, while policymakers "perceive the public as going through a 
phase, in the wake of the Cold War, of wanting to disengage from the world (a fact they 
often bemoan), ... a comprehensive analysis of polls shows that the majority of Americans 
supports a foreign policy of broad global engagement." The two-year effort included 
polls, focus group discussions in various cities, interviews with policymakers, and an 
analysis of all publicly available polling data. PIP A concludes that it was not the general 
public that pressed for disengagement, blaming in part the reliance of policymakers on 
small "self-selected samples of vocal [anti-engagement] citizens," rather than on available 
polls (Kull, Destler and Ramsay, 1997: 184). Several examples support the PIPA 
conclusion that the US public is not seeking disengagement. 
5.1.1.1 US Sentiment on Development Assistance 
Foreign assistance has come under fire since the declining economic status of the 
US in the late 1980's and early 1990's caused a hard relook at the effectiveness of US aid. 
efforts. Aid levels declined and, by 1995, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development had placed the US -- once the world's top donor -- last among 21 
industrial nations in aid allocations as a percentage of GDP, at 0.10 percent. That ranking 
appeared set to remain stable in mid 1997.7 Foreign aid advocates admit that reforms are 
necessary, however, noting that "many nations in Sub-Saharan Africa are poorer than 
7These are figures for Overseas Development Aid (ODA), from the OECD 1996 report on "Financial Flows 
to Developing Countries in 1995," quoted in Graham and O'Hanlon, 1997: 100. 
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when they began receiving aid." They note that "while aid has had success m 
humanitarian relief, family planning, and reducing infant mortality, its record m 
promoting economic growth has been mixed ... and growth is a necessary condition for 
meeting most of the broad objectives of aid" (Graham and O'Hanlon, 1997: 96). These 
analysts called on donors "not to end foreign aid, but ... to know when to say when, cutting 
off countries that fail to adopt sound economic policies and rewarding those that do." 
This distinction seems to have been too difficult to maintain in the hurly-burly of 
congressional politics in the mid 1990's, however, and aid in general continued to 
decline,8 based on an assumption that it was no longer considered a worthwhile 
expenditure by the US public (Kull, Destler, and Ramsay, 1997: 97). One January 1995 
PIPA poll found, however, that when misperceptions about the percentage of the US 
federal budget spent on foreign assistance (then, and currently, less than 1 percent) were 
rectified, those who felt the US spent too much on foreign aid dropped from 75 percent to 
18 percent. "Americans overwhelmingly support the principle of giving some foreign 
aid .... though there are a great number of changes [in emphasis] Americans would like to 
see," Kull concludes (Kull, 1995: 25). 
In the greater aid debate, of course, South Africa is viewed as an exception (along 
with Botswana) in Sub-Saharan Africa, in that it is able to attract significant amounts of 
private investment on its own (van de Walle, 1996: 1). Indeed, USAID officials 
announced in early 1996 that the agency would "begin a process of phasing doWn" the 
South Africa programme, to be completed by the year 2005.9 Though aid may not remain 
of direct significance in US South Africa policy, it will however remain indirectly 
8Except in the case of the Middle East, where aid to Israel and Egypt has remained at the long-stable $3 
billion and $2.1 billion, respectively, based on perceived US national interests (security concerns) in the 
region, as well as domestic political constraints. 
9US AID Administrator Brian Atwood made this announcement, based on the assessment that South Africa 
was acquiring the reources to deal with its own development problems, quoted in Copson, 1997: 11. 
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important both as a barometer of US willingness to engage internationally and as a critical 
factor in developing economic stability among South Africa's neighbours. 
5.1.1.2 US Sentiment on Free Trade 
Polls on free trade show similar engagement sentiments among the US public, in 
that Americans appear to be more and more in favour of lifting trade barriers. According 
to one Gallup poll, prior to the 1992 presidential elections, 48 percent of Americans saw 
foreign trade as a threat compared to 44 percent who saw it as an opportunity. By 1994, 
the numbers had changed to 38 percent and 53 percent, respectively.10 Protectionist 
voices remain raised, of course, in support of increased barriers -- and no less so in trade 
relations with South Africa, as will be discussed -- but these voices often seem to be 
shouting into the wind in the overall picture of US sentiment on, and investment in, 
international economic activity. 
5.1.1.3 US Sentiment on Peacekeeping 
Peacekeeping, likewise, may be an issue which seems not to impinge directly on 
US policy toward South Africa during the current period, when little threat of South 
African civil war or foreign aggression remains. On the other hand, the African Crisis 
Response Initiative can be seen as a direct result of US policymakers' perceptions that the 
US public is not willing to send American soldiers abroad to join multilateral efforts to 
keep the peace when there is no vital US "national interest" at stake. According to this 
mind set, the establishment and sponsorship of local, regional peacekeeping capabilities 
would be preferable. But PIP A found that a majority of the US public did not, in fact, 
disapprove of contributing US troops to UN peacekeeping efforts, even in polls taken 
10Steven Rattner quotes' a 1994 Gallup Poll showing increased US public support for free trade in "Kantor 
Can." Letters to the Editor: Foreign Affairs Vol 75 No 4 (July/August 1996): 182. 
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shortly after the withdrawal of US troops from Somalia after the debacle there in October 
1993. 11 The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations likewise found, in October 1994, that 
51 percent of their sample agreed that the US should contribute to UN peacekeeping in 
general, and an additional 23 percent in some cases. I2 Another poll, by Roper Starch in 
March 1997, found that 72 percent would support or probably support sending US troops 
for UN peacekeeping efforts, in general. 13 
The underlying message, it would appear, is that while the American public no 
longer wanted to appear the bully on the international block, and objected to ineffective 
expenditure of US resources (including the lives of American soldiers), they were not 
opposed to engagement internationally. It would seem, in fact, that the 104th Congress 
and Newt Gingrich's second American revolution had been an exaggerated response to 
the ruminations of the US about its role in the post-Cold War world. "The US carries 
this latent virus [of 'isolationism']," asserted one interview respondent. "Depending on the 
overall health of the body, it may manifest itself ... [But] most Americans, when properly 
informed, tend to be supportive of some level of involvement. Even Helms couldn't tum 
his back on the world." 14 
5.2 Factors affecting US Engagement with South Africa 
Public sentiment supporting international engagement does not automatically 
translate into increased US engagement in South Africa, and factors that would militate 
against public support for expending resources on post-apartheid South Africa do exist. 
These include a changed focus -- some would say a lack of focus -- among the African-
American community following the demise of apartheid, and the "Africanisation" of 
II Americans al1d UN Peacekeeping: A Summary of Research on US Public Attitudes. Program on 
International Policy Attitudes (February 1995): 2. 
12Summarised in Rielly, ed (1995), quoted in Kull, Destler and Ramsay (1997): 81. 
13See Kull, Destler and Ramsay (1997): 81. 
14From interview with Kevin Luther, of Africare (#31). 
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South Africa in American perceptions generally. These must be weighed against new 
incentives for engagement in South Africa, however. 
5.2.1 African-Americans Changing Focus 
When, in early 1990, South Africa suddenly turned about-face and abandoned the 
policy of apartheid, the anti-apartheid coalition in the US watched with a sense -- rightly 
or wrongly -- of having had a significant role as Nelson Mandela was released and as 
negotiations for a new constitution began. But, after a brief period of suspicion over 
whether apartheid was truly and irreversibly over -- and a cold-shoulder from the ANC, 
by some accounts 15 -- many of the anti-apartheid groups, among -whom African-
Americans had leading roles, began to spend their energies elsewhere, or to dissipate. A 
few groups chose to make the transition from policy advocacy to programmatic 
involvement in South Africa, which they have achieved with varying degrees of success. 
Others chose to pursue business opportunities they perceived in the new South Africa. 
But in most cases, the ability to garner interest from the wider public had become more 
difficult. Why? 
In the midst of the perceived isolationist tum in American society, it seemed to 
many that African-American interest groups were focusing inward, onto the situation of 
African-Americans themselves. Having "participated in the righting of the enormous 
injustices of apartheid," they had "moved on."16 And like most middle-class Americans, 
they were "not that interested in Africa." Supporting that view, one political scientist 
writing in 1994, just after the election of the 1 04th Congress, noted that "like most 
Americans, African-Americans ... are now more preoccupied with domestic problems." 
15Randall Robinson, founder of TransAfrica, writes in his 1998 memoirs Defending the Spirit that, on more 
than one occasion after Mandela's release in 1990, the anti-apartheid coalition was rebuffed by Mandela or 
the ANC who, he thought, "had virtually no understanding of how US political society worked," and so 
underestimated the importance of interest groups such as TransAfrica. Quoted in Barber, Simon. "Pressure 
grOUPS did not win the struggle." Business Day (3 February 1998). 
T6From interview with Robert Price, University of California, Berkeley (#11). 
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He concluded that "as the problems in South Africa come to closely resemble those that 
many African-Americans face at home [crime, grinding poverty, educational crisis], it is 
unlikely that there will be enough support for foreign policies which transfer financial 
resources from domestic problems to foreign countries, including South Africa" (payne, 
1994: 67,73). 
This view was not entirely borne out by subsequent polls, however. According to 
PIP A polls in 1996, for instance, minorities in the US (including African-Americans) 
"tended to favor higher allocations for foreign aid than white Americans did." Minorities 
favoured devoting a higher portion of the GNP to aid to poor countries (a median of $100 
per $1000), while whites favoured a much smaller amount ($15). And "despite having 
proportionately the most to gain by putting tax dollars toward aid for poor people in the 
US, minorities favored having a higher percentage of assistance going to poor people in 
other countries (29 percent) ... [while] white Americans thought only 22 percent of 
assistance should go to poor people in other countries" (Kull, Destler and Ramsay, 1997: 
187). In addition, once any misperceptions of assistance percentages were corrected, "the 
argument that 'aid to newly democratic countries is a good investment for America' won 
66 percent agreement from whites, but 78 percent agreement from African-Americans" 
(p.188). Relative to other Americans in the 1990's, then, African-Americans appear to 
remain in favour of the US assisting developing countries such as South Africa. 
5.2.1.1 Diffused Agendas 
More likely than African-Americans opposing US engagement with South Africa, 
it seems, is the possibility that the changed nature of issues with regard to South Africa 
has left the greater African-American public without a handle on US South Africa policy. 
This change has not necessarily reduced activism among all African-American interest 
groups, but their focus has shifted either to other African crises, such as Rwanda or 
Nigeria, or to more routine Africa policy areas, such as development, or trade, or to the 
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Caribbean. Close relations with South Africa remain important, it seems, from a 
politically symbolic viewpoint, but unless those relations are threatened, interest in US 
policy toward South Africa -- and financial support for the relevant lobbies -- from the 
wider African-American community is most likely to remain diffuse. 
One important factor in this development may be that the general thrust of US 
Africa policy, undertaken by a Democratic administration expressing commitment to 
racial harmony in the US and consisting of several African-Americans in key posts,17 is 
in accord with the general thrust of expressed African-American opinion on the region. 
Encouraging democracy and economic development (even if not in line with some groups 
who oppose WTO guidelines for African nations), celebrating South Africa's new 
dispensation, and welcoming an African renaissance with black leaders at the forefront of 
positive developments in Africa (even if, again, some groups disagree that these leaders 
are democratic), characterise both the administration's and African-American lobbies' 
general approach to the continent. 
In any case, the galvanising days of the anti-apartheid movement are over. 
Several respondents noted this phenomenon, but insisted that "South Africa continues to 
be on the agenda" of African-American and human rights interest groups. They also 
admitted, however, that "the concern is uneven" and that "not all organisations have made 
the transition to programmatic involvement.,,18 Because many former anti-apartheid 
17Examples are the late secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown, and Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Laurie 
Fitz-Pegado. The Secretary of Labour, Alexis Herman, and the Secretary of Transportation, Rodney Slater 
-- both of whom accompanied President Clinton on his 1998 Africa trip -- are two more, as are the Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice, and the Assistant Trade Representative for Africa, Rosa 
Whittaker. At the American Embassy in South Africa, Ambassador James Joseph is an African-American, 
as well as Minister Counselor Millard Arnold and several of the AID South Africa key officials. There are 
also African-Americans at the forefront of US efforts to finance economic development in Southern Africa: 
Andrew Young heads the Southern Africa Development Fund; and New Africa Advisers, a unit of the Sloan 
Financial Group, America's largest African-American-owned asset management fIrm, manages the New 
Africa Opportunity Fund. 
18From interview with Francis Kornegay of the African-American Institute (#1), reiterated by Ted Dagne 
of the Congressional Research Service (#13) and foreign correspondent Simon Barber (#29). 
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groups have changed the focus of their policy advocacy to other regions in Africa and the 
Caribbean, where the issues involved are less straightforward or less compelling than 
apartheid, lobbyists find it increasingly "difficult to mobilise forces in the US."19 And, 
among the African-Americans still active on South Africa policy, many appear to agree 
with Jesse Jackson's call that they should become the "conduit" through which US-South 
African trade and other links expand.20 This approach has met with mixed reactions 
from South Africans, however.21 
5.2.1.2 CBC Worries 
, 
It is in the detail that disagreement arises, and detail is a more difficult agenda 
around which to rally opposing forces. This has been the experience, it appears, of the 
Congressional Black Caucus. Since 1994, the CBC has faced not only declining public 
interest in African issues, but a declining hold on power in the legislature. With the 
Republican take-over of Congress and subsequent reforms under Newt Gingrich, CBC 
members lost their majority standing, their chairmanship over key committees, and much 
of their support funding. Also, subsequently, senior African-American legislators such as 
William Gray and Ronald Dellums retired, and differing approaches to several African 
conflicts shook the strong consensus that had existed over South Africa under apartheid 
and then, in the early 1990's, over aid to Africa. Thus, when Congressman Bill Jefferson 
of Louisiana and Senator Carol Moseley-Brown of Illinois came out in support of 
sanctions against Nigeria in 1997, for instance, others such as Representative Donald 
Payne opposed them. Payne based his view on his constituency's dependency on 
19From interview with Douglas Tilton of the Washington Office on Africa (#25), and also Timothy Sisk of 
the US Institute for Peace (#47). 
20See "Jackson Recalls Past, Points to Future of U.S.-African Ties." Text of speech from the 1997 Harare 
African/African-American Summit, USIS publication File 1D:97072403.AAF (24 July 1997): 5. 
21See Daley, Suzanne. "Top US paper picks up on debate raging about role of African-Americans in South 
Africe." Sunday Independent (19 April 1998). 
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Nigerian-grade oil, which was most suitable for certain industry in New Jersey.22 
Maxine Waters (the CBC chairperson) was at the same time denouncing lobbyists of the 
Nigerian regime and calling on African-Americans to "part company with African 
dictatorships and their US supporters. ,,23 
This case supports the theory that "without race as an anchor for deciding which 
side to take [in African conflicts], unity is more difficult for African-American interests 
to maintain." 24 Indeed, it appears that for the time being, except on domestic issues of 
civil rights for African-Americans, the Congressional Black Caucus is no longer the most 
effective point of departure for effecting change in US policy. Their future role will be 
greatly affected by whether or not Democrats remain in the minority in Congress --
determining their status on committees where Africa legislation lives or dies -- beyond 
the year 2000, following only minor gains in the 1998 elections. 
5.2.2 The "Africanisation" of South Africa 
Another of the factors militating against deeper US involvement in South Africa, 
according to one interview respondent (whose view was echoed by others), is the fact that 
"there is a growing -- though not yet dominant -- tendency for the public image of South 
Africa to be one of a country slipping into the "African condition." According to this 
view, post-apartheid South Africa is increasingly equated with other, failed, African 
countries with black majority governments, which "allows the imagery of the rest of the 1 
continent to wash over South Africa." The media apparently contribute to this perception 
as, with little of political interest to report on in South Africa in the late 1990's, they focus 
on human feature stories, which "translate into crime and corruption,"25 or else, as 
22From interview with Lester Munson, professional staffer for the House International Relations Committee 
~#22}. 
3From the forward by Imani Countess in Countess, et al (1997). Making Connections: Report from a 
Constituency Builders' Dialogue. Washington, DC: Africa Policy Information Center: 5. 
24Countess, 1997: 5. 
25From interview with University of California Professor Robert Price (#11). 
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another respondent put it, on nature footage, portraying a "dark, dangerous continent, a 
primordial Eden." Furthermore, by "aggregating" Africa, the US public "undermines 
South Africa's ability to have a straightforward relationship with the US," as South 
Africa gets "lumped into a constituency in the US which is complicated for reasons of 
Americanness, not Africanness. ,,26 
5.2.3 New Incentives for Engagement 
There are promising indicators, however, that post-apartheid South Africa has 
neither slipped completely off the US public agenda after sanctions, nor been swamped 
with the negative perceptions (which in any case are changing, in some observers' views, 
with the hopeful signs in Uganda, Ghana, and other "New Leader" states) of the African 
continent. Beyond the demonstrated trend toward support for engagement internationally, 
there is continued and new interest in South Africa among specific US interest groups, a 
fact which has served to maintain the high profile of South Africa for American foreign 
policymakers. These include new African-American organisations, coalitions of 
legislators, activists and political analysts, and some new business lobbies. Many 
members of these groups fought for sanctions, some did not, but they now share an 
interest in South Africa of a very different nature than that of the heady days of the 
1980's. A few, and by 1998 even fewer, lobby for increased -- or at least maintained --
levels of development aid for the continent, including South Africa. Others, noting the 
new promise of some African economies, have increasingly trained their gaze (albeit 
more warily after the Asian currency crisis27) on Africa, and especially on South 
Africa.28 These groups lobby for greater access to South Africa's market, for policies 
26From interview with Dale Lautenbach, former foreign news editor (#43). . 
27See Green, Matthew. "Battered commodity prices will blunt Africa's growth." Cape Times Business 
Report (5 November 1998). 
28 See Spira, John. "SA among top emerging market club." Cape Times Business Report (4 December 
1996). 
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which will develop that market, and for US pressure against any changes in current South 
African macroeconomic policies which might have a deleterious effect on South Africa's 
credit rating. There are also many Americans who see a model for the US in the 
nonracial democracy occurring in South Africa, based on parallels in South African and 
American struggles to improve race relations. 
The Clinton Administration policy of visibly promoting US involvement in post-
apartheid South Africa through, for instance, the BEM initiative, the Binational 
Commission, visits by high-level officials, and the African Growth and Opportunity 
Initiative, as well as links with the One Nation initiative on race in America, must be 
seen, at least in part, as a function of these domestic interests. Vocal and potentially 
powerful interest groups lie behind each of those initiatives. There was also some public 
impetus behind the ACRI in the perceived public unwillingness to shoulder peacekeeping 
responsibilities, as previously discussed, and there appears to be some interest group 
activity generally on "new security" issues such as environmental degradation, organised 
crime and international terrorism which might be seen to overlap with US South Africa 
policymaking. 
Issue-area analysis will reveal how important such domestic political 
considerations are in the issue-types present in US South Africa policy, and in which net 
direction they seek to influence policy -- towards or away from deeper engagement. 
5.3 Interest Groups and Issue-Types in US South Africa Policy 
As posited by Zimmerman in his issue-area paradigm, interest groups will have a 
greater or lesser effect on foreign policy depending on the issue-areas occupying a nation 
at any given time. An issue-area, it is remembered, is, in short, a set of similar policy 
disputes. This study, moreover, notes that different interest groups and other public 
sources of pressure will be active on particular issues within each issue-area, pressing in 
perhaps oppositie directions to affect policy. Each issue-area in US South Africa policy, 
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then, will have its own configuration of public influences, involving a different group of 
interest groups and other domestic political sources such as members of the legislature 
and results of public opinion polls. Observation of these will yield the net direction of 
public pressure on foreign policy in that issue-area. As there have been no US public 
opinion polls specifically on engagement in South Africa in the period 1994-1998, polls 
on US engagement generally, as well as legislative activity on Africa and South Africa 
specifically, will form the backdrop for subsequent issue-area analysis of interest group 
activity on US South Africa policy. 
"Issue-types in US South Africa policy, in a further development on the 
Zimmerman paradigm, were those recurring themes which presented themselves from the 
data for the period under study. Most, if not all, issues which were on the South Africa 
policy agenda during the Clinton period (up to the end of 1998) appear to fit into these 
categories. Due to the specific issues involved, the four issue-types identified over the 
course of this study -- development assistance, trade and investment, security, and issues 
of political symbolism -- can be placed under Zimmerman's issue-areas of distribution, 
regulation, interaction/protection, and redistribution, based on his two questions: 1 )Are 
the political goods in question exclusively tangible? and 2)ls the expected domestic 
political impact of the issue's resolution symmetrical? Whether the policy processes 
uncovered in this study coincide with those suggested to be inherent in Zimmerman's 
different issue-areas -- that is, whether conflictual or consensual, and whether pluralist or 
elitist -- will become "apparent. 
In addition, an engagement! disengagement function, introduced earlier, is 
applied within each issue-type (as indicated by a vertical continuum alongside the issue-
type matrix) to show the direction of interest group activity on US South Africa policy 
(see Figure C). Interest groups can then be placed, based on the issues on which they 
have lobbied with regard to South Africa in the latter half of the 1990's, and on the 
direction in which they are lobbying in terms of engagement, in one section of the matrix. 
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The thrust of US interest group activity on US South Africa policy -- whether 
encouraging or disparaging of closer relations with South Africa -- will thus emerge to 
round out the picture of pluralist influences underlying US policy. 
YES 
I 
FIgUre C 
INTEREST GROUP ACTIVITY ON US SOUTH AFRICA POLICY 
AND DIRECTION OF ACTIVITY 
US Domestic Impact 
Symmetrical? 
YES~NO 
I: Development Assistance 
CBC & CFA pre 1996 
Development NGO's 
Cangressional budget-cutters 
II: Trade & Investment 
Africa T & 1 Caucus 
CFA, AAl, US ASI, AlG 
Rainbow CaaUtion AflAf-Am Summit 
CC4, US-SASC, Africa Trade Forum 
AMCHAM et ai, State Trade Offices 
Protectionist Groups 
(citrus, steel & textile industries) 
Labour (AFL-ClO) 
Engage 
vs 
Disengage 
engage 
disengage 
Tangible 
Benefits? ...------------1<-------------1 
\ 
NO 
ill: Security IV: Political Symbolism 
NPT& 
• New Security· CFA Landmine 
Interest Groups* NSA interest groups· 
---Regional ---------- --Global ------- --Domestic-------- --Global --------
ACRl opposition* Cangressional 
budget-cutters 
Opposition 
to ·rogue· 
states 
engage 
disengage 
* very little visible interest group activity vis-a vis US - South Africa Policy 
(Based on Zimmerman's "Issue-based Foreign Policy Paradigm") 
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The analysis now proceeds with an examination of the interest group activity 
underlying US South Africa policy in the period 1994-1998, via the framework of the 
issue-types paradigm moving from development assistance (quadrant I), around the 
matrix to issues of political symbolism (quadrant IV). 
5.3.1 Development Assistance and the Public 
Aid to South Africa, as discussed in Chapter Two, has not been a major focus of 
US interest groups, even under apartheid.29 The years immediately after the passage of 
the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 saw greater activity on the part of interest 
groups on the issue of aid to Africa as a whole, however. This activity, for reasons of 
South Africa's interests in the region and its share of the overall Africa aid budget, does 
affect US South Africa policy, even if indirectly. 
When US development assistance to Africa came under increasing budgetary 
pressure in the late 1980's -- due to the sense of US decline as a world power, to fiscal 
constraints, and to the growing disillusionment with aid generally -- the Congressional 
Black Caucus succeeded in creating an earmark for that aid in the form of the 
Development Fund for Africa (DF A). From FY1988 to FY1995, the DF A protected aid 
levels for Sub-Sahara Africa from diversion to other regions by allowing Congress to 
specify the total aid level to Africa within the USAID development assistance budget. 
Overall aid levels, including aid to Africa, continued to decline each year from 1985, 
however. This trend was arrested for Africa in 1990 when the CBC, working by now 
apparently without the constituent pressure that lay behind the passage of the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act but with the support of the TransAfrica lobby 
29If anything, the Reagan administration tried to promote its aid efforts in the public eye. See US 
Assistance: Working/or Positive Change in South Africa. US Department of State, Southern Africa 
Working GrouplBureau of Public Affairs (May 1986). But, due to the general unpopularity of constructive 
engagement, and even though aid to South Africa under apartheid went to non-governmental groups only, 
lobbying for increased assistance was not a feature of interest group activity in that period. 
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(Lancaster, 1991: 2), was able to increase the allocation for the DF A over the 
administration's request of $560 million to $800 million. At this time, there was also 
concern outside the CBC in Congress and in the administration that overall aid could not 
be cut more deeply without "compromising US foreign policy interests" (Lancaster, 1991: 
1). Thus aid levels rose again until the advent of the 104th Congress, with their agenda 
for disengagement challenging not only aid levels, but the concept of development aid 
itself. 
At that point, the CBC was joined by a new movement in support of US 
engagement in Africa to take up the defence of aid to the region. In terms of the issue-
type analysis, aid to Africa at that point can be said to have moved from being a 
distributive issue to being a redistributive issue, reframed in the debate as a trade-off 
between the status (an intangible good) of foreign and domestic assistance programmes. 
Whereas prior to the 104th Congress, a consensual-pluralist process (or at least the 
remains of the public movement ofthe 1980's) had maintained aid levels to some degree, 
now. a conflictual-elitist process came into play to challenge the concept of aid as it had 
been understood in the past. Public sentiment as a whole, it is to be remembered, was 
understood to be against aid at this stage. The general consensus in support of aid that 
held during the Cold War had, it seemed, broken down. 
The leadership of the movement to save aid to Africa, very different in 
configuration from the anti -apartheid coalition of the 1980's, was spearheaded by a small 
but influential African-American-led organisation called the Constituency for Africa, as 
TransAfrica was by then focused on US policy on other human rights abuses in Africa 
and in Haiti. The CF A was begun in 1990 as a loose coalition of "Africanists and citizens 
representing major organisations with an interest in Africa ... to build organised support 
for Africa in the United States." By 1994, the CFA was registered as a non-profit 
organisation with a board of directors including several major figures in the African-
American community such as David Dinkins, Andrew Young, Herman Cohen, and 
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Dorothy Height. According to director Mel Foote, the CF A was "in the forefront for the 
movement pushing to retain Africa's aid levels" in 1995, with its Summit on Africa Aid 
and other lobbying efforts. These efforts, joined by others', were successful in saving 
more than $200 million in the US budget for Africa that year,30 over the objections of 
Senat~r Jesse Helms and several freshmen in Congress who opposed such federal 
spending, and in fact sought to eliminate USAID altogether}1 As a concession to the 
opponents of aid in the 1995 debate on the FY1996 budget, however, Congress and the 
Clinton administration did agree to drop the separate line-item for Africa, "folding Africa 
into the worldwide development assistance account" (Nowels, 1997a: 18). While 
continued attention to Africa's aid budget was provided for through a non-binding call on 
the administration to continue the proportion of aid Africa had received under the DF A 
(36 percent, which later grew to 41 percent), as aid continued to decrease generally,32 
Africa's development aid dropped from $745 million in FY 1994 to $675 million in 
FY 1996. In a reflection of increased support on the part of the administration -- based no 
doubt in part on public interest in trade opportunities -- for economic reform in African 
nations such as Mozambique, Uganda, Ghana, and Malawi, aid to Africa rose again, to 
$700 million, in 1997. Many interviewees reported some resentment on the part of other 
African nations to the "US preoccupation with South Africa," however, which receives 
the "lion's share of aid to the region. ,,33 
The CF A, meanwhile, "after looking at the facts" about previous aid efforts and 
Africa's concomitant economic decline, began "pushing trade" and calling on the United 
Nations and such organisations as the Africa Development Foundation to adjust their 
30From interview with Mel Foote, Executive Director, Constituency for Africa (#27). 
31 See Copson (1997) for discussion of that opposition, as well as Dohertx (1996) on sentiment among new 
let,islators. 
3 For detailed discussion of US aid in the 1990's, see Nowels, 1997. 
33From interview with Kevin Luther of Africare (#31), and echoed in interviews with MacArthur DeShazer 
(#20) of the National Summit on Africa and Melanie Bixby of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy 
(#38). 
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development strategies, as well. 34 The shift represented by CF A, in addition to the 
increasing fragmentation in the Congressional Black Caucus over USAID's focus on 
rewarding increased economic liberalisation in developing nations (without requiring 
political reforms or a broad distribution of the economic benefits of liberalisation), has 
undermined the development assistance lobbying effort significantly. TransAfrica, for 
instance, opposed the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, which provides some 
development assistance, on the grounds that it represented the "recolonisation" of Africa 
by the developed world.35 The Africa Faith and Justice Network also opposed the 
legislation, asking whether "if Uganda registers a comparable growth rate of 9.4 percent, 
does that mean more people are in schools?" 36 A few non-governmental development 
organisations continue to press quietly for increased Africa aid levels, and funding to 
meet humanitarian crises has remained available despite the pressures applied on aid over 
the 1994-1996 period (Copson, 1997: 13). 
With trade "trumping" aid at the moment, there is little leverage behind any efforts 
to increase aid generally, but the initiative to eliminate USAID altogether has, for the time 
being, apparently failed. Whether this latest development theory focusing on trade will 
survive is a matter for watching and waiting for some sceptical NGO's, who hope that the 
interest generated in Africa by the Africa Growth and Opportunity Initiative will, at the 
least, have some future benefit for Africa. In the meantime, the issue of development aid 
appears to have remained a matter for conflicting elites, and in terms of the typology of 
issue-areas, seems to have become more a matter of political symbolism than one of 
goods distribution. How long it will remain in the fourth, redistributive quadrant is a 
34From Mel Foote interview (#27). 
35Gumede, WM. "Hand of Friendship or deadly grip?" Sunday Independent/ Reconstruct (29 March 1998). 
36From the contribution of AF IN policy analyst Ezekiel Pajabo to the 25 September 1997 Overseas 
Development Council congressional staff forum on "The US and Africa: Can Trade and Investment 
Replace Development Assistance?" 
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matter for further study, based on the political imperatives governing the greater aid 
debate. 
This finding, while it contradicts the prediction made at the outset that 
development assistance to South Africa was not a redistributive issue, also may 
demonstrate how issues could change in nature from one issue-area to another over time. 
5.3.2 Trade and Investment and the Public 
Several interest groups, instead of watching and waiting to see what the trade 
approach in US policy towards South Africa and Africa will bring, have actively involved 
themselves in that approach. These include groups which were previously active on US 
South Africa or Africa policy, new groups which have their genesis in the growing US 
business interest in the continent as a whole, and labour groups seeking protection from 
the threat of competitive African imports. 
Several factors at the global, regional and domestic level have contributed to the 
enhanced interest in Africa among the business community. The globalisation of trade 
and finance, the increasing liberalisation of world markets, and the end of the Cold War, 
together with the promise of Africa's emerging markets and the booming American 
economy of the mid 1990's, have combined to focus attention on trade and investment 
opportunities in Africa, and on US policy in that regard. The dramatic switch between 
the 1980's and the 1990's within this issue-type, from opposing sanctions to promoting 
trade, has brought to the fore new voices speaking out on trade and investment in Africa 
as a whole, as well as a renewed willingness among traditional actors to be heard and 
seen publicly promoting commercial engagement in South Africa. Even in the years 
since 1994 new voices have emerged, as some groups have switched their focus from 
promoting assistance to promoting trade. The Constituency for Africa, cited in the 
previous cha~ter, is only one example of a group which has shifted its focus after 1995 
from the programmes of USAID to those of the Department of Commerce. It is of note 
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that the CFA and other interest groups who have decided that "trade is not a dirty word" 
might be seen to be working in tandem with US policy, without a need to lobby for 
change -- yet the fact of their existence, and of the constituents they can mobilise, has 
arguably helped to push Africa up the foreign policy agenda. 
5.3.2.1 An African Trade and Investment Caucus 
Signalling the changes taking place in interest group activity was the formation of 
the bipartisan African Trade and Investment Caucus, which came together in early 1996 
to "initiate broader discussion" on US policy towards Africa. This move constituted 
unusually high congressional attention on Africa from members outside of the 
Congressional Black Caucus. Resulting legislation, which formed the basis for the Africa 
Growth and Oppurtunity Act, followed consultation with, and lobbying by, several 
Africa-related groups. Besides the CF A, these included the African-American Institute, 
the US Africa Economic Institute, and the American International Group (a US-based 
international insurance organisation), as well as members of the African diplomatic corps 
in Washington. 
As one of the most visible African-American-Ied groups actively lobbying in 
support of the AGOA, the CF A focused its 1997 "town hall meetings on Africa" on this 
aspect of US policy, seeking to "make the connection between trade [with Africa] and US 
interests" for Americans.37 The Reverend Jesse Jackson, a leader in the African-
American community and director of the Rainbow Coalition, was also active on lobbying 
for US trade initiatives prior to his appointment as the US special democracy envoy to 
Africa in late 1997. Jackson led a delegation, with US Secretary of Transportation 
Ronald Slater, to Harare in July 1997 for an African/African-American Summit, co-
chaired by Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and the Reverend Leon Sullivan, 
37From Mel Foote interview (#27). 
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where education and business in Africa were the focus. Representatives from more than 
300 companies, including major actors such as Procter & Gamble and Chevron, attended. 
While several members of the Congressional Black Caucus participated in the 
Africa Trade and Investment Caucus, none were original sponsors of the resulting 
legislation (although CBC member Congressman Charles Rangel was reportedly 
instrumental in garnering wider support for the AGOA among his colleagues in 199738). 
The loss of key Africa committee and subcommittee chairs to the new Republican 
majority in 1994 had somewhat undermined CBC leadership on Africa policy by this 
point, and in any case, there were several divergent views on the trade proposals among 
CBC members. Another factor militating against greater CBC activity on the Africa trade 
and investment initiatives over the 1996-1998 period, it appears, was the fact that CBC 
energies -- as usual, in tandem with those of TransAfrica -- were being expended 
elsewhere on US Africa policy, specifically toward the ongoing political crises in the 
central Africa region and on events in Sierra Leone and Nigeria. 
5.3.2.2 New Voices 
In addition to the lobbying and business endeavours undertaken by the African-
American community on the part of increased trade with Africa, several efforts have 
emerged from within the traditional business community. Whereas before the 1990's, 
"there were always the three C's -- coups, curses and catastrophes," now Africa had 
"come of age."39 Corporate America was beginning to speak out about Africa because 
they perceived that "African governments ... [were] starting to do the kinds of things that 
make the continent look like a real market. ,,40 
38Statement by Congressman Philip M. Crane in the US House of Representatives on the African Growth 
and Opportunity Act. CongreSSional Record (24 April 1997). 
39From interview with David Miller, executive director of the Corporate Council on Africa (#24). 
40See Barber, Simon. "Corporate US turning its eyes to Africa." Business Day (6 May 1997). 
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New organisations to promote and protect US commerce and investment in Africa 
have emerged at several levels to serve the growing business interest. Others which have 
existed for years have become much more vocal in their support for a US policy 
supporting expanding commerce with the continent, and with South Africa. 
The website for the US Foreign Trade Office, for instance, lists the American-
South African Chamber of Trade and Industry in New York; the US-African Chamber of 
Commerce with offices in both New York and Washington, DC; the World Africa 
Chamber of Commerce in Washington, DC; the Africa Trade Forum, created in 1995 and 
operating out of Samuel's International, a Washington, DC, investment consulting firm; 
as well as the African-American Institute and the Constituency for Africa. Also listed are 
the Washington-based Corporate Council on Africa and US-South Africa Business 
Council which, based on interview responses, seem to have attracted the most attention 
in policymaking circles since their creation in 1992 and 1993 respectively. 
The Corporate Council on Africa is a non-profit, non-partisan organisation and, as 
such, claims that nothing in its newsletter "should be construed as an attempt to aid or 
hinder the passage of any legislation." Yet by its activities, it has done a great deal to 
promote US investment and trade in Africa, and to bring issues of concern to US business 
in Africa to the attention of the US govemment. Its stated goals are to "strengthen and 
, 
facilitate relationships between African and American individuals and organisations" 
through a series of exchange opportunities, "educational, cultural, and commercial" in 
nature. It aims to educate constituencies about the different social customs and economic 
climates on both continents, at the same time "utilising a network of business executives 
and government officials to promote US-Africa relations." Most notable among CCA 
activities thus far has been the April 1997 "Attracting Capital to Africa" summit, at which 
first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton gave the keynote address following her visit to Africa a 
month earlier. US Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, World Bank President James 
Wolfensohn, and South Africa's Thabo Mbeki also featured as speakers. The 700 CCA 
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summit delegates, mostly business representatives, when compared to the 75 that attended 
a similar conference sponsored by the US Departments of Commerce and State in 1983, 
are a further indicator of the increased US business interest in Africa. The summit 
addressed such topics as progressive taxation for economic growth, privatisation in 
Africa, investment financing, health care economics, telecommunications, and emerging 
transportation technologies in Africa. The CCA also works in partnership with the US 
Trade and Development Agency -- for instance, introducing African health care officials 
to the US pharmaceuticals industry through a visitors' programme in May 1997 -- and 
with the Departments of State and Commerce in hosting annual Africa Trade and 
Investment Seminars at various business centres around the US. 
The US-SA Business Council, on the other hand, describes itself as "dedicated to 
assisting the entry and activity of US companies in South Africa by ... advocating on behalf 
of US business interests directly to senior level decision makers of both countries." 
Sponsored by the National Foreign Trade Council, it was formed in 1993 to "reconnect 
the private sectors of the two countries," apparently as one product of the ad hoc South 
Africa Working Group at the Department ofState.41 It is well connected in policy circles 
in that its executive director has extensive experience with the Senate, and its managing 
director worked as the South Africa desk officer at the Department of Commerce under 
the first Clinton administration, when both the Business Development Council and the 
Binational Commission began operation. While their website specifies that they "do not 
assist exporters," the US-SA Business Council does offer extensive research facilities and 
information on current policy to its member companies, and ensures its members that 
their concerns are "highlighted on the agendas" of both the BDC and the BNC meetings. 
Another significant indicator of increased business interest in Africa are the state 
41 From interview with Whitney Schneidman, then of Samuel's International financial consultants, now a 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (#34). 
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trade offices established in Africa over the past few years. Representatives from Virginia, 
Ohio, Texas, California and Michigan now work to promote US trade with the continent. 
California, especially, is a significant trading entity in itself, often cited as among the top 
ten economies (including national economies) worldwide. While these offices seek to 
promote trade and investment opportunities for their own constituents, they will 
undoubtedly be applying pressure through state channels on US national policy affecting 
US-South Africa trade relations. 
The specific issues that have arisen under this issue-type, about which groups such 
as those named above are pressing for increased engagement with South Africa, are 
varied. According to one senior administration official, referring to the BNC-brokered 
1997 US-South Africa tax treaty, for instance, there was lobbying from a "huge chunk of 
US business" who said completion of such a treaty was "critical to getting involved" in 
South Africa. 42 Other issues have been protection of intellectual property rights, 
demonstrated in the trade mark violation case brought by McDonald's against a South 
African restaurateur, and the still-pending patent violation complaint made by Pharma, 
the main US pharmaceuticals lobby, over South Africa's Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997. Other issues include pressing South Africa 
for increased access to markets through reduced tariffs and elimination of import quotas, 
as well as improved anti-trust legislation and an increased rate of privatisation. They are 
also concerned about the insistence by South African labour that South Africa modify its 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, and about South Africa's 
crime statistics and their related effects on the business climate. The American Chamber 
of Commerce, for instance, expressing concern over what US companies saw as a 
"punitive" trend in Pretoria's economic policy, was seeking in late 1998 to engage the 
South African government in order to stave off a reversal of US corporate sentiment on 
42Confidential interview (#36). 
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South Africa as an investment destination, due to these several concerns.43 AMCHAM 
envisioned a forum for US-South Africa economic dialogue, which may eventually 
dovetail with the TIF A (Trade and Investment Framework Agreement) which was created 
as a "dispute resolution mechanism" for commercial disagreements after the August 1998 
meetings of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission. 
5.3.2.3 Protectionist and Anti-WTO Voices 
Conversely, the voices of various protectionist elements within the US have also 
been raised on issues of US Africa policy. These are not new voices, but have rarely had 
reason to protest any trade threat from Africa in the past. While these lobbying efforts are 
pressing for less engagement with South Africa by protecting US markets from South 
African imports to the US, they have generally "not dominated the debate" in the 
1990's.44 There was, however, enough concern over these voices to stall the passage of 
the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act in the 105th Congress. 
US industries threatened by specific South African imports, such as steel, citrus, 
and textiles, have raised vociferous voices against such trade with South Africa.45 One of 
the largest efforts has been directed at the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. Certain 
industries, particularly the textiles industry, perceive an inherent threat in the provisions 
of the bill calling for a relaxation of US tariffs on their products. In this campaign, 
industry lobbies joined forces with human rights groups such as the Africa Faith and 
Justice Network, TransAfrica, Friends of the Earth and UNITE, who believed the 
legislation would exploit rather than benefit Africa with its conditions of WTO 
membership, its structural adjustment programmes, and its "radical, mandatory 
43See Fabricius, Peter. "SA's 'punitive' trend alanns US." Cape Times Business Report (5 November 1998). 
44From interview with Rosa Whittaker, then senior staff member for Representative Charles Rangel, now 
the Assistant US Trade Representative for Africa (#46). 
45See, for instance, Barber, Simon. "Lift on Cape citrus ban irks Californians." Business Day'(2 September 
1996) and "Iscor, Highveld struggle with US duties." Business Day (24 November 1997). 
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privatisation" requirements. The Public Citizens Global Trade Watch, deeming the 
AGOA the "Sub-Saharan Africa NAFTA Bill," lobbied vigorously on both human rights 
grounds and, more to the point, on grounds that it would jeopardise the jobs of US 
workers -- especially textile workers -- by instigating a loose free-trade zone which made 
no provision to stop transshipment of Asian textiles and clothing via Africa to take 
advantage of these benefits.46 A subsequent letter to the press from the American Textile 
Manufacturers' Institute outlined similar objections, and derided "an erroneous 
International Trade Commission study ... [arriving] at the ludicrous conclusion that its 
economic model is accurate enough to predict the loss of 700 jobs in a domestic industry 
of 1.4 million employees. ,,47 The fact that organised labour in the US, in the fonn of the 
AFL-CIO, was opposed to the AGOA,48 while many African-American legislators were 
supportive of the bill, created a difficult situation for the Clinton administration. 
Traditionally, Democratic administrations and legislators rely on the support of both 
labour and the African-American constituency in national elections. The juxtaposition of 
this legislation with the mid-tenn congressional elections in November 1998 would have 
underlined this split at a time when Democrats were hoping to regain at least some of the 
seats they lost in 1994 to the Republican Party. For this and other reasons, as has been 
discussed, the legislation was withdrawn for reintroduction in the next Congress, 
allowing for further consultation with opposing parties and for the November 1998 
elections to pass.49 
The wide variety of voices that have been raised over trade and investment in 
South Africa demonstrates a conflictual-pluralist policy process which, as suggested by 
46See www.citizen.org for more detail, as well as links to other statements opposing the AGOA, including 
those from TransAfrica, the Africa Faith and Justice Network, the AFL-CIO, and Friends of the Earth. 
47Letter to the Editor from JP Danahy, President, American Textile Manufacturers' Institute. Washington 
Times (28 August 1998). 
48See www.citizen.org/pctrade/aflcio.htm 
49See Barber, Simon. "Africa bill's backers unwilling to back their words with dollars." Business Day (28 
October 1998). 
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Zimmerman, generally applies in the regulatory issue-area. As that is the issue-area 
where trade and investment issues in US South Africa policy appeared to fit, according to 
the criteria of tangibility and symmetry, this set of issues appears to support the 
Zimmerman paradigm's usefulness. 
5.3.3 Security Issues; Old and "New," and the Public 
Of the issues falling specifically into the security issue-type, only a few have 
entailed much articulated interest from the public, either in the current period or in the 
past. Instead, as the Zimmerman paradigm would suggest, these are issues which, for the 
most part, attract a consensual-elitist policy process. In the past, issues in this category 
dealt with the threat of communist expansion on the African continent, with protecting 
the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope for US access, and monitoring the nuclear 
weapons technology of which South Africa was rumoured to be in possession. These 
concerns have faded with the end of the Cold War and with South Africa's own admission 
of possessing, and voluntarily destroying, its nuclear arsenal. These, it is clear from the 
record, were not the issues which occupied interest groups active on South Africa in the 
1980's or before, unless they were used as a justification by pro-South Africa lobbies in 
the US seeking continued support for Pretoria as a "bastion against communism" in 
Africa. 
In the 1990's, other issues have arisen, but these remain a matter mostly of elite 
debate. The issue of the African Crisis Response Initiative, for instance, has remained 
outside the focus of interest group activity on South Africa, except in passing reference as 
comment on the wider US policy toward the region or as an issue for fringe groups of 
which neither the public nor the administration take much heed. 50 Public opinion was 
5 0 Present at the I October hearing on the ACRI was a member of an unnamed organisation (who suspected 
Henry Kissinger was a spy for the UK) opposing any US engagement with peacekeeping in Africa, whose 
remonstrations with Defense official Vincent Kern during a recess were later rejected as inaccurate and 
irrelevant. 
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initially a factor in the development of the concept of the ACRI, in that perceived 
opposition to US participation in peacekeeping forces was no doubt one impetus behind 
sponsorship of an African peacekeeping capability. But public debate and interest group 
activity has not focused on the ACRI subsequent to its introduction, based on the findings 
of this study. Similarly, the US response to South Africa's support for indefinite 
extension of the current Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 seemed to gamer little 
public interest, except perhaps from specialised interest groups following the wider non-
proliferation debate. South Africa's role in calling for a total ban on anti-personnel 
landmines along with other nations such as Canada and Norway, while at first glance an 
issue of security, would in fact fit better in the fourth, or redistributive issue-area. 
Landmines are not an issue in US South Africa policy except for the fact of South 
Africa's participation in the international defiance of the US on this issue, details of which 
will be provided in later discussion. 
Other security issues, termed "new security" issues in the current literature, consist 
of such threats as international terrorism, organised crime, environmental degradation, 
and the spread of infectious diseases. These issues attract some attention from sectors in 
the US concerned about them specifically, either as they pertain to US business interests 
in South Africa, or to global security in general. Many new security issues appear to be 
high on the agenda of US South Africa policy, as a factor in issues of trade and 
investment -- as manifested in the committees of the BNC, for instance. Interest group 
lobbying, therefore, has to do with increasing the administration's degree of commitment 
to addressing these security issues more than with any change in policy. Security, thus, 
constitutes a secondary focus of groups promoting, for instance, trade with South Africa, 
or sustainable development worldwide, or a general focus on infectious disease. 
The evidence would thus appear to confirm the suggestion that the security issue-
type in US South Africa policy, which falls under the interactive/protection issue-area, 
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does attract a consensual-elitist policymaking process as posited in the Zimmennan issue-
area paradigm. 
5.3.4 Issues of Political Symbolism and the Public 
Politically symbolic issues, being difficult to distil into discrete activist 
campaigns, do not attract widespread public attention as do more tangible issues. The 
main issues in US South Africa policy which fall into this issue-type are 1) the quest for 
fair and harmonious race relations, shared by certain leaders in the US and South Africa, 
and 2) perceived threats to US global hegemony, based on US perceptions about its 
preeminent position in the post-Cold War world and America's ability (or inability) to 
impose its will on other nations. The following looks at each of these in turn through the 
perspective of polls and US interest group activity. 
5.3.4.1 Issues of domestic political symbolism 
Issues of domestic political symbolism in US South Africa policy have attracted 
specific interest from members of the public pursuing changes in the status quo of social 
relationships, and as such fit into the fourth, redistributive issue-area, suggesting that a 
conflictual-elitist process would dominate in policymaking in these issues. 
Public elite sentiment on US engagement with South Africa, and on a close 
association with Pretoria's experiment in nonracial democracy and the person of Nelson 
Mandela, derives for many US leaders from the importance they place on racial equality 
in the United States. In fact, for the activist and non-activist African-American alike, 
South Africa had provided a spark of optimism after the dimming of Martin Luther King's 
thirty-year-old dream of a nonracial society in Americ~. Indicators show that interest in 
the success of South Africa ran high in the early stages of Pretoria's transition from 
minority rule: in 1990, 60 percent of African-Americans said they were closely following 
stories concerning Nelson Mandela's release from prison, as opposed to 30 percent of 
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whites.51 Also, following the' changes m South Africa in 1994, several African-
Americans (1000 by 1998) had moved to take up jobs or seek to be part of South Africa's 
new democracy, and hopes of business opportunity in a black majority-ruled South Africa 
ran high. 52 But that widespread interest in issues of political symbolism, it would seem 
from interviews and interest group activity, has not been sustained, and has come rather 
to reside in the leadership of the African-American community seeking specific changes 
in US policy calculations. 
There are, of course, members of the US public who are opposed to changes in the 
status quo, who make it their business to remain informed on issues that may impinge on 
their preferences. These detractors may press against increased engagement with South 
Africa, and against the inferred transfer of resources to and emphasis on African-
American priorities that such a policy represents. Senator Jesse Helms might be seen as 
representative of this segment of US society. A compromise position between the policy 
preferences of these two poles of opinion -- between support for increased engagement 
with South Africa on the grounds of racial solidarity on the one side, and opposition to 
increased engagement with South Africa, for various reasons such as budgetary 
constraints or lack of concern about racial inequality, on the other side -- will most likely 
be a matter of recurring give and take between these conflicting elites. 
The fact that before the 1990's, a broad public seeking racial solidarity with South 
African blacks was specifically opposed to any form of engagement with the South 
African (apartheid) state is one fundamental change in activity in this issue-type between 
the past and the period under study. But in fact, race continues as a compelling interest 
behind that policy, though activism on that basis is not as broadly supported as in the 
period before sanctions. 
51 The Gal/up Poll Monthly, No 293 (February 1990): 2-3. 
52See Moses, Charles. "African-Americans are not dupes, professor; we're here to make a contribution." 
Sunday Independent (1 March 1998). 
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In 1994-1998, a major factor behind public activity on issues of domestic political 
symbolism vis-a.-vis South Africa -- besides the changed circumstances in South Africa 
itself -- has been the raised visibility of race as an issue within the US itself. This raised 
visibility has been manifested in administration programmes such as Clinton's One 
Nation Initiative. Termed a "national conversation on race," the initiative invited 
Americans of every race to join in a year-long series of "townhall" meetings, conferences 
and probing reports. Launched with great fanfare in June 1997 at about the time that the 
White House Initiative on Trade and Growth in Africa surfaced, the One Nation Initiative 
was a direct response to a sense of continuing discrimination against African-Americans 
and of deteriorating race relations within America. Ironically, the despair over US race 
relations had grown with Clinton's enactment of legislation drastically reducing federal 
welfare programmes (of which blacks form a substantial proportion ofrecipients),53 with 
the retreat of affirmative action programmes at the state level (including in California and 
Texas) and with rumours of blatant racial slurs in corporate boardrooms.54 Furthermore, 
while crime statistics were dropping nationally, one in three young black males was either 
in jail, on probation or awaiting trial.55 Education statistics were little more promising. 
Indicative was the example of the school district in Oakland California that experimented 
with "ebonics"56 in 1997, where African-Americans who accounted for 53 percent of the 
district's pupils constituted 71 percent of remedial classes and 80 percent of 
suspensions. 57 As a backdrop to these trends, there were also the nearly diametrically 
opposing responses from black and white Americans to the Rodney King and OJ 
53See Ogden, Christopher. "Bye-Bye, American Pie." Time (12 August 1996): 24, and "Advances still far 
far short of King's dream." Cape Times (6 Apri11998). 
54See "Texaco's White-Collar Bigots." Time (18 November 1996): 65. 
55See Karon, Tony. "Racial divide gets wider in US." Cape Times (8 December 1997). 
56Ebonics - a hybrid of ebony and phonics -- was the name given to the dialect spoken by inner city 
African-Americans. In 1997 in Oakland, California, one school board adopted ebonies as an official 
second language and then dropped it amidst controversy within the African-American academic and 
~olitical community. 
7 See Reed, Christopher. "Ebonies pushed out the back door." Mail & Guardian (9-15 May 1997). 
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Simpson trial verdicts.58 These revelations underlined the racial divide persisting 
between African-Americans and "mainstream" white America. By late 1998, with the 
Clinton administration mired in the Starr investigation into misconduct in the White 
House, however, the report of Clinton's race advisory board was received with little note, 
and a hush seems to have settled over the public "conversation on race." The symbolic 
significance of the One Nation Initiative had not, however, been lost on influential 
African-Americans.59 
Meanwhile, a parallel, private-sector effort in the realm of foreign policy was also 
working to give African-Americans increased leverage at the national level in issues of 
politically symbolic importance to that community. This effort, the National Summit on 
Africa~ aims to build the African-American constituency into a force for political change 
on US Africa policy. In line with the notion that ethnic diasporas, by focusing on 
political causes in their respective lands of origin, become "better positioned to mobilize 
their political communities for empowerment inside the United States" (Shain, 1994/95: 
812), it is likely that the National Summit for Africa will dovetail in many ways with the 
One Nation Initiative. One aspect of the Summit's programme60 will be a series of 
regional summits to debate "key US-Africa issues," which will no doubt involve leaders 
in the African-American community who would also have participated in the One Nation 
conferences throughout the US, as well as the Constituency for Africa's "townhall 
meetings." These overlapping agendas will most likely contribute to building a 
connection between mobilising this community for domestic and for foreign policy goals. 
58Gallup Poll of7 February, 1997. 
59See Rosenblatt, Roger. "Talking Race with the President." Time (20 July 1998): 68. 
60The National Summit's series of regional summits throughout the US over 1997 and 1998 will culminate 
in a five-day national summit in Washington, DC, in 1999. Also in this Ford/Carnegie funded programme 
is the African Odyssey multi-year arts and cultural festival run by the prestigious Kennedy Center, which 
will tour the US, and production by an African-American multimedia company, Blackside, of an historical 
documentary on Africa, Hopes on the Horizon. A proposed "Study Commission on Africa," will also 
complement the Summit's programme. The Summit is currently under executive director MacArthur 
DeShazer, an African-American formerly on Clinton'S NSC Africa team, whose inside knowledge of US 
policy processes will augment the work of the Summit. 
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It would be interesting to learn what causal relationship exists, if any, between these 
efforts and politically symbolic moves on the part of the Clinton administration, such as 
the numerous high-level visits to Africa, the president's near-apology for slavery 
delivered during his visit in March 1998,61 and continued support for the US-South 
Africa Binational Commission. As the work of the National Summit on Africa and the 
Constituency for Africa unfolds, the impact on US Africa policy overall would, it seems, 
merit further study. 
5.3.4.2 Issues o/Global Political Symbolism 
Perceived threats to US hegemony representing Issues of global political 
symbolism in US South Africa policy-- fit into the fourth, or redistributive, issue-area as 
well, although it is more difficult to perceive the asymmetrical domestic impact of such 
an issue-type without considering the wider debate over the benefits of globalisation and 
of a refonned role for the US in the increasingly interdependent "global village." The 
conflictual-elitist policy process inherent in the redistributive issue-area would, however, 
seem an accurate description of the process underlying the issues in this issue-type, as few 
members of the public are active on such an esoteric level, and yet opinions vary widely 
on the part of the political-analytical community that debates such issues as perceived 
threats to US hegemony. 
One example confronting US policymakers in this issue-type is the case of South 
Africa's stance against US opposition to the complete ban on anti-personnel landmines. 
The US opposed the ban on the grounds that, until alternatives were available to protect 
US soldiers in conflict areas such as North Korea, these mines remained a necessity. 
Maintenance of this position on the part of the US precipitated in 1996 a move by several 
61 Clinton said that "American participation in the slave trade was wrong" before his visit to Goree Island, 
the site off the coast of west Africa where slave traders loaded their human cargo for their long trip over the 
Atlantic. See "Bongo drums and cigars for 'vindicated' Clinton." Cape Times (3 April 1998). 
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nations, including South Africa, to circumvent the established process which the US and 
other major powers had created for the gradual phasing out of anti-personnelolandmines. 
In spite of US pressure to the contrary, South Africa, with Canada and Norway, led the 
way to create this alternative process which was able to garner by late 1997 support from 
over 100 governments for the need to ban these mines immediately and completely (Nel, 
Taylor and van der Westhuizen, 1998: 16-17). The message to the US was clear: 
America could no longer assume that it would be ultimately in charge of such processes, 
as it has been able to assume in the past based on its resources and its clout 
internationally, nor could America pressure allies -- including South Africa -- to follow 
the US lead in every instance. Interest group activity vis-a.-vis US policy on South Africa 
on this issue did not become apparent during the course of this study, though it may be 
occurring within small groups in the US focusing on the abolition of landmines. There 
are likely some linkages at the transnational level between groups in the US and in South 
Africa focused on the landmines campaign. 
Another example of global political symbolism in US South Africa policy, 
discussed in Chapters Two and Four, is that of South Africa's continued diplomatic 
relations with "rogue" states which the US has deemed to be sponsoring terrorist activity, 
such as Libya, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, or has attempted to ostracise on anti-communist 
grounds and for human rights abuses, such as Cuba. The negative effect on US South 
Africa policy of South Africa's rejection of US pressure on this issue has been 
demonstrated by the recurring tensions that arise whenever South Africa's diplomatic 
visits to these states are reported in the press.62 However, these actions do not attract 
specific US interest group activity on US South Africa policy, per se.63 The effects are 
62See, for instance, "'We'll sell to whom we want': Mandela rejects US warnings on arms deals." Cape 
Times (16 January 1997), and "US accused of playing the 'bullyboy'." Cape Times (27 January 1997). 
63With regard to "rogue" states, the American-Israeli Political Action Committee and others are, however, 
considered a root cause of the anti-terrorist legislation underlying this US opposition to maintaining 
relations with certain third-party states. A vocal anti-Castro lobby was similarly behind the Helms-Burton 
legislation. 
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not such therefore that they have derailed engagement with South Africa, as seen in the 
ongoing Binational Commission meetings and Clinton's 1998 visit. 
Any interest group input on these issues in the US would have focused on the 
wider issues -- a total ban on anti-personnellandmines or relations with "rogue" states --
more than on South Africa's role therein. Such examples of interest group activity, 
therefore, have little direct effect on US South Africa policy in this issue-type, in which 
the policy process suggested by the issue-area typology -- conflictual-elitist -- would 
appear to hold sway. 
5.4 Conclusion: US Public Sentiment and Clinton's South Africa Policy 
Clinton administration policy on South Africa must be seen, in part, as a function 
of domestic political concerns, expressed through public opinion, legislative action, and 
interest group activity. In review, public opinion has fonned an important backdrop for 
each of the issue-types identified in US South Africa policy during the 1994-1998 period. 
Due to a "foreign policy gap," perceptions among policymakers of strong disengagement 
sentiment on the part of the public led to signs of imminent US withdrawal from such 
regions as Africa. However, as public support for engagement in Africa, and especially 
South Africa, became more evident in the second half of the 1990's, forces for 
disengagement lost momentum. 
In this first attempt to apply the Zimmennan issue-area paradigm to interest group 
activity behind US South Africa policy, the predictions regarding expected policy 
processes appear to hold. There are, however, instances where the changing dynamics of 
an issue -- where it involves more or less tangibility or symmetry of impact than before --
can move an issue-type from one issue-area to another (such as in the case of US 
development assistance to South Africa after 1995). To review, depending on the issue-
type in question, interest group activity has been either significant (as in the issue-type of 
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trade and investment), or minimal (as in the issue-types of security and political 
symbolism), or has varied over the period in question (as in the issue-type of development 
assistance. ) 
General observations about US engagement policy are borne out by the location of 
interest group activity on US South Africa policy in the issue-area matrix, the majority of 
which has fallen in the top half of the quadrant in question (see Figure C). This pattern 
indicates that the net thrust of interest group activity in the post-apartheid period has been 
in a positive direction, pressing for engagement with South Africa at a deeper level 
sociopolitically and commercially. 
Specifically, concern about US Africa policy have been expressed by the African-
American community, both through public opinion and through its elite, creating 
pressures for delivery on two related issues: Clinton's stated aim that racial harmony in 
the US be a legacy of his presidency, and US engagement in support of South Africa's 
experiment in nonracial democracy. Business interests also express concern about US 
South Africa policy, via a broad range of interest groups (including African-American 
groups). While current policy runs parallel with most business interests' agendas (the 
exception being that of the vocal protectionist minority), these groups are pressing for 
specific changes in US or South African economic policies which will increase US 
market shares and access to profitable investments. 
According to several respondents in the interviewing process behind this study, 
even with such efforts as the CF A and the National Summit on Africa, there is unlikely to 
be a constituency for Africa as powerful as that for Israel in American politics, partly 
because, as one interviewee noted, "the constituencies for Africa in the US are diverse, 
both within and beyond the African-American community.,,64 If interest groups do seek 
64See Minter, William. Making Connections for Africa: Constituencies, Movements, Interest Groups, 
Coalitions, and Conventional Wisdoms. Background paper 008, Washington, DC: Africa Policy 
Information Center (March 1997): 1. 
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to oppose US policy toward South Africa, they will most likely need another coalescing 
issue around which they can again become the force they were in fighting Reagan's 
"constructive engagement" policy. However, if that coalescing issue arises, another 
interviewee noted, "the NGO and civic activist groups ... are not to be ignored. ,,65 
Moving from the public to the government sector at the sub-unit level of analysis, 
the following chapter will focus on the bureaucratic politics and processes which 
constitute a second important factor behind the formulation of US foreign policy. 
65From interview with former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker (#26). 
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Policymaking on South Africa under Clinton: 
Foreign Policy Process, Bureaucracies, and the BNC 
Within the context of global developments in the 1990's, and of current US 
foreign policy goals as set out by the Clinton administration, perceived US public opinion 
and interest group activity have continued to play an important role (though to a greater or 
lesser degree depending on the issue-type under examination) in the formulation of US 
South Africa policy in the 1994-1998 period. The net effect of that contribution has been 
enhanced engagement with South Africa, especially in the areas of commercial policy and 
identification with South Africa's new nonracial democracy. 
The chapter at hand seeks to move the discussion forward, holding these several 
other factors in tension, to examine a further important factor shaping US South Africa 
policy: that is, the institutional framework underlying US foreign policy in general, and 
the process by which the whole of that institutional framework, made up of its many 
parts, "makes policy." This policy process, to use Zimmerman's term,1 is multilayered 
and complex, insofar as most foreign policy decisions must wend their way through a 
multitude of checks and balances, organisational levels, standard operating procedures, 
and bureaucratic politics before they reach an outcome. These components of the policy 
process are each discussed and debated in depth in the literature (eg, Allison, 1971; Snow 
and Brown, 1994; Hilsman,1993), but constitute, for the purposes of this study, one factor 
underlying US foreign policy. Before the following issue-area analysis of these 
bureaucratic politics and processes begins, two aspects of the policy process will be 
pulled out for fuller discussion: 1) executive-legislative tensions in foreign policy, and 2) 
IThe reader is reminded, however, that while Zimmerman did not differentiate between domestic politics 
and policy process in the development of his "issue-based foreign policy paradigm," but chose to lump both 
together as one factor termed "domestic political processes" in foreign policymaking (p 1205), this study 
has chosen to separate the two out for the sake of more specific analysis. 
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the burgeoning US Africa policy bureaucracy. Preceding even that discussion is a brief 
overview of the constitutional guidelines upon which the American foreign policy process 
relies for its fundamental form. 
Unique to this study, relative to past studies of US foreign policy process, is the 
intensive campaign on the part of the Clinton administration and spearheaded by Vice 
President Gore to "reinvent government." This campaign arose from the conviction that 
the cumbersome nature of the bureaucratic process, intended to safeguard against abuse 
of power, was often serving rather to obstruct effective policymaking. In this context, the 
US-South Africa Binational Commission may thus be seen not only as an attempt to take 
advantage of the "window of opportunity" presented by South Africa's transition to 
democracy, but also as a pilot project in the Clinton/Gore programme to reform the 
federal bureaucracy. Whether or not the BNC has succeeded in "reinventing" the US 
policy process vis-a.-vis policy towards post-apartheid South Africa will be addressed in 
ensuing discussion, as will the implications of success or failure in that venture for future 
US South Africa policy. 
As previously discussed, the controversy over exactly what role policy process 
plays in the making of foreign policy carries on from the time the concept was first 
mooted. While this study does not contend, as Henry Kissinger once put it, that "the 
process is the policy," it does argue that without taking the policy process into account, 
any attempt to understand foreign policy outcomes will be incomplete. In attempting to 
discern the degree of US engagement in South Africa in the 1994-1998 period, as this 
study does, issue-area analysis of the bureaucratic activity within each of the issue-types 
in US South Africa policy is critical. As in the previous chapter, each instance of activity 
will be located along the engagement/disengagement continuum within each issue-area 
quadrant, in order to gain a picture of the net direction of governmental pressure on US 
South Africa policy under Clinton. 
Discussion begins with policy process and the US Constitution. 
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6.1 A Survey of the American Foreign Policy Process 
From the end of the second World War, US foreign policymaking has been 
centralised in the National Security Council (NSC), a highly-elitist organ of the executive 
branch upon which the president relies for counsel in foreign affairs under most 
administrations, and whose membership is left to the president's discretion. As such, the 
NSC has varied in membership with each president since its creation in 1947, but under 
the Clinton/Gore administration it consists of the Vice President and the Secretaries of 
Defense and State, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Chainnan of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a matter of course, the National Security Advisor, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, the US Representative to the UN, the Assistant to the President 
for Economic Policy, and the White House Chief of Staff are "invited to attend all 
meetings of the Council," while the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of 
National Drugs Control Policy attend only those meetings "pertaining to their 
jurisdiction. ,,2 
However, the United States, a presidential democracy, is also one of the few 
nations in the world where the leader of the government is not also the leader of the 
majority party in the legislature, but is elected by separate ballot. While American 
leaders have from the beginning debated the wisdom of such an arrangement,3 the US 
constitution remains in its original fonn -- save fewer than 40 amendments over 200 years 
-- and is defended still as a document "to save the people from autocracy,,,4 or at least 
from an "imperial presidency" (Fulbright, 1972: 227). The implications of this separation 
of powers for foreign policy are that while the executive branch, including the NSC, is 
technically the beginning and the end of the process of US foreign policy fonnulation and 
2See the Clinton administration's website at <www.whitehouse.gov> . 
3See comment by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay at the time of the ratification of the 
American Constitution (1789), in Rossiter (1961): No 23 & 29. 
4From Justice Brandeis in the 1926 Myers Case, quoted in Abshire (1979): 68. 
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execution, the legislature has wide ranging powers to alter or even obstruct the foreign 
policy programme of any presidential administration. The overturning of President 
Ronald Reagan's veto of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act is cited as one of a few 
instances in US history in which Congress has ever turned the tide of an administration's 
foreign policy, in that case, "constructive engagement" (Lindsay, 1994: 281). 
6.1.1 Conflict by Design -- The Constitutional Separation of Powers 
The sanctity of this separation of powers, which is further extended to include an 
independent judiciary in matters of procedure, is perhaps one of the least understood 
aspects of the US foreign policymaking process. Consider, for example, this note from 
history: 
During his presidency in the late eighteenth century, Thomas Jefferson 
intercepted a letter from the French government to the US Congress and 
sent it back to Paris with the message that the President was to be the only 
channel of communication between the United States and foreign nations. 
It was from him and him alone that "foreign nations or their agents [were] 
to learn what is or has been the will of the [ American] nation 
(Corwin,1917: 1). 
There is no questionning the plethora of communications between Congress and 
representatives of other states in the 1990's, the age of electronic mail and easy 
international air travel. But there are still basic understandings in the US as to a 
separation of foreign policy powers between the executive and legislative branches of 
government. The US constitution separates authority in American foreign policy without, 
however, granting complete independence of action to either the legislative or the 
executive branch. Thus, not only is an American administration not guaranteed support 
for its policies, but it must govern the nation on the basis of political agreements with an 
independently elected legislature. Compromise is often the result. 
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With regard to foreign policy, the American Constitution endowed the president 
with the responsibility to negotiate and sign treaties (the latter on Senate approval), to 
command the armed forces, and to appoint and receive ambassadors. Congress, on the 
other hand, in addition to its general authority over the appropriation of government 
funding, received the power to advise and consent on treaties, to confirm or reject 
presidential nominees for cabinet posts and diplomatic missions, to declare war, and to 
regulate trade. Congress' power to override a presidential veto of legislation also 
impinges on presidential powers, but requires a two-thirds majority in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. 
This delegation of foreign policy powers, while traditionally interpreted as vesting 
the conduct of US foreign relations in the executive branch, has often presented 
difficulties for US policymakers. There have also been several instances, which continue 
to occur, where the tug and pull of the foreign policymaking process has assured that 
administration initiatives which began well have floundered not on the rocks of 
substantive disagreement, but on the rocks of executive-legislative discord.5 This 
problem has been the subject of many a proposal for reform in the policymaking process6 
and is likely to be even more so with the increasing importance of trade in US foreign 
policy in the post Cold War period, pointing to increased legislative influence over US 
foreign relations. 
Woodrow Wilson, 10 his 1884 commentary on American government, termed 
periods in which a strong willed American legislature dominated a weak president 
"congressional government.,,7 These surges of congressional activism typically followed 
5The recent defeat of President Clinton's request for renewed "fast-track" authority in trade negotiations is 
only one example. Another is the fact that Congress has not enacted a foreign aid authorisation bill since 
1985, leaving most foreign assistance programmes unauthorised. (Nowels, 1997a: 2). 
6See, for instance, Strengthening Executive-Legislative Consultation on Foreign Policy. Congress and 
Foreign Policy Series No 8, US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC 
(1983); and for discussion of the general issues, Spanier, John and Nogee, Joseph. Congress, the 
Presidency and American Foreign Policy. New York: Pergamon Press (1981). 
7From the introduction by Walter Lippman, p. 14, in Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government. 
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periods of war or economic depression, when the legislature perceived that it must wrest 
back some of the control commonly gained by the executive during such testing times.8 
One recent example is that of the Post-Vietnam War "democratisation" of Congress. 
Throughout the 1980's, however, several of the new provisions for congressional 
authority in matters of foreign policy, such as the War Powers Resolution, were called 
into question9 or even, in the case of a legislative veto on matters of policy, struck down 
as unconstitutional. IO Indeed, when President Bush was calling on America to support 
war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq over Kuwait in 1991, Congress again (after some 
objections) followed the prevalent historical pattern in American foreign policy: 
congressional deference to the executive branch. I I Subsequent cuts in government 
spending under House Majority Leader Newt Gingrich, in his campaign to balance the US 
federal budget, included reducing House committee staffs by a third, a move which 
further eroded the "democratisation" efforts of the 1970's and early 1980's. 
How has this affected US South Africa policy? For one thing, there were fears 
that, once again, there might be moves to abolish the House Subcommittees on Africa --
fears that were quelled only after a meeting between the Congressional Black Caucus and 
House Speaker Newt Gingrich in which the latter gave assurances to the contrary 
(Copson, 1996: 31). However, signalling revived congressional foreign policy activism 
and an increased ability to drive policy on Africa and South Africa under the current 
emphasis on trade in foreign relations, Congress' Africa Growth and Opportunity Act was 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (1981). Originally published in 1885. 
8professor Seth TilIman concludes this in his course notes on Vietnam and the Teaching o/Congress and 
Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Georgetown University (1984): 7. 
9Robert F. Turner called the War Powers Resolution "unconstitutional, ineffective, unwise" in his critical 
analysis of the Act in The War Powers Resolution: Its Implementation in Theory and Practice. 
Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research lnstitute (1983): 107. 
10The supreme court ruled in 1983, in I.N.S. vs Chadha, that the legislative veto is constitutional only when 
affecting congressional procedure, but not policy. See discussion in James M. Lindsay, "Congress, Foreign 
Policy, and the New Institutionalism" in the International Studies Quarterly (1994): 286. 
11 For a chronology and discussion of congressional opposition before the "resolution authorising the use of 
force" against Iraq was passed, see Snow/Brown, Puzzle Palaces and Foggy Bottom: 242-4. 
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presented (in its original form) ahead of the similar White House initiative on Africa 
(Dagne, 1997: 1). Factors extraneous to the constitutional delineation of powers --
developments in communications, in cross-national relations, in interest group activism 
and influence, for instance -- would also point to a continued increase in congressional 
activism and influence on foreign policy generally (Lindsay, 1992-3: 609; Tierney, 1994: 
103; and Huntington, 1997: 46). 
As Congress, in effect, mirrors domestic political trends, discussion at this point 
overlaps greatly with the earlier issue-area analysis of public opinion and interest group 
activity. To review, the Zimmerman paradigm suggests that domestic politics have their 
greatest influence in those issue-areas involving tangible political goods, as in issues of 
distribution and regulation. Likewise, congressional activism in foreign policy matters 
would tend to fall in the categories of regulation and distribution. 12 This study suggests, 
however, that members of Congress might also be seen as elite players if their activism is 
undertaken without the support of constituents. 
This study now turns to an examination of the wider Africa bureaucracy before 
setting out on issue-area analysis of the bureaucratic processes and politics in US South 
Africa policy in the post-apartheid period. 
6.1.2 The Burgeoning Africa Bureaucracy 
The growth of the US bureaucracy on Africa, as with most of the US foreign 
policy bureaucracy, began in the context of the Cold War, when US interests in the 
continent revolved around issues of geopolitical security and competition for third world 
loyalties. In 1957, ten years after the Department of State emerged as a separate 
bureaucratic entity from the War Office,13 US Vice-President Richard Nixon visited 
120ne exception was in the 1994-96 period, when elites were most active on issues of development 
assistance due to perception that aid had become a redistributive issue nationally. See the section on 
development assistance in Chapter 5. 
13 1947 saw the creation of the Departments of State and Defense, and of the National Security Council, in 
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Africa to assess US interests and options on the continent. At that time, the Soviet Union 
was actively seeking to influence nations of the third world and the "winds of change" 
were gathering force over colonial Africa, bringing independence to one nation after 
another. In his trip report, Nixon predicted that "the course of [Africa's] 
development...could well prove to be the decisive factor in the conflict between the forces 
of freedom and international communism," 14 and recommended the creation ofa Bureau 
for African Affairs. Previously handled by the Department of State's Bureau of Near 
Eastern and African Affairs (which was preceded by the Bureau for Near Eastern, South 
Asian and African Affairs), US relations with Africa were boosted by the installation of a 
separate bureau in 1958. The focus on Africa (though by no means at the top of policy 
agendas) grew under President Kennedy in the early 1960's with the inception of the 
Peace Corps and new experiments in Africa in the area of development assistance. As the 
threat of communist influence over the newly independent African nations largely faded 
in the latter part of the 1960's -- the fonner colonies either choosing to remain in the 
western camp or rejecting both east and west to try their own political arrangements -- US 
strategic interest waned. The ensuing thirty years showed a pattern of low priority status 
given to the continent in US policy circles, interrupted by occasional high-profile African 
political events which required some American response. These included, for instance, 
the Biafran War of the late 1960's, Angolan independence in the mid 1970's, the 
intensification of the anti -apartheid struggle in South Africa in the mid 1980's, and South 
Africa's peaceful triumph over apartheid in the early 1990's. 15 
The latter event, happening as it did soon after the more general transfonnation in 
international relations with the end of the Cold War, opened the way for more diverse US 
order to deal with the growing threat of war with the Soviet Union. 
14"The Vice President's Report to the President on His Trip to Africa, February 28-March 21, 1957," April 
5, 1957, White House Office Files, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. Quoted in Clough, 1994: 
6. 
I 5 Peter Schraeder posits this perspective, and discusses each of these cases in detail, in United States 
Foreign Policy toward Africa (1994). 
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relations with the nations of Africa, and specifically with South Africa. This expansion 
of relations has been mirrored in the bureaucracy which deals with Africa, from the 
Department of State to the Department of Commerce and beyond. While this expansion 
of relations has added to the complexity of policymaking on Africa, there have also been 
efforts on the part of the Clinton/Gore administration to reform the process on the 
grounds of both efficiency and relevance. This reform drive includes the formation of the 
US-South Africa Binational Commission. 
6.1.2.1 The Need to Reorganise 
In the 1790's, the Secretary of State oversaw a "bureaucracy" that consisted of five 
clerks, one translator, two messengers, and two overseas diplomatic missions. In the 
1990's, the Secretary of State oversees a department which employs over 24,000 people 
and supports 300 embassies, consulates and missions overseas -- yet remains the smallest 
of all the cabinet-level agencies and has a budget roughly six percent that of the 
Department of Defense (Snow and Brown, 1994: 91). These figures indicate not only the 
vastness of the US federal bureaucracy, but also the challenge for students of the current 
US foreign policy process: namely, increased complexity. The Department of State 
alone presents a myriad of overlapping functional and regional offices to confound even 
the most determined observer, and represents only the tip of the iceberg which is the 
foreign policymaking process. With regard to policy on international trade, for instance, 
depending on the issue, upwards of 20 different federal bureaucratic entities, in and 
outside of the Department of State, will be involved in the decisionmaking process 
(Nunn, Domenici, and Miller, 1994: 34). 
Activity on Africa policy is likewise scattered throughout the US federal 
government, in offices and bureaux which are either focused on Africa, or from time to 
time overlap with the process of policymaking on Africa. At the Department of State 
(DOS) -- besides the Africa Bureau the Bureaus for International Organisations, 
185 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Policymaking on South Africa 
Refugee Programmes, Legislative Affairs, and Humanitarian Affairs are often active on 
US Africa policy. The Agency for International Development and the US Information 
Service (which have been reorganised as of 1997 to fall under the purview of the 
Secretary of State) have regional offices dealing with Africa, as does the US Trade and 
Development Agency. Outside of DOS, there are the regional desks within the National 
Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
Department of Commerce and its attendant trade-related bodies, as well as in the 
Department of the Treasury and the Office of the US Trade Representative. And this list 
expands greatly with the inclusion of the many new bureaucratic agents involved in the 
US-South Africa Binational Commission, including for instance the Departments of 
Transportation, of the Interior, of Energy, of Health and Human Services, and the White 
House Office on Science and Technology. These federal agencies, in turn, must 
cooperate with the legislative branch, which has its own set of committees, 
subcommittees and staffers which affect US policy on Africa. Besides the Africa 
Subcommittees of the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, there are the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate 
Finance Committee, with their subcommittees dealing with trade; the House and Senate 
committees dealing with military affairs; and the respective Appropriations Committees, 
to name a few. 
Even before (but especially after) the budget crisis of late 1995 and early 1996, 
when the US federal government was virtually shut down while lawmakers sought a 
resolution to the impasse between Congress and the executive branch over balancing the 
federal budget (which included severe cuts to the foreign affairs account), several ideas 
for reorganising the foreign affairs bureaucracy surfaced (eg, Stokes, 1994: 231-235; 
Eagleburger and Barry, 1996: 4-8). Efforts to reframe the debate abounded, focusing on 
the small size of the foreign affairs budget -- at less than a tenth of one percent of the 
federal budget in 1997 -- relative to its importance in the current global age (eg, Walker, 
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1997: 1; Muravchik, 1996: 8). There was also an attempt at structural reappraisal by the 
Department of State which began with an outline of new, post-Cold War challenges. A 
Department of State task force charged with this effort listed several: renewing the US 
economy to compete in an increasingly interdependent world; supporting democracy and 
market economies worldwide; confronting global issues such as the environment, drugs, 
and AIDS; redefining national security in the light of the rising threat of proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction; and, directing US diplomacy in order to capitalise on new 
opportunities for multilateral cooperation (US Department of State, 1992: 217). In 1998, 
they would no doubt have added the need to reform the current international financial 
regime, which appears insufficient to meet the threat of financial meltdown facing a large 
part of the world. Even as it stands, however, the list is surprising for its admission that 
the US economy, generally the domain of the Department of Commerce, is a top US 
foreign policy priority. 
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) also came in for some 
critical scrutiny, by advocates and detractors alike (Graham and O'Hanlon, 1997; Gordon, 
1996; Kull et aI, 1997: 95-114) during the reorganisation process. Declining foreign aid 
budgets brought the message home even louder: increase effectiveness, not spending. 
Despite the 1997 bargain struck with Senator Jesse Helms over the resubordination of 
USAID under the DOS umbrella, USAID continues to fight declining budgets. 
Perhaps most germane to the discussion of US policy on South Africa, however, 
has been the reordering of foreign policy priorities in which trade and investment have 
become the keystone of Clinton's foreign policy, and the resulting changes in the 
bureaucratic processes and politics. 
6.1.2.2 Commerce to the fore 
As trade and investment are the watchwords of global relations and of US foreign 
policy in the 1990's, it is not surprising that elements of the foreign policy bureaucracy 
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charged with developing and implementing US trade policy have come to the fore, in 
South Africa policy and in general. 
In an early attempt to drive this transformation, and making good on his campaign 
promise to focus on the reinvigoration of the US economy through expanded trade and 
investment opportunities, President Clinton established by an executive order in January 
1993 a National Economic Council. The NEC was designed to coordinate domestic and 
international economic policy from a central point in the White House, forming an 
economic counterpart to the National Security Council -- the powerful hub of foreign 
policy formulation established during the Cold War years. Clinton's was not the first 
administration to attempt coordination of international economic policy; in 1971, for 
instance Gust as Nixon was about to drop the gold standard), the Council on International 
Economic Policy (CIEP) was established. The CIEP followed years of wrangling over 
the creation of a department to deal comprehensively with such matters as trade, 
investment, balance of payments issues and finance. Such a department, envisioned 
under the Special Trade Representative (now, the USTR), never reached the floor of 
Congress due to fears that ""trade policy" might become isolated from "economic and 
foreign policy interests" (Destler, 1980: 208). Instead, the CIEP was set up much like the 
National Security Council, as an "umbrella for a staff of substantive aides reporting 
directly to the president," and mandated to provide a "clear top-level focus for the full 
range of international economic policy issues" (p.213). However, as it became "not so 
much a coordinator as a competitor" with the departments already dealing with each of 
the issues under its mandate, the CIEP was allowed to expire by 1977. 
Similarly, the NEC has not, as yet, successfully taken up the challenge of pulling 
the disparate players in the foreign trade policymaking process together. Its emphasis on 
domestic, as opposed to international, economic affairs is reflected in the fact that only 
three of the 18 NEC staff focus on international issues. The National Economic Advisor, 
Gene Sperling, is hardly a visible foreign policy actor, and reports little activity in the 
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realm of coordinating US international trade and investment policy. 16 Instead, under the 
leadership of the Department of Commerce, a Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee 
operates to bring together agencies involved in trade. Through the vehicle of the TPCC, 
Commerce and other agencies such as the US Trade Representative (which has operated 
out of the White House since 1962), the Department of the Treasury, and the various 
trade related offices referred to above, appear to have gained influence in many of the 
foreign policy issues facing the Clinton/Gore team. This commercial emphasis is 
reflected in US policymaking on South Africa, which shall be demonstrated in succeeding 
pages of issue-area analysis. 
6.1.2.3 "Reinventing Government" 
The broad and deep domestic content of trade policy, coupled with the explosion 
of activity in the financial and commercial realm of the mid 1990's, have both played a 
role in bringing commercial policy further to the fore in foreign policy considerations. 
Even as international trade policy became a matter of increased domestic interest, the 
urgency of addressing at the multilateral level such issues as, environmental degradation, 
nuclear and chemical weapon proliferation, organised crime, and the possibility of global 
financial "meltdown," became increasingly apparent. These dynamics have brought 
greater complexity to the policy process even as rapid responses are increasingly critical 
in the world of real-time news coverage as discussed in Chapter Two. 
It is in this milieu that President Clinton and Vice President Gore's initiatives on 
"reinventing government" have captured the imagination of some bureaucrats, even as 
they have frustrated others. Before turning to discussion of "reinventing government" and 
the innovation inherent in the Gore-Mbeki BNC, the discussion first turns to an analysis 
of the US bureaucracy on South Africa in terms of issue-areas. By analysing these 
16See www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/neclhtml/sperling.html 
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bureaucracies within the same framework employed for the study of interest groups, the 
goal is to provide an overall picture of the role of, and direction of pressure on 
engagement policy from, the domestic politics and policy process behind US policy on 
South Africa under President Clinton. 
YES 
/ 
Figure D 
BUREAUCRATIC ACI'IVITY ON US SOUTH AFRICA POLICY 
AND DIRECTION OF ACI'IVITY 
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** Involved under the auspices of the Department of Commerce are the Export-Import Bank, 
the International Trade Administration. the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminisrration. 
OPIC. the foreign commercial service, and the Minister Counselor Arnold. as well as the 
Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee. 
(Based on Zimmerman's "Issue-based Foreign Pol icy Paradigm") 
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6.2 Bureaucratic Process and Politics, and Issue Types in US South Africa Policy 
As with societal sources of foreign policy where different issue-areas involve 
different configurations of interest groups and other actors, so in the institutional case 
different issue-areas involve different groups of bureaucracies, each of which have their 
own peculiar sets of hierarchy, culture and politics. The specific placement of US 
bureaucracies within policymaking on South Africa under Clinton is illustrated in the 
matrix above (see Figure D), based on their involvement in different issues and on 
whether they are thereby encouraging conflict or cooperation (and therefore, encouraging 
engagement or disengagement). The BNC and the policy process which that entity entails 
will be addressed both within each issue-type, and as an example of a unique policy 
process on its own. 
6.2.1 Development Assistance and the Bureaucracy 
While development assistance is often used to garner public favour from 
interested American constituencies, it is more expressly used by policymakers to support 
US national interests abroad. Through the economic development of allies and potential 
allies, US assistance aims to contribute to the stability of the international system, as well 
as increased US leverage therein. US aid levels to the Middle East are the highest, but 
have long exceeded any developmental rationale and are based on strategic and economic 
interests in the region, as well as on domestic political considerations. US aid levels to 
Africa, on the other hand, are historically among the lowest in the world, and remain so, 
(see Table 4 below) based on the perceived relative lack of strategic interests in the 
continent as well as a perceived lack of public interest in Africa. 
In line with aid in general, as well as with the mid-1990's anxieties about US 
economic performance, the US proportion of total international overseas development 
assistance (ODA) to Africa has been on the decline in the 1990's (although the decline has 
been slowed by the public support for aid to Africa shown in the 1994-1995 period, as 
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Table 4. Leading Recipients of U.S. Foreign Aid: 
FY1997 'and FY1998 Request 
(appropriation allocations - $ in millions) 
FY1997 Allocation FY1998 R~uest 
Israel $3,000.0 $3,000.0 
Egypt $2,116.0 $2,116.1 
Russia $100.1 $246.2 
Turkey $208 .3 $231.0 
Ukraine $228.4 $229.1 
Bosnia $218 .1 $225 .5 
Greece $122.5 $122 .5 
Armenia $96.0 $81.1 
Bolivia $76.3 $78.1 
Jordan * $47.1 $75 .6 
West Bank/Gaza $75 .0 $75 .0 , 
Peru $48.7 $74.9 
South Africa $79.5 $72.5 
Haiti $73 .2 $71.7 
(Source: Copson, (I 997b): 8) 
discussed in the previous chapter). In 1994, the US was the second leading donor of 
ODA to Africa after France. By 1995, according to the OEeD, the US had slipped to 
fourth place behind France, Japan and Germany. Some 14 developed countries gave a 
larger share of their net ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa than did the US in 1995. 17 
Likely institutional reaction to this downward pressure on aid levels is well-
documented: agency representatives will seek not only to protect aid levels in order to 
17From Development Cooperation. The OECD Development Assistance Committee 1996 Report, quoted 
in Copson, 1997: 9. 
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meet developmental goals in recipient states, but also to maintain "turf," or even 
institutional survival (Halperin & Kantor, 1973: 10). Indeed, as mentioned earlier, there 
was recently a major challenge to the concept of foreign assistance itself, in the form of 
the 1995 campaign by Republican legislators to eliminate most forms of aid and the 
attendant bureaucracies. IS With the end of the Cold War as a backdrop -- robbing aid of 
its political justification in the eyes of many -- these antagonists reframed aid funding as a 
redistributive issue, playing on the sense of national economic malaise of the early 1990's, 
and projecting cuts in the aid budgets as a trade-off for threatened domestic welfare 
budgets. The campaign was successful in cutting foreign assistance spending, but not in 
ending aid altogether and, as of 1998, the aid bureaucracies have remained intact, though 
reorganised and with reduced budgets. 19 
While aid to Africa was spared somewhat from the worst of the cuts in 1995 due 
to pressure from a coalition built by the Constituency for Africa, the effectiveness of 
many of the African programmes is under review after reports that most African countries 
are worse off now than they were before aid began (Graham, 1997: 19). The threat to aid 
has, however, only peripherally affected US aid to the newly democratic South Africa 
which, it appears, remains a matter of overriding domestic political importance. Besides 
South Africa's economic reforms and strong performance since apartheid's end, the 
general euphoria surrounding South Africa's transition appeared not to allow the 
administration or Congress to countenance major cuts to Pretoria's programme, except in 
the future on the grounds of South Africa's readiness to "graduate" from development 
assistance to more commercial forms of US policy engagement.20 
ISLegislation along these lines was introduced in the 104th Congress, based on an overwhelming 
perception among legislators that Americans would like to "nix aid" (Kull, Destler and Ramsay, 1997: 97), 
but failed. See also Copson (1997): 1. 
19Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Jesse Helms achieved this reorganisation by promising 
(partial) payment of UN arrears, which was later held up over a controversial provision on international 
~opulation control. 
OSee Copson, 1997: 11, on South Africa as a special focus of Clinton's aid policy in Africa. 
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From within the US government itself, however, came a highly publicised 
congressional attack on USAlD's mission in South Africa. These objections, noted in the 
press and at the ANC national conference in early 1998,21 were not based on changing 
geostrategic priorities or lack of economic effectiveness, but rather on the lack of 
accountability of the mission and a perceived inappropriateness of specific projects. 
Debate, in short, focused on the implementation and not on the existence or size of US 
development assistance to South Africa. The conflictual-elitist process entailed in that 
debate, however, contradicts expectations that a consensual-pluralist policy process 
would apply in this issue-type, placed as it was in the distributive issue-area at the outset 
of this study. But, as noted in Chapter Four, this apparent contradiction is actually caused 
by the fact that development assistance in US South Africa policy shifted out of quadrant 
I and into quadrant IV, the redistributional issue-area. This shift was largely due to 
changes in systemic and national factors which undermined the consensus upon which aid 
policy had been based since its inception, as well as the unique nature of the USAID 
mission to South Africa over the 1994-1998 period (as shall be demonstrated more fully 
below). This failure to meet the expectations established at the outset signifies not so 
much a weakness in the expectations of the Zimmerman paradigm as a limitation of this 
study in making judgements about an issue-type. The issues within this issue-type 
obviously changed in nature in terms of the criteria of tangibility and symmetry of impact, 
and the change was enough to move development assistance to a new issue-area. This is 
an important limitation which must be noted for the future application of the Zimmerman 
typology using issue-types. At this point, however, we turn to the specific bureaucratic 
dynamics of South Africa's development assistance programme under Clinton. 
21See Mandela, Nelson. "Looking Ahead to the Millennium." Special Supplement on the ANC 1997 
national conference, Cape Times (23 December 1997); 2. 
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6.2.1.1 USAIDISA 
The USAID mission in South Africa (USAID/SA) was fonnally established in late 
1986, based on a legislative mandate to "assist victims of apartheid and promote a 
peaceful, negotiated end to the apartheid system" (CAAA, 1986, Sections103 and 106). 
Funding increased dramatically (from $7 million in FY1985 to a peak of $212 million, 
including $81 million in guarantees, in FYI99422), and the USAID representative at the 
US embassy in Pretoria was replaced by a mission director and several personnel. This 
new entity relocated itself away from the embassy compound in separate offices,· to 
underline its independence from the anti-sanctions campaign of the (by then defunct) 
policy of constructive engagement. This move, according to USAID's own evaluation 
from Washington, DC, "created considerable tension" between USAID/SA and the 
embassy. But it was the "unique political activist role" of the US AID mission in South 
Africa (relative to other USAID missions) which provided the grounds for the 
congressional attack on the mission in 1996. In a trip report to the (Republican) 
chainnan of the House International Relations Committee, staff members warned that, 
contrary to the overall mission of the US government in South Africa after 1994 to 
"support President Mandela and his government to address his country's needs," USAID 
had carried on with "intensely political, potentially controversial interventions" in internal 
South African political affairs. Listing among its goals (which also included black 
private sector development, jobs and infrastructure, education and health delivery) the 
strengthening of democratic and political institutions in South Africa, USAID was still 
funding advocacy groups to monitor and lobby for changes in government policies and 
"even setting up trust funds to pay for legal challenges in court against the new 
government's action or inaction" (Munson and Christenson, 1996:2). Congress found this 
22In the US, a fiscal year runs from I October to 30 September. Levels have declined somewhat, but 
remain the highest in Africa, and higher than those to Latin America and the Caribbean due to commitments 
from President Clinton following the election of Nelson Mandela as South Africa's first democratically 
elected leader. 
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state of affairs unacceptable, and its declaration that USAID was "making President 
Mandela's task more difficult" was quoted in the press on more than one occasion.23 
Also pertinent to the bureaucratic analysis of this section was criticism directed at 
the administration of the USAID programme in South Africa. "The AID South Africa 
program was selected for inspection because the program represents the new direction in 
AID's management and program strategy," wrote the staffers, pointing out that USAID 
had been chosen as a model agency for the Gore "reinventing government" initiative. 
However, they found not only that the "highly political nature of the South Africa 
program raises ... serious questions about AID's integration into the overall foreign policy 
structure of our government," but that the disproportionate employment of foreign 
nationals undermined the ability of anyone in Washington, including USAID 
headquarters, to oversee the project approval process to an appropriate degree. The report 
concluded that "further Congressional review of the relationship between AID's expanded 
political agenda and the traditional foreign policy prerogatives and responsibility of the 
Secretary of State appears warranted" and that "some realignment of responsibilities and 
authorities appears to be long overdue" (Munson and Christenson, 1996: 2). This 
appraisal was, of course, in line with calls by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, to submit USAID to the authority of the Secretary of 
State, as in the original conception of the agency. The reorganising legislation of 1997, 
providing for changes to that effect, may well have been due in part to the congressional 
staffers' critical appraisal of USAID/SA. Subsequently, embassy officials point out, 
USAID/SA has gradually become more a government-to-government programme, and the 
practice of reserving USAID contracts for businesses run by "historical1y disadvantaged 
minorities" from the US has been curtailed.24 
23Besides the ANC conference report coverage in the press, see Randall, Estelle. "State to take action on 
'meddling' US aid agency." Cape Times (16 February 1998). 
24Confidential interview (#51). 
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Perhaps with USAID's South Africa mission entering a more normalised stage of 
operation, the conflictual-elitist process which has characterised its first twelve years may 
revert to the more expected consensual-pluralist process, in accordance with the pattern 
suggested by the placement of the development assistance issue-type under the 
distributive issue-area. On the other hand, with the introduction of the BNC, there have 
been further challenges to bureaucratic norms for USAID/SA. 
6.2.1.2 USAID and the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission 
Concomitant to this controversy about authority over USAID programmes and 
administration, and about USAID's mission to South Africa in particular, was the creation 
and consolidation of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission. This commission 
introduced yet another hierarchical element directly over USAID/SA -- the office of the 
Vice-President (OVP) -- as well as several new bureaucratic actors in the US foreign 
assistance efforts in South Africa. According to both USAID/SA and OVP, the BNC has 
not replaced the USAID/SA mission but, in the initial stages of the commission in 1995, 
there was some jostling and negotiation to sort out which programmes would remain 
under the purview of US AlDIS A exclusively, and which programmes might be subsumed 
under the BNC. Most of the USAID/SA education programme, for instance, has 
remained separate from the BNC, as it "already had its own momentum." At the same 
time, several federal agencies and departments involved with the Gore-Mbeki 
Commission, but lacking international programme funds, have sought to work through 
USAID/SA's budget. The Department of Transport, for instance, has few funds for 
overseas programmes (although the AGOA would have provided some), and has been 
working with USAID in Washington to further develop its initiative to develop the 
transportation infrastructure of Southern Africa (Peasely, 1997: 2). The Peace Corps 
programme in South Africa, which sent its first volunteers in early 1998, was negotiated 
and signed via the BNC, but is funded by USAID. Secretary of Health and Human 
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Services, Donna Shalala, signed a joint statement with South African Minister of Health 
Nkosazana Zuma on violence as a public health problem, and another on occupational 
safety and health, yet both these initiatives appeared later under an USAIDlMinistry of 
Health joint effort on health issues which also includes cooperation in addressing 
HIV / AIDS, emerging infectious diseases, and substance abuse. Further BNC-driven 
development assistance initiatives operate out of the Departments of Energy, of the 
Interior, of Labor, of Agriculture, and of Housing and Urban Development, and several 
are relying on USAID at least in part for funding.25 In addition, several of these 
initiatives include exchange programmes for South African officials under the Transition 
Support Fund, an USAID fund administered by the US Information Service in Pretoria. 
I 
All of these initiatives put increased pressure on USAID budgets. 
Thus, while USAID has asserted that its South Africa programmes are being 
phased out over a ten-year period, actually foreign assistance has expanded -- under the 
aegis of the BNC -- as a component of US bilateral relations with South Africa since 
1994. The expansion has brought many new bureaucratic actors into the process, each 
with their own set of standard operating procedures and organisational politics. Foreign 
assistance policy formulation, it would seem, rests with the Department of State (and 
more so since the reorganising legislation of 1997), but also to an unusual degree with the 
Office of the Vice President. All of the above serves to heighten the conflictual-elitist 
nature of policy making on development issues in US South Africa policy. 
6.2.2 Trade and Investment, and the Bureaucracy 
The fact of the rise of commercial issues within foreign policy generally, In 
response to international developments in the post Cold-War world, has placed 
commercial bureaucracies in a new position of power in US foreign policy-making, as 
25Confidential interview (#8). 
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discussed earlier. The fact of South Africa's new nonracial democracy is a further 
impetus behind the rise of trade and investment issues to new prominence in US South 
Africa policy. In the past, even as commercial ties were rationalised in terms of US 
security concerns -- the threat of communist aggression in Africa, and the need for access 
to strategic metals of which South Africa was a major supplier -- business was 
downplayed due to the liability of a close association with apartheid. In the post-1994 
era, however, enhanced US-South Africa trade and investment ties stand on their own as 
worthy policy goals. 
Turning to the issue-area paradigm, US-South Africa policy with regard to trade 
and investment in the 1994-1998 period appears to fit in the second, or regulatory, 
quandrant. It should therefore involve a conflictual-pluralist policymaking process. Is 
this corroborated by the specifics underlying US commercial policymaking on South 
Africa? 
6.2.2.1 Africa on the Commercial Agenda 
Trade and investment (the latter to a lesser degree) are regulated by a number of 
,~deral bureaucracies, as discussed, all subject to the tug and pull of executive-legislative 
wrangling over administration goals and congressional authorisation. Trade and 
investment in Africa has, by many accounts, received unprecedented attention from the 
foreign policy bureaucracy under the Clinton/Gore administrations, attention generated 
not only by Africa's economic realities but by various efforts to highlight them. 
Congress, for instance, in the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, required a series of 
five reports from the administration on how to address the marginalisation of Africa from 
the new international trade regime emerging at that time. This legislation set in motion 
an "interagency process" which coincided with the legislature'S own initiatives on Africa. 
A White House conference on Africa in June 1994, for instance, brought together 
administration officials and members of Congress and the public to discuss "critical 
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African issues and the US response to them," including bilateral trade and investment 
ties. Three years later, the administration announced its plans for a "Partnership for 
Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa," which resembled the AGOA in many 
respects. All of the above contributed momentum to a process which seems to have 
broken the bureaucratic inertia of the Cold War years on US Africa policy, prompted both 
by the interest of the wider public and that of the policy community seeking to promote 
liberal democracy wherever possible. 
6.2.2.2 Secretary Brown sets the pace 
At the same time that Africa, and particularly South Africa, was rising on US 
commercial agendas, commerce as a whole was coming to the fore in US foreign policy. 
This phenomenon was reflected widely in US policymaking on South Africa, due in large 
part to the strong leadership taken on the policy by the US Department of Commerce 
under the late Secretary Ron Brown. The first high-level Washington official to visit 
South Africa after US sanctions were lifted, Brown considered the role of the Department· 
of Commerce (DOC) to be "the bridge between domestic and foreign policy," telling one 
journalist that "commercial interests are now on a par with security in the world of 
foreign policy" (Ogden, 1996: 37). This did not always sit well, according to several' 
interview respondents, with Department of State officials who saw George Moose, their 
own Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, upstaged in the fonnulation of policy and 
initiatives on South Africa in that period. For instance, after South Africa's elections in 
early 1994, the Department of Commerce moved quickly to promote trade and investment 
with South Africa. Millard Arnold, appointed as the department's highest ranking foreign 
commercial officer and the one roving minister counsellor available to DOC, was 
stationed with much publicity in Johannesburg. Together with South Africa's Ministry 
for Trade and Industry, DOC created the US-South Africa Business Development 
Council, a precursor of sorts for the Binational Commission. And in early 1995, DOC's 
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Big Emerging Market conference focused foreign trade-related bureaucracies on US 
policy towards South Africa and nine other BEM's. 
The Commerce Department was well equipped to handle the burgeoning trade and 
investment relations with South Africa, wielding not only its regional and sector 
specialists, the but also the International Trade Administration, the Export-Import Bank 
and the Foreign Commercial Service in its set of bureaucratic tools. The Department of 
State's Africa Bureau, on the other hand, is not designed for such purposes. The Office of 
Southern Africa Affairs has one economic counsellor to deal with the region, who must 
coordinate policy with the Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs under 
the Undersecretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs, neither of which appear to 
have taken any lead on US Africa policy. The US Trade and Development Agency, 
which operates only when mandated to do so by the Department of State, has been active 
in South Africa since 1993, but only within the narrow confines of that mandate: to assist 
in the economic growth of low and mid-income countries, and to promote the interest of 
US companies. Overall, the contributions of the Department of State, contrasted with 
those of the Department of Commerce, were much less visible, the little-noted testimony 
by Moose before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade in 
March 1995 serving as a good example. Another public appearance by a DOS Africa 
Bureau official, that of Deputy Assistant Secretary Regina Brown at an Overseas 
Development Council congressional staff forum in September 1997, showed up a DOS 
tendency to defend the continued use of aid, a powerful tool in its own arsenal, in 
economic development efforts. Such pronouncements are no doubt indicative of the turf 
battles waged behind closed doors between these two new rivals for foreign policy 
supremacy, DOS having always before had the upper hand over DOC and instead 
focusing on competition from the Department of Defense. 
Subsequently, under the second Clinton administration, a stronger Department of 
State team on Africa -- including Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Assistant 
201 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Policymaking on South Africa 
Secretary for African Affairs Sue Rice (whose immediately prior appointment was with 
the NSC on Africa) -- has reasserted its voice in Africa trade policy. Both these officials 
made visits to the continent early in their tenure (as opposed to Warren Christopher, 
Clinton's first Secretary of State, who waited nearly four years to make the trip), and show 
strong support for the policy of increasing both trade and investment in the region, 
especially insofar as it effectively supports the department's other policy objectives of 
countering transnational threats such as terrorism and organised crime, and building 
mechanisms for conflict resolution (Smythe, 1998: 82). A previous member of the NSC 
who worked with Rice predicted that "for the remains of [Clinton's second] term," in any 
case, "policy making on Africa should shift back to State. Joe Wilson (Rice's successor at 
the NSC as senior director on Africa) seems to assume he will take his lead from State. ,,26 
The Department of Commerce has, however, maintained a high level of activity on US 
South Africa policy under Brown's successor, William Daley. It is significant, for 
instance, that Secretary Daley, according to one Cape Town embassy official, has become 
the most frequent official visitor to South Africa since his appointment in 1997. In 1998 
alone, Daley visited South Africa in March, September and December, with plans to visit 
in February 1999 as well. 
6.2.2.3 Other Bureaucratic Actors on Trade and Investment 
Another important bureaucratic actor in this issue type has been the Department of 
the Treasury. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, who featured as a keynote speaker at the 
well-attended CCA "Attracting Capital to Africa Summit" in April 1997, visited South 
Africa, and other nations on the continent, in July 1998 to discuss fiscal and monetary 
policy with national leaders and with representatives of small business. His deputy 
26Confidential interview (#20). 
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Lawrence Summers made a similar tour in mid 1997, just before the Denver G7/8 
conference where the administration's own Africa initiative was announced. 
The White House-based Office of the US Trade Representative has similarly 
notched up its involvement on the continent, creating the new post of Assistant Trade 
Representative to Africa. The first incumbent, Rosa Whittaker, visited Johannesburg in 
April 1998 to seek increased support among South African leaders for the US Africa 
Growth and Opportunity Act. USTR has, however, had a more negative role in US South 
Africa policy than have other bureaucratic players, as it has responsibility for intellectual 
property rights. South Africa's appearance on the USTR watch list for alleged IPR 
violations, both in 1996 over misuse of the McDonald's restaurant trademark and, in 
1998, over South African pharmaceuticals legislation which contained potential threats to 
patent rights, has hovered in the background of two Binational Commission meetings. 
US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, moreover, carries the responsibility of 
reporting annually on any foreign trade barriers, and in 1998 felt impelled to label South 
Africa as "anti-competitive" for its weak competition laws as well as for the use of non-
tariff barriers to trade. 
Finally, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation COPIC), an independent 
government agency that sells investment services to assist US companies investing 
abroad, "because it is in America's economic and strategic interest" to do so, draws in 
private sector financing to develop markets in emerging economies. In 1997, under the 
White House "Partnership" initiative, which included $650 million in investment funds 
for OPIC to promote business and pay for infrastructure projects, OPIC opened the New 
Africa Opportunity Fund. The NAOF provides loan guarantees for US private investment 
in the SADC nations. (OPIC's Modem Africa Fund offers similar benefits to the rest of 
Sub-Saharan Africa.) 
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6.2.2.4 The BNC and US commercial policy 
The introduction of the Binational Commission to this hive of bureaucratic 
activity has both complicated the bureaucratic politics affecting US policy on issues of 
trade and investment in South Africa, and expedited policy formulation and execution. By 
imposing lateral thinking on project design, for instance, it has drawn together offices 
from different departments and agencies, but focusing on results. One project, for 
instance, under the auspices of the Science and Technology Committee of the BNC, 
involved the US Department of Agriculture sharing technology with its South Africa 
counterpart, with the primary goal of supporting "small-scale farmers and creating 
business enterprises in rural areas through joint technology development." A practical 
output of that effort was an exhibit in Washington, DC, of indigenous South African 
flowers in late 1997 which drew considerable interest from US importers.27 
While the BNC has certainly added to the conflictual nature of policy-making in 
one sense, in that "some bureaucrats get whacked out of shape when they have the White 
House wanting special prograrnmes,"28 "it has also drawn the process more deeply into the 
elitist realm, away from the more pluralist mode expected in issues involving such 
tangible goods. In any case, having brought the weight of the vice-presidency to bear on 
issues of trade and investment, the BNC has certainly altered the normal trade 
policymaking processes. 
6.2.2.5 Concerns about the Commercial Agenda 
Pulling against this general thrust of increased engagement in matters of trade and 
investment, even more so than the USTR who at least is seeking improved trade relations, 
have been elements within the Congress reacting to constituency concerns of job 
27Based on interview with South African Embassy official, October 1997, Washington, DC. 
28Confidential interview (#20). 
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competition. Also, Africanists within both the executive and legislative branches are 
likely to share concerns with colleagues outside of government that the general 
commercial thrust of US policy is tilted toward the wealthy in Africa, and therefore 
detrimental to the continent in the long run. These fears have been fuelled by recent 
volatility in currency markets among emerging economies worldwide, although not yet 
realised in the case of South Africa. 
The bureaucratic processes and politics underlying US South Africa policy must 
be taken together with the activities of interest groups and with public opinion in order to 
see whether the overall nature of the policy process in this issue-type is truly conflictual-
pluralist, as the issue-area paradigm would suggest. Judging from the breadth of public 
activity and debate on trade and investment in US South Africa policy, and the high 
degree of responsiveness to that activity on the part of the several bureaucratic actors and 
the Congress, it would seem that the facts do support the proposed pattern of 
policymaking for regulatory issues. 
6.2.3 Security Issues and the Bureaucracy 
Military security issues viewed through the prism of their bureaucratic processes 
and politics are, for the most part, more enigmatic (at least for an academic without a 
government security clearance) than issues of other types in current US policy on South 
Africa. In most matters of this issue-type, only the public record is available for scrutiny, 
and not the processes behind that record nor deeper agendas based on military 
intelligence. That said, it is still worthwhile to analyse the available material, in 
conjunction with interviews with members of the security bureaucracy in Washington --
keeping in mind that the resulting picture is likely to be less complete than in the other 
issue-types in this study. 
On the other hand, in matters that would fall under the "new security" category --
such as threats to the environment or the spread of infectious diseases -- the institutional 
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component of policymaking is less concerned with secrecy and more concerned with 
research and multilateral coordination, making bureaucratic processes more observable. 
However, as these security matters have been incorporated into security policy only 
relatively recently, and tend to fall under the purview of non-Africa related offices, the 
connections to US South Africa policy lack a history and, in any case, are generally less 
direct. 
The demise of the Soviet Union, as discussed in Chapter Two, fundamentally 
changed US perspectives on security concerns in Africa. No longer was South Africa an 
ally against communism, in cooperation -- even if sometimes covertly -- with the US 
military and intelligence communities. Instead, since 1994, the US has had to deal with 
an ANC-dominated government which was incorporating elements of Umkhonto We 
Sizwe (the military wing of the ANC) into its national security forces. In addition, 
tensions created by the US litigation against Armscor clouded the new relations until 
early 1998, including discussions of a new committee within the BNC on defence, created 
in 1997. With the gradual resolution of that arms smuggling case, relations have 
improved somewhat. South African Defense Minister Joe Modise, who at first refused to 
enter the Pentagon during the July 1997 BNC meetings, did finally agree to meet his 
counterpart there, and in 1998 joint US-South African military exercised resumed. The 
US Navy also twice visited the South African naval base in Simonstown in 1998, the first 
official US port visits to Africa's tip in over twenty years.29 
The placement of the security issue-type in the interactive/protective issue-area 
suggests that consensual-elitist policy processes would most often attend policymaking in 
this issue-type. The following analysis shows that the evidence supports such a prognosis 
for traditional security issues, but may point toward a more pluralist approach behind the 
new security issues in US South Africa policy. 
29See Schraeder (1994): 205. 
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6.2.3.1 Security Structures 
The Department of Defense remains at the head of the bureaucratic process in 
issues of military security, under the authority of the President and the National Security 
Advisor, who in turn formulate policy in consultation with the National Security Council 
(NSC). With regard to Africa policy in particular, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
delegates related tasks to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, under the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. That official often must 
work closely with the PoliticallMilitary Affairs Advisor in the State Department's Africa 
Bureau. Inevitably, as questions of turf and seniority arise, the incumbents must rely on 
their representatives in the NSC to prevail if their department's point of view is to direct 
policy, after which they are called upon to -- and generally do, considering the 
authoritative culture of the military arms of government -- support stated policy. 
Security policy with regard to South Africa has rarely featured as a major issue for 
the weighty group of US foreign policymakers in the NSC, however. The exception 
would have been US deliberations over an American response to requests from Pretoria 
for assistance in reacting to the sudden independence of Angola in 1974. But in the post-
Cold War period, without a communist threat justifying the protection of sea routes 
around Africa's tip and the securing of a capitalist ally, South Africa would seem to hold 
even less interest for US security policymakers. In the midst of the continuing aggression 
of Serbs in central Europe, the stand-off with Iraq, and the wavering peace process 
between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as ongoing military conflicts throughout 
Africa itself, it would seem there is little compelling the US security bureaucracy to 
devote time and energy to South Africa. 
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6.2.3.2 South Africa as Leader in Africa, and Beyond 
In spite of these circumstances, however, South Africa has indeed attracted the 
attention of the traditional security bureaucracy -- in particular those agencies charged 
with reformulating US security policy globally -- for its potential both as a force for 
stability in the region and as a force to be reckoned with (or co-opted) in the process of 
international, and especially North-South, negotiations on security arrangements. With 
the Armscor issue resolved, South Africa is increasingly viewed by this sector as a 
"partner," perhaps even a surrogate,30 in Africa, and South Africa's military cooperation 
and transparency is viewed as critical. Regionally, the US has encouraged South Africa's 
still-new role as a peacebroker in African conflicts, as well as cooperation in the creation 
of local peacekeeping capabilities. Internationally, US concerns which overlap with 
policy on South Africa revolve around the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and the spread of international terrorism and organised crime, environmental degradation 
and infectious disease, all of which require the strong lead of a nation with the moral 
authority of post-apartheid South Africa. 
Beyond noting with interest (and encouraging noises) the nascent role of South 
Africa as a peacebroker in Africa, the US has downplayed its activity on this matter. This 
has been true especially after the intervention by the US Representative to the UN, Bill 
Richardson, at a critical stage in the Zaire/Congo crisis. Richardson was subsequently 
castigated for "muscling in" just as South Africa was "poised for a major foreign policy 
coup. ,,31 Regional peacekeeping on the continent, on the other hand, has been an issue 
of considerable activity on the part of the US foreign policy bureaucracy. Predictably, it 
has also been an issue over which bureaucratic politics have affected the process behind 
the policy. For instance, from which department did the African Crisis Response 
30See Mamdani, Mahmood. "Naive South Africa must not adopt missionary position." Mail & Guardian 
S23-29 May 1997). 
1 See "US 'muscles in' to deny Africa the glory." Cape Times (2 May 1997). 
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Initiative (ACRI) originate? According to one interview respondent, it was a policy 
concept fashioned for the most part by NSC and Department of Defense officials, 
designed specifically to address the threat of renewed violence in Central Africa, 
especially Burundi, in 1995-96. On the eve of Secretary of State Warren Christopher's 
trip to Africa in late 1996 it seems that DOS gained approval from the NSC, based on 
informal consultations with African missions in Washington, to broaden the concept to 
cover Sub-Saharan Africa, and to discuss it with African heads of state during his visit. 
After Christopher'S unsuccessful diplomatic effort, in which President Mandela's cautious 
response was especially discouraging,32 responsibility for the ACRI appeared to be 
relocated under the relevant office at the Department of Defense. Judging from the 
presentation of testimony at congressional hearings on the ACRI in October 1997, while 
DOD and DOS were still working together on the initiative (State having created a 
Special Coordinator/ACRI position in its Africa Bureau), there was little question that 
DOD (under the guidance of the NSC) was in charge. In any case, the US Senate, in the 
meantime, refused to appropriate any funding for the plan, which as of late 1997 was 
operating instead under a continuing resolution, in limited form, and had trained troops in 
Senegal, Malawi and Uganda. President Clinton lent his own considerable leverage to the 
initiative during his visit to Senegal in April 1998, when he called for wider support for 
the ACRl. Press reports on the appeal quoted NSC Senior Director for Africa Joe Wilson 
on the matter.33 The Gore-Mbeki BNC committee on defence adds yet another high-level 
voice to security issues, though according to one DOD official, US officials are careful 
not to use the BNC to "flog the ACRl." They do, however, "discuss peacekeeping in 
general." 34 
32See "Mandela wary of plan for intervention force: 'Africa wants own initiatives.''' Cape Times (11 
October 1996). 
33See "African force 'could prevent Rwanda repeat'." Cape Times (2 April 1998). 
34Confidential interview (#39). 
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South Africa's strong sentiment about remaining an independent player are 
perhaps most evident in its reaction to the Armscor case, and related charges from the US 
about South African relations with "rogue" states. South Africa stood its ground in the 
face of the US fines for arms embargo violations under the previous government. US 
embassy officials in Cape Town insisted, in late 1995,35 that Armscor was not a political 
issue but a legal one, and that the case was being handled by the FBI, US Customs, and 
the US Department of Justice. As discussed in Chapter Four, resolution was reached, in 
principle, in mid-1996 through the diplomatic channels established by the BNC, allowing 
the US and Pretoria to soften the stances they each had made in public. Subsequent 
negotiations have focused as much on those past violations as they have on assurances 
that South Africa will not in the future export any arms or arms technology purchased 
from the US to nations such as Libya, Iran or Syria. Taking the baton handed on by the 
Office of the Vice President, Defense officials -- specifically, the US Defense Trade 
Control -- authorised a South African-designed compliance programme to insure against 
export to third parties, and will inspect South Africa's arms industry at regular intervals. 
Through the encouragement of South Africa's peacebroker role on the continent 
and initiation of the ACRI, the US has demonstrated its hope that South Africa will take 
on the responsibilities of regional leader. At the same time, the facts surrounding the 
resolution of the Armscor case (as well as other instances of thinly-veiled defiance, to be 
discussed under the next issue-type) demonstrate South Africa's own determination to 
remain a sovereign actor in its sphere of influence. Based on international realities, 
Pretoria may not have a choice about taking the lead in Africa or within the nations of the 
developing world, but it appears to reject the role of surrogate of the US outright. 
35Confidential interview (#i). 
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6.2.3.3 Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
South Africa's status as the first nation to voluntarily and unilaterally destroy its 
arsenal of nuclear weapons has definitely attracted the attention of the security 
bureaucracy in Washington, as has South Africa's role in international negotiations on the 
1995 review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1967. 
The Central Intelligence Agency, at the behest of the National Security Council, 
has apparently been seeking to confirm that South Africa has indeed destroyed its nuclear 
devices and disabled production and test facilities in 1993, as the new government 
claimed in 1995.36 Just in case, the Department of State has underlined -- with 
threatened economic disincentives -- US prohibitions on the exportation of arms, nuclear 
or conventional, to "pariah states" by recipients of US aid, as in the case of South Africa's 
proposed sale of tank equipment to Syria. 
At the same time, South Africa's ability, and willingness, to garner support from 
the nations of the developing South for an extension of the 1967 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty deeply impressed US policymakers. This is evident from Vice 
President Gore's praise of South Africa at the first meeting of the Binational Commission, 
where he said that Pretoria's "leadership on the issue of nuclear non-
proliferation ... provides a model for the rest of the world."37 In the wake of nuclear tests 
by India and Pakistan in mid-1998, the pressure will have increased on US security 
bureaucracies to contain any further nuclear proliferation just as the US Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency is dismantled and subsumed into existing Department of State 
bureaux. 
The fact that as of June 1998, Congress had yet to approve American ratification 
of another important nuclear agreement, the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, must 
36See Vesely, Milan. "SA Nuclear power worries US." African Business (July/August 1998): 9. 
37 Gore Praises South Africa'S Leadership on Nuclear Non-Proliferation. United States Information 
Service (5 December 1995). 
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only further frustrate the federal agencies charged with carrying out administration policy 
in this area. In any case, South Africa, as leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (of which 
India and Pakistan are members) for three years from mid-1998, may perceive increased 
pressure from the US to lead the developing world in the realm of nuclear non-
proliferation. 
All of the above "traditional" matters of security policy have followed the 
expected mode of policymaking for interactive/protective issues, that is, a consensual-
elitist one. The overlapping jurisdiction of the bureaucracies might, as usual, be a source 
of low-level conflict, but appear not to have impinged on the substance of policy over the 
1994-1998 period. It is in the area of "new" security issues, to which this study next 
turns, that more pluralist modes of policymaking have entered in, bringing greater conflict 
as well. 
6.2.3.4 "New" Security Issues 
"New" security issues, or those which are increasingly recognised as security 
issues and arise from transnational threats such as international crime and terrorism, 
environmental degradation, overpopulation, and the spread of infectious diseases, have 
involved South Africa insofar as it is a leader among the developing world, and at the 
same time a nation in transition. As such, it is not only well-placed to develop 
progressive policies in the areas of health and the environment, and to gain endorsement 
for these abroad, but it is also particularly vulnerable to saturation by organised crime and 
terrorist operations. 
The activity of the US policymaking community on these issues is varied, and has 
drawn in many actors not traditionally associated with foreign or security policy matters, 
which in turn has drawn in more pluralist policymaking processes than are usually 
attendant in security issues. The BNC has, to a great degree, been responsible for 
introducing these elements to US South Africa policy, through its committees on 
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sustainable energy, on science and technology, and on conservation, the environment, and 
water. Key to the activity of these committees, it would appear, is the White House 
Office on Science and Technology. Currently under presidential advisor Jack Gibbons, 
the office coordinates research on specific projects by the Departments of Energy, 
Commerce, Defense, Transport, and Agriculture, as well as by the National Institute for 
Health, the Food and Drug Administration, the National Science Foundation, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and various other bodies. For instance, on the issue of 
the impact on South Africa (and the Southern Africa region) of the weather phenomenon 
EI Nino, Gibbons' office worked with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration of the Department of Commerce (as well as South Africa's Weather 
Bureau) on the predictions of EI Nino's arrival and duration in the region, and then turned 
those findings over to the BNC committees on agriculture (under Agriculture Secretary 
Dan Glickman on the US side) and water conservation (under Secretary of the Interior 
Bruce Babbitt for the US) for further action. On another area, Gibbons' office is still 
working on a specific programme to develop South Africa's communications technology, 
and with the respective health ministries in the US and South Africa to strengthen 
collaboration in biomedical research on several health concerns, including HIV / AIDS and 
other infectious diseases. 
The status of the White House behind all these efforts, and the impact of increased 
expectations of performance on bureaucratic politics and processes, is a factor which no 
doubt weighs on each of the BNC committees. "I do think AID and State resent the 
BNC," commented one White House interviewee involved in this area, who had 
described the BNC committees as "special mechanisms to bypass the bureaucratic 
mess."38 
38Confidential interview (#40). 
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In another example, US resources for combating international crime and terrorism 
have been brought to bear on South Africa after a July 1996 US-South Africa 
"memorandum of understanding" on law enforcement cooperation provided for the 
introduction of four new US bureaucratic players into the US South Africa policy process. 
These were the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, 
the US Customs Service, and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, all of which 
have established a presence at the US embassy in Pretoria with at least one representative. 
One US embassy official noted this "expansion of the US mission in South Africa," 
pointing out additional new posts for USAID and the Foreign Commercial Service. 
According to this official, speaking in late 1998, "over the last two years alone, the size of 
the mission has grown by 10-20 percent each year.,,39 Additional personnel arrived 
when, immediately after the bombing of the Planet Hollywood restaurant in Cape Town 
in September 1998, a delegation from the FBI and other anti-terrorism offices visited the 
site to lend expertise. While there may be suspicion as to the motives for US law 
enforcement activities in South Africa, the working relationship has lent to smoother 
relations -- according to another interviewee, from the NSC, for instance, the relations 
between the FBI in Pretoria and South African law enforcement agencies helped resolve 
the row caused by FBI agents posing as South Africans in the US to trap American spies 
in late 1997.40 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, many of these "new" security issues gamer 
some public interest, though not necessarily with regard to US policy towards South 
Africa specifically. (One exception to this is the business community's interest in 
increased US pressure on South African law enforcement efforts, in order to curtail crime 
and enhance the business climate for US investments.) But on the whole, there is a more 
39Confidential interview (#51). 
40Confidential interview (#36). 
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consensual-pluralist policy process at work within the "new" security issues in US South 
Africa policy than expected by its placement in the interactive/protective issue-area. 
Because that pluralist activity (except on the part of business groups) is not directed at 
changing US South Africa policy, per se, it should not necessarily be weighted as equal to 
other factors -- such as the elitist activity on traditional issues of security -- in US 
policymaking on South Africa, however. Taken as a whole, then, security matters should 
be considered to be appropriately placed in the third quadrant dealing with issues of 
protection/interaction, involving for the most part a consensual-elitist policy process, but 
noting the consensual-pluralist process involved in several "new" security issues. Perhaps 
the issues of health and environmental degradation, terrorism and international crime, are 
still considered as "intangible" political goods, not yet a reality for many policymakers 
and interest groups, thus dividing the security issue-type into two (the third and fourth) 
Issue-areas. 
6.2.4 Issues of Political Symbolism and the Bureaucracy 
The bureaucratic politics and policy processes involved in issues of political 
symbolism, which fall into the redistributive issue-area due to the intangibility of political 
goods at stake and the asymmetry of their expected outcomes, should, according to the 
issue-area paradigm, be conflictual-elitist. As introduced in the previous chapter, the two 
most prominent issues of this type in Clinton's South Africa policy are 1) the quest for 
fair and harmonious race relations, shared by certain leaders in the US and South Africa, 
and 2) perceived threats to US global hegemony, based on US perceptions about its 
preeminent position in the post-Cold War world and America's ability (or inability) to 
impose its will on other nations. The following looks at each of these in tum through the 
perspective of the bureaucratic politics and processes described above. 
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6.2.4.1 Issues of Domestic Political Symbolism and the Bureaucracy 
Since 1994, South Africa's experiment in nonracial democracy has offered hope 
for US race relations in the eyes of many American leaders, President Clinton and Vice 
President Gore included. The imperative to assist with that experiment appears to run 
strong throughout the US government, except among those who would point out that 
resources might be better spent on poorer African nations, on African-Americans 
themselves, or on Americans in general. The redistribution to South Africa of US 
resources, whether it be foreign assistance or goodwill, grates on this latter group, who 
even as a minority can exert considerable influence (Senator Jesse Helms being a classic 
example, as an "isolationist" at the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee). 
But race is a sensitive issue within American government, as the US history of 
racial inequality and affirmative action have skewed the perception of the issue for both 
blacks and whites. The bureaucratic processes and politics which involve questions of 
race are often concealed far below the surface. There is scepticism, for instance, that the 
enthusiasm for South Africa among those in elected positions in the executive and 
legislature has more to do with winning domestic political points with African-American 
constituents than with South Africa itself. Critics also claim that the Clinton 
administration presumes that by placing African-Americans in positions of power on US 
South Africa policy, or on US Africa policy in general, it will appear on the right side of 
the racial question. One interview respondent went so far as to claim that the Clinton 
administration "has made Africa the sole purview of African-Americans." It would be of 
interest to the field of political science to see a survey of African-American incumbents 
and their level of interest in Africa, as well as the impact their tenures have had on US 
Africa policy so far.41 
41 Michael Clough made this suggestion in his interview, March 1998. 
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What has been the impact, for instance, of the advent of an African-American 
woman as Assistant Secretary of State in the mostly male, mostly white enclave that 
forms the high elite of the foreign policy bureaucracy, even in the 1990's? At the age of 
33, Susan Rice is also the youngest person ever to take up this post, and has reportedly 
had to fight a series of "internecine battles," only some of which she has won, in order to 
take charge of US policy on Sub-Saharan Africa. One of these was with her senior in 
both years and position, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering, 
over policy towards Sudan, which, eventually and with the support of Secretary Albright, 
Rice won. Even given the fact of Rice's rumoured high intellect and her experience as the 
Director for Africa at the NSC under the first Clinton administration, one account quotes 
a "veteran diplomat" as asking "Why would I expect a 33-year-old black woman to know 
how to run a large bureaucracy?" (Smythe, 1998: 84). There are obviously power plays 
still to be won, and which will affect policymaking to some degree, for Clinton's second 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. 
The active role of the Secretary of Transportation, African-American Rodney 
"later, in US policy on Africa is another example. His department has little funding for 
involvement in foreign relations, and is limited to appropriations for international 
aviation, maritime administration and Coast Guard responsibilities. Yet Secretary Slater 
has, under the second Clinton administration, launched from his office a "Transportation 
Initiative and Partnership with Africa" in support of the administration's Africa initiative. 
While this effort focuses on improving aviation safety and airport security throughout 
Africa, in Southern Africa one aspect has been a computerised rail car tracking system to 
. improve commercial rail services. Slater has travelled to Africa three times since his 
appointment (although only once to South Africa, with the President),42 has carried out 
42Slater's first visit to the continent was with the Reverend Jesse Jackson to co-lead the fourth African-
African American Summit in Harare in July 1997, where he spoke on much more than transportation, 
delivering the message that America wants Africa as "a full partner in the cause for freedom, democracy, 
and prosperity." He did speak on the need to strengthen Africa's transport sector in the interests of greater 
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extensive "constituency outreach," mostly to business executives in the US with an 
interest in investing in Africa, and has met with African diplomats as well, in order to 
"discuss how the Department's initiative can best address the needs of individual African 
nations. ,,43 
It would appear that, more than the administration using the appointment of an 
African- American to promote the perception of good race relations in the US, Slater is 
using his position to demonstrate his own interest in African (and African-American) 
development. Many interviewees independently, in discussion on the bureaucratic 
dynamics of the current administration, posited that Slater is well positioned to take up 
the mantle dropped by the late Commerce Secretary Ron Brown as an African-American 
who can give leadership on policy toward Africa for the Clinton administration. In any 
case, the result has been increased visibility of the African continent in US foreign policy. 
Several transport projects are in the pipeline, for instance, after US-South Africa 
discussions at the first meeting of the Gore-Mbeki Commission. The failure of the 105th 
Congress to enact the Africa Growth and Opportunity Bill, which contained provisions of 
funding for Department of Transport projects in Africa, may slow Secretary Slater's 
progress, but there should be little doubt that he will pursue other means by which to 
remain involved in US Africa policy. Clinton's Special Envoy to Africa for Democracy, 
the Reverend Jesse Jackson, Sr., appears to share the same compelling interest, as well as 
a large following among the African-American community. 
The conflictual-elitist nature of such bureaucratic politics is difficult to uncover 
when the issue of race is involved, as it is in matters of domestic political symbolism in 
US South Africa policy. However, based on interviews and the observable facts, it would 
trade and investment in the region. See http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviationiAfrica! 
43See <http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviationiAfrica> 
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appear that the evidence supports the existence of a conflictual and elitist policy process 
behind these issues. 
6.2.4.2 Issues of Global Political Symbolism and the Bureaucracy 
The second category under this issue-type, that of perceived threats to US global 
hegemony on the part of South Africa, has been one of the areas over which US 
policymakers have expressed greatest concern. The powerful symbolism of Nelson 
Mandela embracing Libya's Muammar Gaddafi in 1997, in "defiance" of US diplomatic 
requests to the contrary, reverberated throughout the US government, and seared the 
image of South Africa as a nation of questionable loyalties into the American psyche. 
The elites and counter-elites of the various members of the National Security Council, 
with their competing viewpoints over which response was appropriate to such perceived 
threats to US hegemony, have travelled a long road (or left the administration) since 1994 
and Mandela's early rebuffs over Libya, Cuba and Iran. Following ~ agreement worked 
out via press reports that the US and South Africa would "agree to disagree" about these 
third-party relations, there were also some American overtures to Cuba in 1998, signs of a 
growing willingness to thaw relations with Iran, and concessions made on the Lockerbie 
trial involving alleged terrorists sanctioned by Libya. The incident in which a desk 
officer at the Department of State apparently telephoned his counterpart in South Africa 
to warn of the imminent cut-off of US aid if a rumoured arms sale to Syria went through-
- based purely on the requirements of the Anti-terrorism Act of 1996 -- was also a lesson 
for all concerned. The immediate and angry reaction from Pretoria began a major 
diplomatic tiff over South African sovereignty, US "bullying," and South African double 
standards, which was only resolved when assurances were exchanged that the Syrian deal 
would be deferred indefinitely. But before that, the White House issued a strong 
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statement condemning the proposed arms sale, though the Department of State reportedly 
had lobbied for a less strident tone.44 
Similar, but less vociferous, US reactions greeted the mooted deal to store Iranian 
oil off South Africa's west coast, Mandela's trip to Libya, and Cuba's offer to send doctors 
to help South Africa meet new health policy norms over 1995 to 1997. Each of these 
events has underlined the fact that, despite the leverage of its trade, investment and 
foreign assistance, not to mention that of its military might, the US is no longer able to 
"call the shots" as it once could. Helms-Burton and other legislation limiting allies' trade 
with "pariah" states must be seen in this context. 
US landmine policy constitutes another highly publicised example of an issue of 
global political symbolism that has come up between the US and South Africa. While the 
details of the bureaucratic politics behind US policy on the campaign to ban completely 
the use and production of anti-personnel landmines are unavailable for this analysis, it is 
important to note South Africa's leadership in this 1997 campaign, and its success in 
garnering broad support for the resulting convention, over the objections of the US. The 
opposition of the Department of Defense, particularly the Department of the Army, to the 
immediate banning of the mines -- on the grounds that, until a viable alternative is 
operational, they are necessary to protect US soldiers on the ground -- most likely 
prohibited movement from stated policy, which was support for the principle of a ban, but 
one qualified by national requisites and to be implemented over time. There was not, 
however, concerted effort on the part of interest groups with regard to US South Africa 
policy specifically. 
Thus each of the issues above involved mostly conflictual-elitist processes. As 
such, they again support the Zimmerman paradigm expectations. 
44Sarber, Simon. "SA anns trigger a new US power battle." Business Day (4 February 1997). 
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The many types of issues, the many configurations of bureaucratic process, as well 
as the many layers of bureaucratic politics evident within US South Africa policy are not 
unique. As the processes and politics in US policymaking have become increasingly 
complex, more than one member of the foreign policy establishment has decried the 
"cautions, clearance processes, and bureaucratic overkill. ,,45 The case of the US-South 
Africa Binational Commission is but one of the Clinton administration attempts to 
overcome what he and his vice-president saw as the inefficiencies of the US foreign 
policymaking system. Discussion turns now to "reinventing government" and the US-
South Africa BNC. 
6.3 Tile BNC - Reinventing Government, or Business as Usual? 
"Our thesis is simple," \\<Tote David Osborne and Ted Gaebler on page 11 of their 
bestselling 1993 book, Reinventing Government. "The kind of governments that 
developed during the industrial era, with their sluggish, centralised bureaucracies, their 
preoccupation with rules and regulations, and their hierarchical chains of command, no 
longer work very well. They accomplished great things in their time, but somewhere 
along the line they got away from us. They became bloated, wasteful, ineffective. And 
when the world began to change, they failed to change with it." 
It was due to the thesis of Osborne and Gaebler, which garnered the attention of 
newly-elected President Clinton and Vice President Gore, that "reinventing government" 
became a theme for the hew administration. "Hierarchical, centralised bureaucracies 
designed in the 1930's or 1940's simply do not function well in the rapidly changing, 
information-rich, knowledge-intensive society and economy of the 1990's," wrote these 
two political consultants. "They are like luxury ocean liners in an age of supersonic jets: 
big, cumbersome, expensive, and extremely difficult to turn around." Presenting 
45Confidential interview (#40). 
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evidence of "entrepreneurial government" at the local level throughout the US, the 
authors posited that "gradually, new kinds of public institutions are taking their place," 
and deemed this development "an American Perestroika" which was reaching into federal 
government as well. Osborne and Gaebler insisted that though "government can't be run 
like a business," it can become more effective and measure performance by "focusing not 
on inputs but on outcomes. ,,46 
The new White House team took up the challenge in 1993, and launched a 
"revolution" to give Americans "better service from [their] government." A White House 
website tells viewers, "You are going to see something different this year -- courtesy, 
convenience, and cooperation that equals the best in business."47 At the same site one 
can also view a list of "customer service standards" for the more than 200 agencies of the 
US federal government. Congress joined the effort, legislating the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993 and the Government Management Reform Act of 
1994. Under the former, agencies were required to choose a pilot programme for 
implementing new management practices. As mentioned earlier, the USAID mission in 
South Africa from 1995 was one such pilot programme. In effect, so is the Gore-Mbeki 
Binational Commission. 
The creation of the BNC, according to one former member of the Department of 
Commerce, was a response on the part of the White House to Ron Brown's Business 
Development Council, the June 1994 signing ceremony of which "basically represented 
Commerce taking charge of US policy toward South Africa." Two dynamics apparently 
contributed to the Gore-Mbeki Commission's inception: one was the personal and 
political interest Gore had in involving himself in this promising new US-South Africa 
initiative; the other was a request from Princeton Lyman, the Ambassador to Pretoria at 
46See Osborne and Gaebler (1993): 11-19. 
47 <www.whitehouse.gov> 
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the time, that the administration coordinate under one over-arching umbrella the deluge of 
cabinet visits and trade missions beginning to engulf the US embassy in South Africa. 
The resulting structure was a vice-presidential and cabinet level commission which could, 
by dint of its political clout, make executive decisions, thereby cutting across many of the 
decisionmaking channels and bureaucratic processes normally involved in initiatives such 
as the BDC. Congress has little leverage by which to thwart the work of the Gore-Mbeki 
Binational Commission either, as, according to a congressional staffer, "there's no line 
item for a BNC .. [all their projects] are funded out of other agencies."48 
The Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission is not, in fact, a pure example of 
Osborne and Gaebler's "entrepreneurial government," however, as it does not so much 
reorganise the existing foreign policy bureaucracy on South Africa as create an 
overarching and executive authority to direct and coordinate action of that bureaucracy, 
on an indefinite basis. But it has attempted to "reinvent" US policymaking on South 
Africa in so far as it has redirected US officials and bureaucrats to "focus not simply on 
providing ... services, but on catalysing all sectors -- public, private, and voluntary -- into 
action to solve ... problems" (p.20). The declining foreign operations budget in any case 
meant that, in the words of one interviewee, "the US has to do what it does better."49 
The concept of "reinventing government" surfaced in several of the interviews 
conducted over the course of this study with members of the policy-analytical community 
in Washington, especially in discussions of the BNC as a foreign policy tool. A 
recurring theme was the BNC's effectiveness in overcoming bureaucratic inertia and in 
forging new coordinating links between bureaucracies, as well as across several layers 
between the US and South Africa. According to the interviewee cited above, "Gore 
genuinely believed the US could show the world how to do foreign policy 
48From interview with Lester Munson (#22). 
49Confidential interview (#17). 
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differentIy ... The BNC is an experiment to achieve and demonstrate the leadership of the 
VP, but also to show a new era in governance, to approach problems without the rigidity 
of hierarchical government structures." 
Indeed, benefits of the BNC appear to be numerous, if not unqualified. Several 
interviewees who were either current or past participants in the Gore-Mbeki Commission 
noted that, in addition to the symbolic value of such a unique arrangement on the current 
world stage, the BNC is an effective foreign policy tool for several reasons. The reasons 
listed, some repeatedly, are that: 
• It cuts through bureaucratic red tape; 
• It is a catalyst for new projects due to the pressure of presenting "deliverables" at the 
biannual meetings; 
• It accelerates the completion of these projects through deadlines and by improving 
interagency coordination; 
• It develops links between actors at the ministerial and functional levels in the US and 
South Africa; 
• It brings greater depth to counterpart contact, engendering "otherwise impossible" 
openness in relations; 
• It provides continuity in what have been portrayed as close relations between US Vice 
President Al Gore and South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki. 
• Due to the last two points, resolution of conflict in US-South Africa bilateral relations 
overall has been eased; 
• It is a creative way to involve the private sector in US South Africa policy; 
• It has brought in sectors of the US government never before involved in foreign 
policy; and provided a framework for coordination without overwhelming the 
Department of State; and 
• It focuses high level attention on South Africa twice a year, which raises the profile of 
South Africa and Africa in US foreign policy generally. 
With only one exception,50 interviewees' complaints about weaknesses in the 
BNC focused on ways to improve the current structure and emphasis, and on deleterious 
side effects which needed attention. These complaints were that: 
50The exceptional case saw the BNC as a waste ofThabo Mbeki's time, in that two weeks out of the year 
was far too long to spend on issues that were not contributing in a real sense to the RDP, moreover in 
Washington, DC, "which is not where US business is." This interviewee suggested that the BNC be cut 
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• The BNC is very labour intensive, straining the capacity of the bureaucracy with its 
twice yearly meetings and causing some ill will between the Office of the Vice 
President and BNC member agencies; 
• It takes up a great deal of time, on top of regular responsibilities, with interim 
meetings and preparation for the commission meetings; 
• It imposes "artificial time frames" on project completion; 
• It focuses too much on issues which do not help South Africa with its critical 
problems of poverty; 
• It lacks bipartisan appeal, being the creation of a Democratic administration; 
• It excludes civil society and needs to move out beyond Washington, DC, to create 
people-to-people links; 
• It has not done enough to institutionalise the private sector arm of its work; 
• It creates too many expectations by engaging in great fanfare at its meetings; 
• It is not accessible to the public, nor does it communicate well with the public, and 
therefore its benefits are generally lost on the public in both the US and South Africa; 
and 
• It dominates US policy on Africa, and should expand to cover at least the SADC,51 if 
not all of Sub-Saharan Africa, if only at a ministerial level. 
In the words of one governmental interviewee, the BNC has provided US 
policymakers with a "low-cost, high pay-off way to be engaged in South Africa." But has 
it "reinvented government" with regard to US policy on South Africa? Has it been a 
worthwhile "pilot programme" and is it likely to become a permanent feature in US 
policymaking towards South Africa? 
The BNC has certainly short-circuited many of the standard operating procedures 
and bureaucratic politics on several issues in US South Africa policy. Examples would 
include not only resolution of Armscor, the McDonnell's case, and the Syrian arms sale 
fiasco, but also a bilateral tax treaty negotiated in "record time" (eighteen months), a 
"working for water" employment/conservation project in South Africa up and running by 
February 1997, a major US-SA trade conference organised between February and July 
back to one-day visits to Washington, followed by trade missions throughout the US with an emphasis on 
~rojects and investments that would create jobs in South Africa. 
1 See Salih Booker's viewpoint on this in "US-SA body needs a more focused agenda." Business Day (30 
July 1997); also, Millard Arnold is quoted in D1udlu, John, "'SA-US binational commision should expand 
agenda' --trade envoy," Business Day, 22 January 1998. This was also the view expressed by a staffer with 
US Representative Rangel's office. 
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1997, and the numerous people exchanges (over 75 between the July 1996 and February 
1997 BNC meetings). But in so doing, the BNC has introduced its own set of processes 
and politics. It would seem that rather than streamlining the policymaking process on 
South Africa, the BNC has accelerated the processes still in place, and made use of the 
executive powers of the heads of the bureaucracies in charge, as well as the overriding 
authority of the Vice President, "to get things done." 
One telling comment stands out. In discussing the fact that several other nations 
had expressed an interest in convening similar binational commissions with the US, one 
political-appointee noted that, "the US-South Africa BNC is out there as a model, but it is 
not sustainable with several countries at once. ,,52 
Another interviewee, from the White House, noted that "weaknesses in any 
system would be amplified through a BNC type structure." Elaborating, he explained 
that, "for instance, there will be differences in getting programs prepared for a report out 
to superiors and to the BNC. These reflect differences in bureaucracies and interagency 
process, which are weak in any case. But the Vice President's office does not 
micromanage -- it does not have the money to do so. It helps with the overall 
management from the top. "53 
Reinventing government, it would appear, the BNC is not. Rather, it is "business 
as usual", but with a twist: While processes and politics stay in place, the bureaucracies 
and agencies must produce "deliverables" for each BNC meeting, or, in Osborne/Gaebler 
terminology, focus on outputs instead of inputs. 
The result has been frenetic activity on either side of the Atlantic which, by 
August 1998, resulted in the agreement to reduce one of the biannual meetings to a 
"BNC-lite," as discussed in Chapter Four. While the Trade and Investment Framework 
---~~ -~ - --. -----
52Confidential interview (#39). 
53Confidentia! interview (#35). 
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Agreement now provides for the resolution of routine issues at the working level, 
according to the new protocol, "priority issues" will be brought to ministerial levels for 
resolution, regardless of whether the BNC is meeting or not. 
The failure of the architects, or perhaps the implementors, of the US-South Africa 
BNC to "reinvent government" does not, however, mean that it has not been a worthwhile 
exercise. In the brief period since March 1995, and during a critical point in South 
Africa's history, the BNC has resulted in several valuable new programmes and trade 
links, in normalised -- some might add improved -- US-South Africa relations, and in the 
creation of a myriad of US-South Africa links via bureaucratic and programmatic 
interactions. 
"Has the BNC done any good?" one respondent, generally critical of US policy 
process and politics, asked rhetorically. "At the low, functional level, yes; as a political 
bun-fight, it has been useless. But, as in the bigger picture of foreign policy in the post-
Cold War era, perhaps it is these little, functional outcomes which add up to the 
importance of international relations. ,,54 Summarising on a similar note, another 
respondent -- an embassy official -- pointed to the lasting significance of the links forged 
through the work of the BNC committees. "Even if the BNC does not survive the 
departure of Thabo Mbeki and Vice President Gore from their present positions (after 
elections in South Africa and the US in 1999 and 2000, respectively), where there is a 
need for them, the links will rem~in. ,,55 
Thus it is the enduring nature of the bureaucracy, with its institutionalised roles 
and relationships, that may define the greatest contribution of the BNC beyond the 1990's. 
Whether tne BNC is likely to remain in place over the longer term remains an open 
question. The changed roles of both Gore and Mbeki following respective national 
54Interview with Simon Barber (#29). 
55Confidential interview (#51). 
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elections would open the way for graceful closure to the Gore-Mbeki Binational 
Commission by the end of the century. Instead, there might be Gore-Mbeki Summits. In 
any case, the probability is high that US policy towards South Africa will be dominated 
by the expanded bureaucratic processes and politics outlined in the previous pages, rather 
than by the BNC. 
6.4 Conclusion: Bureaucratic Processes and Politics 
and Clinton 's South Africa Policy 
The institutional framework underlying US foreign policy in general, as well as 
the policy process and bureaucratic politics of the 1990's, constitute another factor behind 
Clinton's South Africa policy. The American constitution's provision of checks and 
balances in policymaking through a separation of power between the executive and 
legislative branches affects foreign policy through, on the one hand, allowing 
representation of public sentiment via the Congress and, on the other hand, allowing 
alteration and even obstruction of the foreign policy programme of a presidential 
administration, sometimes on party political grounds. The burgeoning of the foreign 
policy bureaucracy since the end of the second World War has brought further complexity 
to the policymaking process, Africa policymaking included. The end of the Cold War 
further highlighted the need to reorganise the foreign policy bureaucracy at the same time 
, 
that Congress began its "revolution" to balance the overblown federal budget. In the 
reordering of priorities that ensued, the Department of Commerce and related agencies 
came to the fore as the liberalisation of trade markets became a key component of 
democracy promotion under Clinton. At the same time, consistent with the Clinton 
administration's campaign to "reinvent government" generally, the US-South Africa vice-
presidential level binational commission was established to expedite policymaking and 
executio~ as well as normalise relations between Washington and Pretoria, after 
Mandela's election. 
228 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Policymaking on South Africa 
Viewed through the four issue-types in Clinton's South Africa policy, bureaucratic 
activity appeared to have greatest importance for policymaking in the issue-areas 
expected by the Zimmerman paradigm. In accordance with that paradigm, elitist 
processes held sway in the issue-areas of protection/interaction and of redistribution, 
which for US South Africa policy consisted of the issue-types of security and of political 
symbolism. Bureaucratic politics and processes were not absent from the issue-types of 
development assistance and trade, which were originally placed in the issue-areas of 
distribution and regulation based on the criteria of tangibility and symmetry of impact, 
but elites were forced to compete with pluralist forces in the formulation of policy to a 
greater extent in these issue-areas than in the others. Development assistance, again, 
showed a shift from one issue-area to another over the period under study, for the same 
reasons cited in the previous chapter: namely, a shift in the perceptions of aid. Aid 
moved from being an issue of distribution to one of redistribution as foreign assistance 
generally came under fire in the campaign to balance the budget. As the public largely 
withdrew support for the concept of aid to Africa as a whole, the locus of policymaking 
moved into the bureaucracy, where there was a particularly acrimonious debate over 
South Africa's USAID mission on questions of accountability and project 
appropriateness. Although bureaucratic activity on trade with South Africa has 
mushroomed since 1994, there has been a commensurate increase in pluralist activity, and 
so the expected conflictual-pluralist policy process expectation is indeed supported by the 
evidence. Bureaucratic dominance in security issues likewise supported the expectations 
of Zimmerman's issue-area paradigm, in that issues in this issue-type attracted very little 
public activity or pressure, except perhaps indirectly via "new" security concerns. Issues 
of political symbolism, both domestic (involving US race relations and the priorities of 
African-Americans) and global (involving perceived threats to US hegemony), were 
found to involve a conflictual-elitist process, as expected. 
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Woven throughout the bureaucratIc activity on US South Africa policy under 
Clinton has been the work of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission. Drawing in many 
more actors from the bureaucracy than are traditionally involved in foreign policymaking, 
the BNC has in some ways complicated the policymaking process. On the other hand, 
because of the executive powers of those chairing the commission, and the lack of veto 
power on the part of Congress over most BNC projects, the bureaucracy has 
accomplished much more vis-a-vis South Africa, over the time-frame of the three years 
the BNC has existed, than usual. Whether the policymaking process has been truly 
changed by the BNC, or merely accelerated, is the question. This study concludes the 
latter. 
With regard to engagement, as with interest group activity, bureaucratic activity 
appears to occur mainly in the upper half of each issue-area quadrant (see Figure D), 
indicating that the majority of activity has encouraged cooperation in US-South Africa 
relations, and has therefore supported the stated policy of the Clinton administration 
concerning engagement in South Africa. 
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Issue-Area Analysis 
And the Study of US South Africa Policy in the 1990's 
South Africa is at a critical juncture in its history. At the end of the twentieth 
century, with the euphoria of 1994 passing, the imperatives of political and economic 
consolidation, coinciding as they do with that of addressing apartheid's inequities, pose a 
major challenge to the nascent state in Pretoria. International reintegration -- key to 
economic growth -- is progressing apace, but often meets with confusing signals from the 
behemoth of the post-Cold War international political economy, the United States. 
Without a sound estimation -- a good map, as it were -- of US policy towards South 
Africa, policymakers in Pretoria are likely to misjudge the contours of that policy, to nin 
up against the differing lTS policies in different issue-areas. The possible consequences 
for the future of South Africa, and therefore Africa and indeed the international system, 
are too costly to ignore. 
7.1 The Framework of Analysis Reviewed 
As stated at the outset of this study, given the importance to South Africa's future 
of a sound estimation of US policy, and given the importance of South Africa's new non-
racial democracy to Africa and to the wider international community, including the 
United States, an accurate map of US South Africa policy seems of considerable import. 
Yet, among the few works written on US Africa policy in the 1990's, little exists to help 
an observer find his or her way through the contours of Clinton's South Africa policy. In 
an effort to draw such a map, the author recognised that foreign policy analysis is 
conducted all too often through the lens of either realist or liberal international relations 
theory, at either the system or the unit/sub-unit level of analysis, and through the 
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perspective of perhaps one or two of the issues confronting nation-states in their foreign 
relations. Such one-sided approaches, it was evident, often result in misleading pictures 
of international affairs. The preceding study has thus attempted to set aside these 
either/or distinctions and to allow insights from both realism and liberalism, international 
relations and comparative foreign policy study, as well as issue-area analysis as posited 
by William Zimmennan, to grant a greater perspective. 
Discussion began by setting the international context for US South Africa policy 
in the post-Cold War, post-apartheid period. It then moved into a review of the history of 
that policy, and an overview of Clinton's South Africa policy via administration policy 
statements and actions, including initiatives and responses. In order to gain a greater 
depth of understanding about the Clinton policy, especially with regard to engagement, 
analysis then took a look inside, at the sub-national level, to reveal the actors involved in 
the policymaking process in different issue-areas of US foreign policy, and to learn when 
they might hold greater or lesser sway in that process. In applying the issue-area 
methodology, introduced at some length in Chapter One, analysis at the sub-unit level 
entailed a disaggregation of Clinton's South Africa policy into the four issue-types that 
emerged from the historical and current policy review, each of which fitted, it appeared, 
into one of the four issue-areas of Zimmennan's "issue-based foreign policy paradigm." 
Analysis at this level included discussion of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission and 
the significance of that new foreign policy tool, both for US-South African relations but 
also for policymaking in Washington. In an innovation on Zimmerman's paradigm, an 
engagement/disengagement function was introduced to allow evaluation of domestic 
factor activity according to the direction of pressure exerted by each actor on US policy. 
Having completed analysis at the designated levels, and across issue-areas, an 
overview of the research findings, as well as an assessment of Clinton's South Africa 
policy, are provided below. 
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7.2 The Findings 
7.2.1 The Global Context and US South Africa Policy 
In view of the vacuum left for US foreign policymakers by the Cold War's abrupt 
end, and of the perceived tilt toward international disengagement on the part of the US 
electorate in the 1990's, one of the aims of this study was to explore the emerging 
guidelines for US foreign policy generally under the Clinton administration and to learn 
what is guiding US foreign policy towards regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa in the 
1990s. Research found that, due largely to the three factors in global affairs -- the demise 
of the Soviet Union and the advent of "unipolarity", the levelling out of the world 
economy relative to the post World War II period, and the spread of global capitalism 
encouraged by the phenomenon known as globalisation -- the Clinton administration 
returned to a fundamental American policy of "democracy promotion." As the "global 
logic" behind US policy in the 1990's, democracy promotion involves not only support 
for democratic reform in developing countries, but also for increased liberalisation of 
markets in what is seen as a natural convergence between democratic governance and 
free-market economies worldwide. Democracy promotion is not free of detractors, 
however, and currency crashes late in the decade served to amplify objections from 
emerging markets such as Malaysia, as well as from critics within the US, about the 
negative ramifications of global capitalism for the developing world. Protectionist 
elements in the US have raised their own objections, as have the few vocal but powerful 
"isolationists" in Congress. There was also criticism in the policy-analytical community 
that such "excessive commercialisation" of US foreign policy was bad for US interests 
overall, in that strategic security issues might be left unattended. As yet, these discordant 
notes do not seem to have swayed the Clinton administration from pursuing its stated 
goals, but they could grow loud enough to do if the US economy, or the global economy, 
takes a turn for the worse again. 
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With regard to regional policy and the impact of the changing global context, 
South Africa features in US policy toward the nations of the South and towards the region 
of Sub-Saharan Africa for several reasons. Ethnic discord having replaced economic 
ideology as the major cause of war in the past ten years the world over, the South African 
miracle of negotiated transition to a black majority-ruled African nation is perhaps 
foremost among the reasons many policymakers are watching South Africa closely. In 
addition, in this era of increasingly "commercialised" US foreign policy and of growing 
international interdependence, South Africa is a significant player in US equations as an 
especially promising "big emerging market." The perceived gains from securing an 
economic foothold in South Africa, as "one of the last untapped markets" globally, are 
obviously significant to have warranted such attention. South Africa's leadership among 
the developing world on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation has garnered the attention 
of US national security officials, as well. South Africa also features in the US strategy to 
build partnerships with regional leaders in order to address other "new" security concerns 
such as environmental degradation, international terrorism, and the effects of huge 
populations displaced by civil war or famine in several regions around the globe. US 
reticence to commit American troops abroad without clear strategic imperatives translated 
into greater importance in US policy of regional powers such as South Africa, although 
Pretoria has refrained from involvement in peacekeeping efforts on the continent, 
including the US African Crisis Response Initiative, due to perceived threats to African 
sovereignty. The withdrawal of France from much of its former colonies in Africa has 
left openings for increased US economic activity on the continent, as does the Africa 
Growth and Opportunity legislation under reconsideration in 1999. Such linkages across 
Africa have, in turn, increased the US stake in a South Africa which is stable, prosperous, 
and willing to take on responsibilities for maintaining stability in its region and beyond, 
even if South Africa remains unwilling to act as a "surrogate" of the United States. 
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Although development assistance in general has suffered in the 1990's, mostly 
because of the reduced American economic advantage over the rest of the world and the 
current climate of pessimism with regard to the effectiveness of past aid efforts, Pretoria 
has been only mirumally affected by attempts to reduce aid. The US, in fact, announced a 
special aid package after Mandela's inauguration, but expects South Africa to "graduate" 
from aid in the next few years. Regarding the United Nations, the IMF and the World 
Bank, which may well playa role in South Africa's post-apartheid economic recovery, it 
appears that until US reservations about the management of funds by multilateral bodies 
(especially the UN) are put to rest, US contributions may continue to decline, if they are 
paid at all. Pressure for US action to address the currency crisis in the developing world 
through a reevaluation of the international financial institutions' approach is likely to 
increase, though, both inside and outside America, and this may affect US-South African 
relations more as South Africa gains momentum as a leader among affected nations. 
The impact on US South Africa policy of the changed US foreign policy priorities 
and processes resulting from its changed global context are perhaps clearest in the content 
and operations of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission. The BNC is focused not just 
on security and on foreign assistance, but on the expansion of trade links, on 
environmentally sustainable development initiatives in South Africa, on law enforcement 
cooperation to combat the encroaching illicit drugs trade and other organised crime, and 
on such projects as increased access to advanced technology in South African schools. 
Negative implications for South Africa of some threads of Clinton's policy are 
greatly downplayed in official statements, but have plagued relations since 1994. US 
laws which seek to limit trade with states such as those deemed to be sponsoring 
terrorism impinge on South Africa's role as an independent actor and leader in the 
developing world. The political cost for South Africa, regionally and domestically, of 
deepening political and economic bilateral relations with the US may grow as regional 
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actors and other multilateral bodies such as the G 15 take a harder line against such 
cooperation in the US-sponsored "Neo-Liberal Economic Order." 
The "global logic" of democracy promotion behind US policy in the 1990s is 
limited by such regional realities around the globe, as well as by fiscal and domestic 
political constraints on US engagement generally. However, as democracy promotion has 
emerged as the "principle" on which to hang US foreign policy, it is likely to remain as 
such for the duration of the Clinton administration. Whether the US will remain 
proactive in its approach to regions like Africa -- as seen in the White House Partnership 
for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa initiative, as well as in its legislative 
counterpart -- and whether these initiatives are more "smoke and mirrors" than 
substantive in content, remains, however, to be seen. 
7.2.3 Issue-Area Analysis and the Study of US South Africa Policy 
Having gained some global perspective on US policy toward South Africa in the 
1990's, discussion turns now to the unit and sub-unit level of analysis and the related 
questions posed at the outset. 
7.2.3.1 Policy, or Policies? 
Firstly, with regard to US policy towards South Africa, the question was posed: Is 
there one unified policy, or are there several policies which differ in tone and even in 
direction, depending on the sorts of issues at stake? It seems evident that the latter is true. 
For instance, throughout 1994 and 1995, even as Mandela was welcomed with open arms 
by the US as president of the new South Africa, and even as the Gore-Mbeki Binational 
Commission held out the promise of increased bilateral cooperation, a series of public 
disagreements over South African commercial policy and over South Africa's relations 
with "rogue" states such as Libya, clouded the otherwise bright horizon. Which approach 
constitutes US policy? Through the overview of policy statements, as well as policy 
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actions in the fonn of US initiatives in South Africa and US responses to affairs involving 
South Africa in Chapter Four, it is apparent that indeed there are different threads of US 
policy, in which ,different and even contradicting sentiments are expressed. An account 
of US policy, or more precisely, of the different US policies in the different issue-areas of 
bilateral relations, was a first step in gaining an understanding of the direction of the 
whole. But deeper analysis was required to begin to accurately map these various strands 
of US policy towards South Africa, as this study intended. 
7.2.3.2 The Value of Issue-Area Analysis 
Issue-area analysis arose out of insights in the 1960's regarding the differing 
behaviour of states in different areas of their international relations. As such, it appears 
well-suited, indeed critical, to analysis of policy in the globalised international political 
economy of the post-Cold War world, where nations interact across numerous issue-areas 
daily. It thus presented itself as the logical tool for understanding US South Africa policy 
under Clinton, and for mapping the contours that had become apparent through analysis 
at the global and national levels. 
Defining issue-areas as a distinct set of disputes over various interrelated political 
goods, the disputes sharing in common certain characteristic qualities -- in short, a set of 
similar policy disputes -- this study set out to apply the Zimmennan issue-area paradigm 
to the study of US South Africa policy, in all its various manifestations, in order to gain 
an understanding of the sources and the direction of that policy. Zimmennan's criteria for 
classifying issues, it will be remembered, are the tangibility of the political goods at stake 
and the symmetry of the expected domestic political impact; his four issue-areas are those 
of distribution, regulation, protection/interaction, and redistribution. Policymaking 
underlying the issues in US South Africa policy, the latter grouped into issue-types 
according to their four themes, mostly supported the expectations of the Zimmennan 
typology with regard to policy process; that is, whether a matter involved conflictual or 
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consensual policymaking, and whether it attracted mainly pluralist or elitist attention. In 
the one example (development assistance) where policy process appeared not to live up to 
Zimmerman's expectation, the issue-type actually shifted from consensual to conflictual 
and from pluralist to elitist process, midway through the period under study due to 
changing systemic and national factors. Therefore, Zimmerman's typology was not 
proved false, but the assumptions made about development assistance as an issue-type 
were found lacking. The need to test each issue according to the criteria of tangibility and 
symmetry of domestic political impact is again emphasised by such an instance. While 
the author maintains the usefulness of noting themes, or issue-types, in the 
operationalisation of the issue-area paradigm, this instance demonstrates that additional 
tests may need to be introduced to ensure that extraneous factors, such as the global and 
national context with regard to certain types of issues, have not changed so much as to 
cause shifts between issue-areas during the period under study. 
In any case, taking into account the changed classification of the development 
assistance issue-type, expected policy processes were confirmed for each issue-type. This 
fact is graphically illustrated in the matrices depicting interest group and bureaucratic 
activity on US South Africa policy (see Figures C and D), and shall be discussed in more 
detail below. Having tested the paradigm and having found it indeed useful for predicting 
policy process in the various issue-areas, the question remains as to how it has 
enlightened US South Africa policy. 
But this answer too seems evident. Issue-area analysis insights into policy 
process, taken together with the context provided by the global, historical and national 
analysis of US South Africa policy, has shed light on the various threads of policy that 
exist in Clinton's South Africa policy, as well as their sources and (with the inclusion of 
the engagement/disengagement function) the direction of pressure exerted thereby. The 
latter shall also be discussed more fully below, based on findings of Chapters Five and 
Six. In sum, issue-area analysis as operationalised in this study (except for the need to 
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institute further contextual checks) has indeed proved of value in the mapping of US 
South Africa policy under Clinton, providing insight into the contours that have 
bedevilled US-South Africa relations throughout the post-apartheid period. 
7.2.3.3 Interest Groups and Bureaucracies behind US South Africa Policy 
Considering the issue-types in US South Africa policy, and their context, what, 
specifically, are the implications of public interest group and bureaucratic activity? 
Depending on which of the four types of issues that arose from the analysis of 
Clinton's South Africa policy -- development assistance issues, trade and investment 
issues, security issues, and issues of political symbolism -- policy has either engendered 
or discouraged engagement. An important factor behind these nuances in policy were the 
articulated interests of the US public and the goals of various actors within the US 
bureaucracy. The first, interest articulation, can best be seen via public opinion polls and 
interest group activity. 
(i) Interest Articulation 
Clinton administration policy on South Africa must be seen, in part, as a function 
of domestic political concerns, expressed through public opinion, legislative action, and 
interest group activity. In review, public opinion has formed an important backdrop for 
each of the issue-types identified in US South Africa policy during the 1994-1998 period. 
Due to a "foreign policy gap," perceptions among policymakers of strong disengagement 
sentiment on the part of the public led to signs of imminent US withdrawal from such 
regions as Africa However, as public support for engagement in Africa, and especially 
South Africa, became more evident in the second half of the 1990's (except regarding 
aid), forces for disengagement lost momentum. 
Specifically, this study found that interest group activity on US South Africa 
policy has been concentrated on trade and investment issues in the period under study, 
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even among interest groups based in the African-American community (after aid was 
largely abandoned in 1996). Several new actors, newly formed or newly interested in 
commercial matters in South Africa, are involved in lobbying for increased engagement 
in the trade and investment issue-area, and these compete with one another for 
policymakers' attentions. Such lobbying includes opposition to any US complaisance 
over South African intellectual property rights violations or suspected concessions to 
labour in Pretoria's Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy, and concerns over 
crime and corruption in South Africa and their affect on the business climate, as well as 
objections from advocates for humanitarian goals in foreign policy and for the rights of 
the developing world to "catch up" with the developed world before the "playing field" is 
levelled completely by such entities as the World Trade Organisation. 
Other US groups, such as the American textile industry and the AFL-CIO, are 
actively opposing expanded trade with South Africa on protectionist grounds, and seemed 
to have made inroads when the AGO A was shelved by the 105th Congress. Their 
activity, however, has not impinged greatly on trade relations with South Africa 
specifically, which are by now established and growing in several sectors and would 
stand to gain little more than increased protection of the reduced tariffs under GSP from 
AGOA passage. 
The finding that there is continued African-American support (though not at the 
mass level of the anti-apartheid era) for engagement in South Africa, and specifically for 
aid (albeit to a lesser degree after 1995), ran counter to theory posited elsewhere that 
African-American sentiment in the post-apartheid period was likely to be against 
international engagement, generally, and against the transfer of US resources to other 
countries, particularly (Payne, 1994: 67,73). Theory postulating the increased leverage 
of ethnic lobbies in general in US foreign policymaking in the post-Cold War period also 
found little support in the African-American experience vis-a-vis South Africa, however. 
Instead, the study at hand found reduced leverage for African-Americans relative to 
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previous periods (especially the 1980's), due to structural refonn's and switched majorities 
in Congress, to a dissipation of interest in foreign policy among this community after the 
end of apartheid, and to increasing disagreement among those African-Americans active 
on Africa policy with regard to the free-market agenda of the US. Action to address some 
of these problems has taken the form of efforts to build an African-American 
constituency for Africa. 
In this regard, the fact that the quadrant depicting domestic politically symbolic 
issues (race relations) shows only two interest groups (see Figure C) is perhaps not a fair 
reflection of the depth of interest among the African-American elite (some of whom are 
not in government) demonstrated during interviews in the course of this study. Such 
discrepancies might, in the future, be accounted for in similar issue-area analysis by a 
simple weighting procedure, which, had it occurred to the author earlier, would have been 
useful in this study to convey the relative impact of interest group activity more fully. 
According to several respondents in the interviewing process behind this study, however, 
even with such efforts as the CF A and the National Summit on Africa, it is unlikely that a 
powerful constituency for Africa will form in the short-term (short of another coalescing 
issue similar to apartheid) due to the diversity of that constituency. 
(ii) The US Bureaucracy 
The institutional framework underlying US foreign policy in general, as well as 
the policy process and bureaucratic politics of the 1990's, constitute another factor behind 
Clinton's South Africa policy. The American constitution's provision of checks and 
balances in policymaking through a separation of power between the executive and 
legislative branches affects foreign policy through, on the one hand, allowing 
representation of public sentiment via the Congress and, on the other hand, allowing 
alteration and even obstruction of the foreign policy programme of a presidential 
administration, sometimes on party political grounds. The burgeoning of the foreign 
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policy bureaucracy since the end of the second World War has brought further complexity 
to the policymaking process, Africa policymaking included. The end of the Cold War 
further highlighted the need to reorganise the foreign policy bureaucracy at the same time 
that Congress began its "revolution" to balance the overblown federal budget. In the 
reordering of priorities that ensued, the Department of Commerce and related agencies 
came to the fore as the liberalisation of trade markets became a key component of 
democracy promotion under Clinton. At the same time, consistent with the Clinton 
administration's campaign to "reinvent government" generally, the US-South Africa vice-
presidential level binational commission was established to expedite policymaking and 
execution, as well as normalise relations between Washington and Pretoria, after 
Mandela's election. 
Viewed through the four issue-types in Clinton's South Africa policy, bureaucratic 
activity appeared to have greatest importance for policymaking in the issue-areas 
expected by the Zimmerman paradigm. In accordance with that paradigm, elitist 
processes held sway in the issue-areas of protection/interaction and of redistribution (the 
latter via the numerous and symbolically significant programmes of the BNC), which for 
US South Africa policy consisted of the issue-types of security and of political 
symbolism. Bureaucratic politics and processes were not absent from the issue-types of 
development assistance and trade, which were originally pl~lCed in the issue-areas of 
distribution and regulation based on the criteria of tangibility and symmetry of impact, 
but elites were forced to compete with pluralist forces in the formulation of policy to a 
greater extent in these issue-areas than in the others. In noting again the migration of 
development assistance into the redistributional issue-area, this section of analysis 
showed that as the public largely withdrew support for the concept of aid to Africa as a 
whole, the locus of policymaking moved into the bureaucracy, where there was a 
particularly acrimonious debate over South Africa's USAID mission on questions of 
accountability and project appropriateness. Regarding the trade issue-type, although 
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bureaucratic activity on trade with South Africa has mushroomed since 1994, there has 
been a commensurate increase in pluralist activity, and so the expected conflictual-
pluralist policy process expectation is indeed supported by the evidence. Bureaucratic 
dominance in security issues likewise supported the expectations of Zimmerman's issue-
area paradigm, in that issues in this issue-type attracted very little public activity or 
pressure, except perhaps indirectly via "new" security concerns. Issues of political 
symbolism, both domestic (involving US race relations and the priorities of African-
Americans) and global (involving perceived threats to US hegemony), were found to 
involve a conflictual-elitist process, as expected, as well, including many members of the 
African-American community from within the bureaucracy in the case of the former 
Issues. 
7.2.4 The Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission and "Reinventing Government" 
Woven throughout the bureaucratic activity on US South Africa policy under 
Clinton has been the work of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission. Drawing in many 
more actors from the bureaucracy than are traditionally involved in foreign policymaking, 
the BNC has in some ways complicated the policymaking process. On the other hand, 
because of the executive powers of those chairing the commission, and the lack of veto 
power on the part of Congress over most BNC projects, the bureaucracy has 
accomplished much more vis-a.-vis South Africa, over the time-frame of the three years 
the BNC has existed, than usual. 
The BNC is arguably more than just another joint commission established to 
normalise relations between the US and South Africa, therefore. As one of two full US 
BNC's (the other is the US-Russia BNC, while two "semi" BNC's with Ukraine and Egypt 
exist, as well), the US-South Africa BNC indeed sends out an important message. The 
US obviously attaches a degree of significance to its relations with Pretoria. 
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But the BNC might also be seen to represent a fundamental drive on the part of 
the Clinton/Gore administration to change the way government works. Apparently 
converted even before their election to the idea of "reinventing government" as posited in 
the 1992 book by that name (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), Clinton and Gore entered the 
White House determined to streamline the huge federal bureaucracy during their watch. 
The result has been a highly publicised campaign to change the modus operandi of the US 
government, to cause federal employees to focus "not on inputs but on outcomes." The 
BNC exemplifies this approach to policymaking. By cutting through the red tape of 
bureaucratic policymaking, and requiring "deliverables" every six months at BNC 
meetings, the Office of the Vice President has set in motion a process which has had 
several beneficial effects for US South Africa policy. Not least of these are the resulting 
linkages between bureaucratic counterparts, which have apparently smoothed the 
resolution of a few subsequent diplomatic faux pas. The BNC meetings have also 
provided opportunities for Vice President Gore and Deputy Executive President Thabo 
Mbeki to discuss sensitive matters out of the hearing of the press or even that of other 
bureaucracies such as the Department of State. BNC meetings have been credited, for 
instance, with resolution of the McDonald's trademark dispute, the Annscor case, and the 
Syria arms sale confrontation. 
But has the BNC changed the way in which policy is made and implemented with 
regard to South Africa? In the short term, it has. By short-circuiting the bureaucratic 
process, requiring results, and placing executive co-chairs over the BNC meetings, the 
BNC has created a means to "get things done" at this important juncture in South African 
history. It has also coordinated a large number of departments and agencies working on 
US South Africa policy through a variety of new issues, such as climatic consultation, 
housing development, AIDS research coordination, conservation of water and educational 
exchange via the Internet. The high-level attention on US South Africa relations, while 
not necessarily a feature in US media reports, has served to focus increased attention on 
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the bilateral relationship among the US foreign policy community and in South Africa 
itself, as well as on the relationship between Al Gore and Thabo Mbeki (which may have 
future ramifications, depending on election results). 
The political significance of the BNC is, it would appear, considerable in light of 
the above. But what of the substance behind the spotlights? Concrete benefits for South 
Africa and the US, flowing from the BNC process, include increased trade and 
investment on both sides, as of late 1998, and access to important actors in the 
policymaking communities for actors on both sides of the table. But "revolution" it is 
not. ,The BNC has not changed the structures of US policymaking on South Africa, but 
rather accelerated the process by which that process must achieve increased policy goals. 
The BNC does form an executive coordinating umbrella over the wide range of 
bureaucratic actors involved in US South Africa policy, and organises the funding from 
existing monies to expedite the delivery of projects in record time. But it has not 
involved the private sector to the degree envisaged in its early stages, and nor has it 
necessarily helped policy to run more smoothly by the end of the 1990's -- higher 
productivity has come at the cost of higher stress and sometimes reduced goodwill among 
the US actors involved, it would appear. 
These facts do not mean that the BNC has not been worthwhile for the US and 
for South Africa in this point in the latter's history, however. The conclusion of this study 
is that, while the BNC is unlikely to leave a "reinvented" policy process behind, it will 
leave behind several US-South Africa joint undertakings, as well as new linkages across 
the two national bureaucracies. From that point of view, the BNC has been positive in 
terms of the previous discussion of the threats to South Africa's future and the value of an 
increased understanding of US policy. Whether the political cost to South Africa of the 
close relations signified by the US-South Africa BNC are worth those gains are another 
matter which, while they should feature in US policy formulations, must also form the 
basis of another study. 
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7.2.5 US Disengagement and South Africa under Clinton -- and Beyond 
To summarise, this study has employed analysis at the system level to delve into 
international sources of US foreign policy, and at the unit and sub-unit level to "unpack" 
domestic interest group activity and policy process as further sources of US policy. In 
addition, to offer an indication of the net thrust of US domestic factor activity with regard 
to engagement in South Africa, an engagement/disengagement function was introduced to 
the issue-area typology. Overall, this integrated approach, it has been suggested, offers a 
sound estimation of US foreign policy, as well as insight into likely trends for the future. 
These insights become possible, as the issues themselves have become one determinant 
of the nature oflikely policy, based on the actors and the interests involved. 
In light of the concerns raised in the literature concerning predictions about the 
external behaviour of states based on domestic political dynamics across different issue-
areas, however, the goal will not be to make conclusive statements about future US South 
Africa policy but to sketch, in very broad strokes, likely outlines for a map of that policy. 
Looking at the Clinton period, the prospect of disengagement as a salient feature 
of US foreign policy has dimmed considerably since its inception in the early 1990's. The 
globalisation which continues to bring such economic benefit to the US has also made 
deeper the "mutual vulnerability" which characterises an interdependent world, and like it 
or not, the US appears to have little choice about at least certain minimum degree of 
engagement. There is, however, some prospect of stepping back from such engagement 
in some regions, as the US seeks to balance limited resources with far-reaching goals. 
Amidst these exigencies, Africa remains fairly low on the US foreign policy agenda. Aid 
to Africa has continued to decline, even in view of the increased aid to South Africa until 
2005. Meanwhile, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act has yet to successfully pass 
through both houses of Congress. 
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South Africa, it would appear however, retains a special place among US bilateral 
relations. Besides the continued and apparently active Gore-Mbeki Binational 
Commission, there have been several high level visits in the past few years, including that 
of President Clinton, the first ever to South Africa by a sitting US president. The 
Department of Commerce continues its active role in promoting South Africa as an 
investment destination through its one roving post, that of Minister Counsellor, assigned 
to Johannesburg. As South Africa features both as a "pivotal state" and as a "big 
emerging market," it garners attention from that policymaker focused on "key nation" 
approaches within the policy of democracy promotion. In America's eyes, South Africa 
appears to genuinely "fit the bill" as a key nation in that it has significant promise as both 
a regional stabiliser and an economic powerhouse in terms of generating growth in 
Africa. Moreover, South Africa has considerable leverage among the developing nations 
of the world through its leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Southern 
Africa Development Community, and in the fact of Nelson Mandela's moral authority, 
which speaks loudly in forums such as the United Nations and the Organisation for 
African Unity. At the same time, US engagement has been spurred because, as a newly 
liberalised country, South Africa is particularly susceptible to infiltration by international 
crime rings and terrorist operations. Traditional military cooperation has resumed with 
the end of apartheid, and joint military exercises may lead eventually to South African 
participation in the African Crisis Response Initiative which underpins the US approach 
to peacekeeping on the continent. Such a move on the part of Mandela, still far from 
certain, would be an important signal to Washington that South Africa has accepted the 
US offer of "partnership." 
Most of the domestic activity In this period likewise engendered deeper 
engagement, as demonstrated by the greater amount of activity in the upper half of each 
quadrant in the two illustrating matrices (refer to Figures C and D). As such, the net 
effect of that activity would seem to dispel the sense that either the public or the 
247 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Conclusion 
government was moving away from supporting engagement with South Africa in the 
current period. This finding parallels that of the Program on International Policy 
Attitudes study on general engagement sentiment among the public, but contradicts their 
findings on sentiment among the foreign policy bureaucracy. According to PIP A, 
policymakers were seen to have worked toward disengagement generally, based on 
erroneous perceptions that the public opposed engagement internationally (Kull et aI, 
1997). One possible explanation for the discrepancy in findings between this study and 
PIPA's, it seems, is the special status of South Africa in US foreign policy over the period 
of study, as seen in the several US initiatives from the Clinton administration. 
So it is that a greater understanding of US South Africa policy becomes possible 
through issue-area analysis. For, without taking into account these differences across 
issue-areas, the many signals from Washington -- from interest groups, legislators 
(whether acting on their own or as representatives of a constituency), functionaries, and 
administration officials -- create a confusing spectacle. When viewed through the issue-
area paradigm, however, policy process and therefore, in view of the specific interest 
groups and bureaucratic politics, policy directions (in both senses of that word), become 
apparent. Thus the contours of US South Africa policy can be drawn, to the benefit of 
both American and South African policymakers, and a more accurate and useful map 
results. It has been said that the best way to anticipate the future is to understand 
the present. The foregoing exercise, while valuable on its own, also allows an informed 
look ahead at US South Africa policy beyond Clinton. 
7.2.6 Historical Continuities and Discontinuities, and Likely Policy Directions 
As noted at the close of the historical review of US South Africa policy, sanctions 
and apartheid are gone as issues in US South Africa policy in the late 1990's, as are Cold 
War concerns about Soviet expansion in southern Africa. These, together with US 
business interest in the resource-laden region, were important factors in US South Africa 
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policy throughout the decades following the second World War. US concerns about race 
relations at home and American influence abroad remain inherent, however, in US 
foreign policy formulations on South Africa, as do the push for expanded trade and 
investment links. It is the fact of these enduring issue-types which allow insight into the 
sources and likely direction of US foreign policy, under Clinton and beyond, via the 
issue-area paradigm. Contextual dynamics are key to these insights (as learned via the 
development assistance issue-type). In addition, each new issue must be tested for issue-
area suitability according to the two questions posed by Zimmerman regarding the 
tangibility of political goods and the symmetry of expected domestic political impact, 
before assumptions can be made about issue-type and policy process. But, within these 
limitations, and augmented by the engagement/disengagement function, issue-area 
analysis yields important indicators about likely future directions of US South Africa 
policy. 
Much about whether the US will remain engaged with South Africa into the new 
century can be gathered, for instance, from the fact of increasing business interest among 
the African-American community, which generally seems to have deeper commitment to 
South Africa than pure mercantilists and may ride the ups and downs of the emerging 
market in South Africa with more equanimity than most hedge fund dealers or other 
global capitalists. In fact, unless the nonracial experiment in South Africa fails utterly, 
African-Americans (or at least the leaders of the various segments of that community) 
look set to remain a force for US engagement in South Africa, perhaps substantially 
through programmes such as those undertaken under the auspices of the BNC, and 
perhaps only symbolically through international initiatives similar to Clinton's One 
Nation Initiative. 
The enduring nature of US interest in South Africa from a security point of view -
- even though the specific issues have changed with the end of the Cold War and the rise 
of international terrorism and environmental degradation -- also supports the notion of 
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engagement beyond the Clinton administration years. No president of the future will be 
able to negate the threat of the international menaces highlighted by the Clinton/Gore 
administration without some repercussions politically, even if not directly pertaining to 
US South Africa policy. The connection between South Africa's future success and the 
danger of these threats for Africa and the developing world (and thus, due to 
interdependence, eventually America) seems to have been made by the new generation of 
leaders in Washington in the post-Cold War period as "new" security issues have been 
allowed to surface. Questions remain as to how best the US might support South Africa 
through its transition into political consolidation and economic integration, and these will 
be addressed below. 
While development aid appears less enduring than the other issue-types in US 
South Africa policy due to its demise as a credible means of sustainable development (at 
least in current forms), this issue-type in any case looks set to fade in importance in US 
South Africa policy as South Africa itself gains in economic resilience. 
For further insight into the continuities and discontinuities in US South Africa 
policy, there might be benefit in comparing the "net effect" of the two domestic factors 
under study in the previous pages, over time. Such an exercise, grounded in the 
contextual dynamics of selected periods of study from a policy's history, may yield even 
richer insights, but is offered as a suggestion for further application in another study 
rather than attempted in these pages.) 
) If issue-area analysis were to be undertaken for several periods of study within a particular policy, and 
grounded in the relevant systemic factors of each period under study, conceivably the input of (aggregated) 
domestic factor activity could be plotted on a graph to show the changes in content and direction of that 
activity over time. With, for instance, engagement on the vertical axis and time on the horizontal axis, 
variations in aggregated domestic factor activity could be located over the years. Such a long-term 
perspective on domestic factor activity with regard to a policy such as enggement would be of great value in 
presenting a more integrated view offoreign policy. 
250 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Conclusion 
7.3 Clinton's South Africa Policy Assessed 
Finally, having drawn in a number of the missing contours on the map of US 
South Africa policy under Clinton, what can be said about the policy itself in light of the 
normative questions raised early on in this study? Those questions had to do with the 
spread of American-style liberal democracy and the sovereignty of the least powerful 
nations of the world in the face of that overwhelming trend. As one of the more advanced 
developing nations of the South, South Africa is perhaps in a stronger position than most 
to resist the forces of gravity inherent in the US and other centres of global capitalism. 
Through Pretoria's firm stance in the face of US criticism over relations with such pariah 
states as Libya and Syria, and the fight it has put up over the Armscor case and various 
other points of disagreement with the US since 1994, South Africa has made it clear that 
it remains a sovereign state and not a surrogate at the beck and call of the US 
government. On the other hand, South Africa can hardly refuse to take the hand of 
friendship offered by the US, laden as it is with promises of aid, expanded trade links and 
the general status that accompanies attention from the leader of the international political 
economy. 
The onus thus rests on the United States to recognise these conflicting pressures 
on this fledgling leader of the South. How can the US expect to engage with Pretoria in a 
"partnership" when their respective economies differ in scale by a factor of 30? If South 
Africa cannot afford to bypass the opportunity of close relations with the US, is it right 
for the US to highlight this budding "partnership" when the political cost of a close 
relationship between the two nations is so much greater for South Africa than it is for the 
US? Is there not another approach the Clinton administration should consider in 
attempting to achieving its goal of supporting South Africa in its experiment in nonracial 
democracy? 
Certainly, by some measures of success, Clinton's policy is doing very well. If 
measured by the standards of political gain, for instance, Clinton's South Africa policy 
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appears to have surpassed expectations. The BNC has firmly cemented relations between 
the US and South Africa in the post-apartheid, post-Cold War period. New links have 
been established for trade and investment, as well as for cooperation in matters of 
security, both national (traditional security issues) and international ("new" security 
issues). The African-American community appears generally satisfied that the Clinton 
administration has taken their preferences with regard to South Africa seriously -- so 
much so that there is little public opinion expressed on US South Africa policy in the 
1990's from this community, except through African-American leaders attempting to 
mobilise a constituency for Africa in general. Development aid packages promised at 
Mandela's inauguration created the impression of US support for South Africa's new 
nonracial democracy in the form of grants and loans, and the subsequent controversy over 
the USAID programme in Pretoria has been largely missed by the US public, whose g(l?:e 
has turned to other issues in Africa or to the potential for trade to bring South Africa 
through its transition and into political and economic soundness. Only the occasional 
diplomatic scuffle over relations with "rogue" states, or over Pretoria's support for the 
abolition of landmines or the establishment of an international court of justice, have 
marred this apparently flourishing -- if relatively low-priority -- bilateral relationship. 
However, there are other measures of success. Earlier, the question was raised as 
to whether the political cost to South Africa of the close relations signified by the US-
South Africa BNC are worth the gains achieved by each in that forum. While the details 
of South African foreign policy have not featured highly in this study on US South Africa 
policy, the matter is one which might figure more highly in US policy calculations and 
therefore merits some discussion here. Does the US recognise the implications of 
isolating South Africa from the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, or indeed the whole of the 
South, by its public pronouncements of partnership? Would a clearly independent 
Pretoria not be a more valuable ally, as it were, in the fight against instability on the 
continent and economic turmoil the world over, than one believed to be a surrogate of the 
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United States? Perhaps the pronouncements should be muted and the resources to back 
up earlier promises of assistance -- whether in the form of trade benefits or housing loan 
guarantees -- should be more forthcoming. While it may be domestic political and 
bureaucratic sources of foreign policy which often thwart intentions such as those 
displayed in the US promises made soon after Mandela's election, the Clinton 
administration must resist playing to those sources for political points -- especially when 
it is at the expense of South Africa's future. For, the consequences of US policy 
backfiring by pushing South Africa to a place where it is forced to defend its sovereignty 
to such a degree that it loses the good grace of the US Congress and the American public 
would be deleterious for all involved, as well as for the international community as a 
whole. By recognising South Africa's sovereignty ahead of a show down, to a greater 
degree than demonstrated over the past four years of the Clinton presidency, US South 
. Africa policy may not appear as successful as before to its domestic audience, but it 
would no doubt be proved more fruitful in the broader purposes of lending to South 
Africa's international integrity. 
7.4 Future Research 
A study such as this produces a number of ideas for research which, if time 
allowed, would no doubt have enhanced the contribution made thus far. However, they 
will rather be posited for future research. 
The application of the Zimmerman Issue-area paradigm might be fruitfully 
repeated in other studies, adding the suggested contextual tests to ensure the proper 
placement of issues throughout the period of study, as well as a weighting system to show 
where domestic factor activity has a greater impact than demonstrated by the number of 
actors involved, for instance. The noted suggestion that issue-area analysis be carried out 
for several periods in a specific foreign policy, and then compared (in the aggregate) for 
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insights into continuities and discontinuities IS another possible expansion on the 
methodology of the foregoing study. 
Another subject for future study, and one which might build on the study at hand, 
would be analysis of other domestic sources of US foreign policy with regard to their 
impact on US South Africa policy in the post-apartheid period. For instance, what role 
has the media had in US South Africa policy between 1994 and 1998? The increased 
access to a wide range of information, often available in real-time coverage, on the part of 
the public via cable news networks, the internet, and expanding world travel has broken 
down many of the stereotypical obstructions to informed foreign policy analysis on the 
part of the wider public. How have these developments affected US policy towards South 
Africa, and towards Africa as a whole? Election politics would form another important 
domestic factor affecting foreign policy. In more than one interview over the course of 
this study, mention was made of the midterm elections in late 1998 and the likelihood of 
the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act being set aside due to legislators' seeking to 
downplay controversy within various constituencies. In fact, it appears that such 
speculation was correct. It is altogether possible that the upcoming US presidential 
elections in the year 2000 will make it similarly difficult to pass the AGOA legislation 
into law during the next congress. What are the implications of such "electioneering" for 
US policy toward South Africa? 
The US-South Africa Binational Commission is an example of only a few such 
commissions, and as such might be fruitfully studied as a generic foreign policy tool, in 
conjunction with the US BNC's with Russia, Egypt, and the Ukraine. Research into the 
value o( these as an example of new foreign policy tools to meet the challenges of the 
1990's would seem warranted. Might the drive to "reinvent government" on the part of 
the Clinton/Gore administration spill over into other innovations, where normal channels 
of authority are overlooked and several new actors on the foreign policy stage report 
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directly to an executive office such as that of the vice-president? What are the 
implications for the pluralist system of policymaking in the US? 
What affect will African-American efforts to build an American constituency for 
Africa have on US South Africa policy over the long-run? Might South Africa be 
excluded from such efforts, as it escapes the marginalisation of the rest of the continent? 
Might new dynamics be introduced into the policymaking process by such close links 
between the elites in government and outside in the African-American community? 
These ideas also constitute a subject worthy of future research. 
Finally, how can the integration of study at various levels of analysis be moved 
forward even further? The example of using issue-area analysis to augment the analysis 
of current systemic factors behind US foreign policy is only one of many approaches that 
might result in more integrated foreign policy analysis. But the proclivity of foreign, 
policy analysts to remain in one "camp" or another remains. Research into the attitudes 
of policymakers about "crossing the bridge" with regard to realist and liberal theoretical 
approaches to policy, as well as international versus comparative policy studies, may 
yield important insights to move this cause forward. 
But then, as the globalisation of the international political economy progresses --
as domestic issues become international, and international issues domestic -- perhaps the 
field of study will progress as well, leaving behind the entrenched, hard divisions between 
realism and liberalism, between foreign policy analysis and comparative studies, and' 
between different issue-areas in the study of a nation's policies, for the greater perspective 
of us all. 
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